The Physical, Logical Space of the Modern Theory of Ideas and its Transformation

洛克和笛卡尔的思想理论是基于物理学提出的新的“事物本身”的概念。因此，贝克莱和康德继承了“理念”或“Vorstellung“的概念，拒绝了它的物理背景，一方面求助于理念或Vorstellungen的物理的、逻辑的空间，另一方面又试图破坏它。本文的主要研究目的在于厘清导致近代“认识论转向“的逻辑，并着眼于洛克之后理念论逻辑的这种破坏性过程。首先，通过与国外一些洛克学者的一系列讨论（尤尔顿，罗格斯大学）我再次确认了我对洛克哲学的重新解释的有效性（这是以《理念与事物》出版的，见Analecta Husserliana，46 [1995]，pp. 3-143）。接下来，我重新考虑了笛卡尔的理念理论与洛克的理念理论具有同样的自然主义的、逻辑的空间这一事实。然后，在这些结果的基础上，我阐明了贝克莱是如何改变“观念”的原始自然主义性质的。“接下来，我拿起洛克的思想时代理论，并试图澄清他的思想理论留下的自然主义，遗传过程的痕迹。然后，为了弄清洛克自然主义的本质特征，我试图对罗蒂对洛克的解释进行批判。"

Locke's and Descartes's theories of ideas were based on the notion of new "things themselves" posited by physics. Therefore, Berkeley and Kant, who, inheriting the notion of "idea" or "Vorstellung, " rejected its physical background, had recourse to the physical, logical space of ideas or Vorstellungen, on the one hand, and at the same time tried to destruct it, on the other. The main purpose of my research consists in clarifying the logic that lead the modern "epistemological turn, " with this destructive process of the logic of the theory of ideas after Locke in mind.First, through a series of discussion with some foreign Locke scholars (esp. John W.Yolton, Rutgers University) I reconfirmed the validity of my reinterpretation of Locke's philosophy (which was published as Idea and Thing, in Analecta Husserliana, 46 [1995], pp. 3-143). Next, I reconsidered the fact that Descartes's theory of ideas had the same naturalistic, logical space as Locke's did. Then, on the basis of these results, I made clear how Berkeley changed the original naturalistic character of "ideas."Next, I took up Locke's theory of ideas age, and tried to clarify what vestiges of its naturalistic, genetic process his theory of ideas left. And then, in order to make clear the essential character of Locke's naturalism, I attempted to criticize Richard Rorty's interpretation of Locke.This research is continued as "A comparative research of Locke's and Berkeley's logical spaces of ideas."