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Empirical Examination of Corporate Governance Functions Performed by the Main Bank and the Equity Ownership Structure in Japan

日本主要银行履行的公司治理职能和股权结构的实证检验

基本信息

批准号：
14530132
负责人：
HIRAKI Takato
金额：
$ 1.54万
依托单位：
International University of Japan
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2002
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2002 至 2003
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

1.We estimated Tobin's q for individual companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange by using the financial and equity data from 1985 to 1998. We converted the value of stock holding and land to their market value. Especially, we checked the validity of our estimates by examining the market value of land implied by the land tax in the 1990's.2.Using the same dataset, we empirically examined how the main bank and cross shareholding affected the firm value measured by Tobin's q. The results show that while the main bank relation lowers firm value due to its monopolistic power in the 1980's, its influence becomes neutral in the 1990's, reflecting the main bank's weakened monopolistic power. We also find that while mutual shareholding tends to lower firm value because of management entrenchment, one-way shareholding tends to increase firm value due to increased monitoring of managers.3.We further investigated the relationship between the firm profitability and main bank. Our empirical results show that the main bank relation lowers firm profitability, indicating the existence of hold-up costs. We also find that multiple main bank relationships can reduce the negative effect of the main bank relation on the firm profitability.4.We examined portfolio investment behavior across different types of investors (individuals, foreigners, cross shareholding, and institutional investors). We find that in the 1990's both institutional and corporate investors tend to over-invest in financially weak firms. We interpret this as indicating that they may invest in order to rescue weak keiretsu member firms.

1.利用1985年至1998年的财务数据和股本数据，对东京证券交易所上市公司的托宾q值进行了估计。我们将股票和土地的价值转换为市场价值。特别是，我们通过检验20世纪90年代土地税所隐含的土地市场价值来检验我们估计的有效性。2.使用相同的数据集，我们实证检验了主银行和交叉持股如何影响托宾q.研究结果表明，虽然主银行关系在20世纪80年代由于其垄断力量而降低了企业价值，但在20世纪90年代其影响变得中性，反映了主银行垄断力量的削弱。研究还发现，相互持股会因管理层防御而降低公司价值，而单向持股会因管理层监督的加强而增加公司价值。3.进一步研究了公司盈利能力与主银行的关系。实证结果表明，主银行关系降低了企业的盈利能力，表明存在套牢成本。研究还发现，多主银行关系可以降低主银行关系对公司盈利能力的负面影响。4.我们考察了不同类型投资者（个人、外国人、交叉持股和机构投资者）的组合投资行为。我们发现，在20世纪90年代，机构投资者和公司投资者都倾向于过度投资于财务状况较弱的公司。我们认为，这表明它们可能会投资以拯救疲弱的经连会成员企业。