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Indirect Tax Competition and Harmonization in Europe

欧洲的间接税竞争与协调

基本信息

批准号：
14402012
负责人：
OHSAWA Yoshiaki
金额：
$ 3.39万
依托单位：
University of Tsukuba
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
财政年份：
2002
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2002 至 2005
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

The purpose of this project is to investigate the actual sales tax competition and harmonization in Europe, which is one of the most important economic problems in Europe. Based on the investigation in European countries such as Principality of Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Austria, we can formulate more realistic and more essential model using Nash game equilibrium. For this, we explicitly take account of mobility, cross-border shoppers, geographical variables such as country sizes and locations, and tax policy of EU (European Union).In this year, in order to focus on the mobility extension in the world, we examine empirically and theoretically how the country size and location affect the tax rates and tax revenues. We visit some European small and interior countries and construct simple Nash equilibrium models. First, we examine the actual tax competition and harmonization in Principality of Liechtenstein which is regarded as tax heaven by OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Second, we survey the international papers on spaceless tax competition models in addition to spatial tax competition models. Third, we model tax competition in two-dimensional space using Voronoi diagrams which is fundamental tool in computational geometry. Also, we develop the model in the network and apply it to Japanese tax competition after introducing decentralization of authority. Finally, we publish partially our result in Japanese book, i.e., Introduction to Optimization in Architecture, edited by Architectural Institute of Japan.

本研究的目的是探讨欧洲最重要的经济问题之一--销售税的竞争与协调。通过对列支敦士登公国、瑞士、奥地利等欧洲国家的考察，我们可以利用纳什博弈均衡来建立更符合实际、更本质的模型。为此，我们明确地考虑了流动性、跨境购物者、国家规模和地理位置等地理变量以及欧盟的税收政策。今年，为了关注世界范围内的流动性扩展，我们从实证和理论上研究了国家规模和地理位置如何影响税率和税收收入。我们访问了一些欧洲小国和内陆国家，并构建了简单的纳什均衡模型。首先，我们考察了被经济合作与发展组织（OECD）视为税收天堂的列支敦士登公国的实际税收竞争与协调。其次，我们综述了国际上关于无空间税收竞争模型和空间税收竞争模型的文献。第三，我们利用计算几何中的基本工具Voronoi图在二维空间中建立税收竞争模型。此外，我们在网络中开发的模型，并将其应用到日本的税收竞争后，引入权力下放。最后，我们在日文书中发表了部分结果，《建筑优化导论》，日本建筑学会编。