The Irreducibility of Permissions in Legal Reasoning

法律推理中许可的不可还原性

• 批准号: 530955097
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Vitaly Ogleznev, Ph.D.
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Lehrstuhl für Bürgerliches Recht, Zivilprozessrecht und Rechtsphilosophie
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: WBP Position
• 资助国家: 德国
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/530955097?language=en
• 关键词: Irreducibility; Permissions; Legal; Reasoning

Permissive norms have not been very popular among logicians and legal scholars because there is no agreement on the need for a notion of permission distinct from the notion of obligation. Many believe that permissive norms do not have an independent status and could be derived from prohibitions; therefore, they recognize only one type of norm, namely mandatory norms, that is, norms that establish obligations or prohibitions. The tendency to reject permissive norms as unimportant is at least in part rooted in the understanding of norms as prescriptions or instructions to behave in a certain way. The difference between permissive norms and mandatory norms is very clear: A mandatory norm excludes some actions and thus is incompatible with a permissive one. Permissive norms are also, in a broad sense, prescriptive, that is, nondescriptive, although they do not prescribe an action as mandatory norms do. Permissive norms are normatively significant; they contribute to the structure of the legal system by determining the normative status of actions regulated by this system, even though to a significant extent. The present work is a study of the types of permissions and the roles played by permissive norms in a legal system. The project seeks to challenge five major ideas of understanding (and misunderstanding) permissions and permissive norms as the following: a distinction between negative (weak) and positive (strong) permissions; a distinction between explicit, implicit, and tacit permissions; an interdefinability of permission and obligation; a presupposition of an obligation by a permission; and the different ways to negate a permission. Challenging these five ideas along with the proposed objections will provide a novel and more accurate picture of legal significance of permissive norms. This concerns especially what focusing on prohibition and considering of a permission as parasitic upon prohibition leaves the understanding of permission in a less satisfactory state. Permissions cannot be reduced to prohibitions and permissive norms are an important and independent kind of norm in legal systems. Although, among logicians and legal theorists, it is common to define a permission as an absence of prohibition. It is not clear if there is no norm permitting p in system S, how one can know that something is permitted, that is, there is a permission to do p. The disambiguation of permission will allow proving the thesis that permission should not be reducible to merely an absence of prohibition. This can be accomplished by stressing the usefulness of permissive norms in understanding the limits of the spheres of what is permitted and what is prohibited. This idea, in turn, will allow proving the thesis that a permission has its own normative value (for a legal system as well as for individuals) not reducing to prohibition.

允许性规范在逻辑学家和法律学者中一直不是很受欢迎，因为没有人就是否需要一个区别于义务概念的许可概念达成一致。许多人认为，准许性规范不具有独立地位，可以从禁止中派生出来；因此，它们只承认一种规范，即强制性规范，即确定义务或禁止的规范。认为放任规范无关紧要而拒绝接受的倾向，至少部分源于将规范理解为以某种方式行事的处方或指示。允许性规范和强制性规范之间的区别非常明显：强制性规范排除了某些行为，因此与允许性规范不相容。宽限期规范在广义上也是规定性的，即非描述性的，尽管它们不像强制性规范那样规定行动。准许性规范在规范上具有重要意义；它们通过确定受这一制度规范的行动的规范地位，促进法律制度的结构，即使在很大程度上也是如此。本工作是关于许可的类型以及许可规范在法律体系中所起的作用的研究。该项目试图挑战关于理解(和误解)许可和许可规范的五个主要观点：否定(弱)和积极(强)许可之间的区别；显性、隐含和默示许可之间的区别；许可和义务的相互定义；许可义务的预设；以及否定许可的不同方式。对这五种观点以及拟议的反对意见提出质疑，将为许可性规范的法律意义提供一幅新颖而更准确的图景。这尤其涉及关注禁止并将许可视为寄生于禁止之上的问题，这使得对许可的理解处于一种不太令人满意的状态。许可不能归结为禁止，许可规范是法律制度中一种重要的、独立的规范。虽然，在逻辑学家和法律理论家中，将许可定义为没有禁止是很常见的。目前尚不清楚S制度中是否没有允许p的规范，如何知道某事是允许的，即有允许做p。允许的歧义的消解将允许证明允许不应简化为仅仅是没有禁止的论点。这可以通过强调允许性规范在理解什么是允许的和什么是被禁止的范围的范围方面的有用性来实现。反过来，这一想法将允许证明这一论点，即许可具有其自身的规范价值(对于法律系统以及对个人来说)，而不是退化为禁止。