Comparative Study of Japanese and German Fiscal System for Welfare from Institutional Economics

本研究的目的是考察地方政府财政均等化等财政制度在制度经济学中的作用与预期目标不同的现象。首先，我们详细考察了国家在制度经济学中的作用，发现应该更多地关注德国和奥地利的经济和财政理论，而不是新制度经济学，这两个国家自19世纪以来就有悠久的传统。第二，对日本和德国社会保险和公共援助制度形成的比较研究表明，作为福利服务的主要提供者，地方政府和非营利组织，在德国享受财政和管理自主权，因为有一般补助金。与此形成鲜明对比的是，日本的这些中介组织强烈依赖中央政府的特别拨款。这种差异的关键在于福利中是否存在一种“辅助性原则”。

The purpose of this research was to investigate the phenomenon that some fiscal institutions, e.g. local government fiscal equalization, function in a different way from the purpose planned at first.First, we examined the role of the state in Institutional Economics in detail and found out that more attention should be needed, not on the Neo-Institutional Economics, but on the economic and fiscal theory in Germany and Austria, that has a long tradition from 19th century.Second, a comparative study on the formation of the institutions in social insurance and public assistance of Japan and Germany suggests that local governments and non-profit organizations, the main providers of welfare services, enjoy fiscal and managerial autonomy in Germany because of general grants. In contrast to that, those intermediary organizations in Japan strongly depend on special grants from the central government. It is crucial to this difference whether an idea "The Principle of Subsidiarity" exists in welfare.