Stock Options at a Combined Corporation

合并公司的股票期权

• 批准号: 13620060
• 负责人: HAYAKAWA Masaru
• 金额: $ 0.83万
• 依托单位: DOSHISHA UNIVERSITY
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2001
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2001 至 2002
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-13620060/
• 关键词: Stock Option; Combined Corporation; New Stock Reservation Right; Subsidiaries; Employees of Subsidiaries; Directors of Subsidiaries; Options; Remuneration of Directors; 新株予約権の有利発行; インセンティブ報酬; 子会社・関連会社の取締役; 結合企業; 連結経営; コーポレート・ガバナンス; コンツィルン

The writer of this research argues that, contrary to majority opinion, under the new system of stock options, directors and employees of subsidiaries are not to be vested with stock options of the parent company. The reasons are as follows :(1) Although the former system limited stock options to directors and employees, the new stock option system replaces this explicit language with "anyone who is not a stockholder." Deletion of the limiting provision was accomplished by strong requests from the economic sphere. The action came to be interpreted in a way that makes it possible to grant stock options to anyone, at the company's discretion. I have concerns about whether such an interpretation is appropriate.(2) Under another new law, the definition of remuneration of directors has been improved to take account of the actual circumstances. According to majority opinion, however, the rules on stock options are provided under an independent system. Under that way of thinking, such rules do … More not affect calculation of remuneration.The former stock option system provided for different rules for company self-owned shares and pre-emptive rights. The current revision organizes and integrates these matters and clarifies the purpose and content of stock options. Stock options are an incentive remuneration that aims to increase the stock price of an issuing company. Because of this purpose, vesting stock options in those who are unrelated to increase in the stock price is not allowed. The scope of those who could be vested with stock options has become seemingly unlimited, but consideration of the institutional framework leads to the conclusion that some limits do, in fact, exist.(3) The revision of commercial law extends to making a change in definitional provisions concerning parent-subsidiary corporations. The change is from a formal standard to a substantial requirement, which is acquisition of a majority of total voting rights. This revision can be evaluated as epoch-making since it reflects real circumstances more than before. There is, however, no change in the status of parent and subsidiary corporations as legally independent. Each has its own organization and makes its own decisions. (It is possible to consider exceptional circumstances when the parent owns 100% of the subsidiary's stock.)Apart from wholly-owned subsidiaries, however, if the parent company issues options of its own stock to directors of a subsidiary, the issuing body is completely different than the actual company to which the director is responsible. It is said that stock options, which aim to contribute to the increase of stock price, target the stock of each independent corporation. Thus, the limitation of those to be vested with stock options is justified from the perspective of legal independence of parent and subsidiary corporations.(4) Moreover, a director at a combined corporation has a duty of loyalty and duty of care as an honest manager towards the company to which he belongs. For instance, when a director of a subsidiary corporation acquires stock issued by a parent corporation for the purpose of stock option, it is usual that parent corporation vests it expecting performance that makes for an increase in stock value. Satisfying such expectations may mean that the director violates his general duty to the subsidiary. Therefore, in theory, a parent corporation's providing stock options in a director of a subsidiary corporation encourages the illegal act of neglect of duty. It is obvious that the legal system could not have had such a purpose.(5) In many cases, directors are in charge of various positions at combined corporation. In such cases, it is necessary to have an approval on conflicts of interests at mutual companies. Vesting stock options is allowed exceptionally only if there is such approval. For approval of a resolution of vesting stock option at the general meeting directors have a duty to disclose the reasons for vesting but my opinion is that in such a case they have to explain the reasons in order to obtain approval over conflict of interests.(6) Merger is said to be the strongest combination of corporations, and comprehensive transfer of property is a legally important effect. Then, in case of stock options under the new system what kind of treatment will be involved with the advantageous issue of new stock reservations? The legal consequence of merger is that the succeeding company succeeds to all the rights and duties of the dissolving company. The new stock reservation right is one kind of obligation, so succeeding companies succeed to duties on new stock reservation rights too. The new stock reservation right holders are protected through filing a petition for creditors' objections when the estimate is extremely low. Less

本研究的作者认为，与大多数人的观点相反，在新的股票期权制度下，子公司的董事和员工不被授予母公司的股票期权。原因如下：(1)虽然旧制度将股票期权限定为董事和员工，但新的股票期权制度将这一明确的语言替换为“任何不是股东的人”。由于经济领域的强烈要求，删去了限制条款。这一行为的解释是，公司可以根据自己的判断，向任何人授予股票期权。我担心这样的解释是否恰当。(2)另一项新法律对董事报酬的定义进行了改进，以考虑实际情况。但是，多数人的意见是，股票期权规则是在一个独立的制度下制定的。按照这种思维方式，这些规则更不会影响薪酬的计算。原股票期权制度对公司自有股和优先购买权有不同的规定。本次修订对这些事项进行了整理和整合，明确了股票期权的目的和内容。股票期权是一种激励报酬，旨在提高发行公司的股票价格。因此，不允许将股票期权授予与股价上涨无关的人。那些可以被授予股票期权的人的范围似乎是无限的，但考虑到制度框架，得出的结论是，一些限制实际上是存在的。(3)商法修订扩大到修改母子公司的定义条款。这个变化是从一个正式的标准到一个实质性的要求，即获得总表决权的多数。此次修订比以前更能反映实际情况，因此被评价为具有划时代意义。但是，母公司和子公司在法律上独立的地位并没有改变。每个机构都有自己的组织，做出自己的决定。（当母公司拥有子公司100%的股份时，可以考虑特殊情况。）但是，除全资子公司外，如果母公司向子公司董事发行本公司股票的期权，则发行主体与该董事实际负责的公司完全不同。据说，以股价上涨为目的的股票期权是针对各独立法人的股票。因此，从母子公司法律独立性的角度出发，对股东行使股票期权的限制是合理的。此外，作为一个诚实的经理，合并公司的董事对他所属的公司负有忠诚义务和注意义务。例如，当子公司的董事以股票期权的目的获得母公司发行的股票时，通常母公司会赋予其预期业绩，使其股票价值增加。满足这些期望可能意味着董事违反了他对子公司的一般义务。因此，从理论上讲，母公司提供子公司董事的股票期权鼓励了子公司董事的违法渎职行为。显然，法律制度不可能有这样的目的。在许多情况下，董事在合并后的公司中兼任多个职位。在这种情况下，有必要对相互公司的利益冲突进行批准。只有在获得批准的情况下，才允许授予股票期权。对于股东大会批准的股票期权授予决议，董事有义务披露授予的原因，但我的观点是，在这种情况下，他们必须解释原因，以便在利益冲突的情况下获得批准。(6)并购被称为最强大的公司组合，财产的全面转移是一种重要的法律效应。那么，如果是新制度下的股票期权，新股预留权的有利发行将涉及到怎样的处理呢？合并的法律后果是后继公司继承解散公司的一切权利和义务。新股保留权是一种义务，继任公司也继承新股保留权义务。新股票保留权持有者在预估极低的情况下，可以通过申请债权人反对的方式得到保护。少

项目成果

早川 勝: "結合企業間におけるストック・オプションの法的規制"同志社法学. 297号(刊行予定). (2004)

Masaru Hayakawa：“合并公司之间股票期权的法律规定”同志社法第 297 号（待出版）。

早川勝: "(翻訳)業務の執行・監督・株式法の現代化"ワールド・ワイド・ビジネス・レビュー. 3巻1号. 140 (2001)

Masaru Hayakawa：“（翻译）商业执行、监督和股票法的现代化”《世界商业评论》第 3 卷第 1. 140 期（2001 年）。

Masaru HAYAKAWA: "Stock Options at a Combined Corporation"Doshisha Law Review. No. 297. (2004)

早川胜：“联合公司的股票期权”同志社法律评论。