Research on Foundation of Dynamic Processes Reaching Consensus from Epistemic Logical Point of View

认知逻辑视角下达成共识的动态过程基础研究

• 批准号: 18540153
• 负责人: MATSUHISA Takashi
• 金额: $ 2.55万
• 依托单位: Ibaraki National College of Technology
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2006 至 2007
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-18540153/
• 关键词: Epistemic logics; Information structure; Nash equilibrium; Core equivalence theorem; Economy under uncertainty; Rational expectations equilibrium; Communication; Protocol; 非分割情報構造

The purposes of this research are to investigate two points:(i) The foundation of the epistemic process reaching consensus, and its application to Game Theory ;(ii) The epistemic foundation of exchange economy under uncertainty with incomplete information, where traders have a multi-modal logic of awareness We obtained the following results :(1) A communication process in the S5-knowledge model is presented which leads to a Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game through robust messages. In the communication, process each player predicts the other players' actions under his/her private information. The players communicate privately their conjectures through message according to the communication graph, where each recipient of the message learns and revises his/her conjecture. The emphasis is on that each player sends not exact information about his/her individual conjecture but robust information about the conjectures to an accuracy In these circumstances we can show that Theorem 1 : The players' predictions about the other players' actions regarding as the future beliefs converge in the long run, and those convergent the beliefs that constitute a Nash equilibrium of the game even when the communication-graph is not acyclic(2) We present an extended notion of economy under uncertainty, called an economy with awareness structure, where each trader makes decision in his/her awareness and belief under incomplete information. We show the no trade theorem' under generalized expectations equilibrium in the extended economy :Theorem 2: In a pure exchange economy under uncertainty, the traders are assumed to have an awareness structure and to have strictly monotone preferences. Then the ex-post core coincides with the set of all expectations equilibrium allocations in awareness for the economy.

本研究的目的是研究两点：（i）达成共识的认知过程的基础及其在博弈论中的应用；（ii）信息不完全的不确定性下交易经济的认知基础，其中交易者具有多模态的意识逻辑我们得到以下结果：（1）提出了S5知识模型中的沟通过程，该过程通过鲁棒性导致策略形式博弈的纳什均衡 消息。在通信过程中，每个玩家根据自己的私人信息预测其他玩家的行为。玩家根据通信图通过消息私下交流他们的猜想，消息的每个接收者都学习并修改他/她的猜想。重点在于，每个参与者发送的不是关于他/她个人猜想的精确信息，而是关于猜想的准确度的可靠信息。 在这些情况下，我们可以证明定理 1：参与者对其他参与者行为的预测在未来信念上是收敛的，并且即使通信图不是无环的，这些收敛的信念也构成了博弈的纳什均衡（2）我们在下提出了经济的扩展概念 不确定性，称为具有意识结构的经济，每个交易者在不完全信息下根据自己的意识和信念做出决策。我们展示了扩展经济中广义预期均衡下的“无交易定理”： 定理 2：在不确定性下的纯交换经济中，假设交易者具有意识结构并具有严格的单调偏好。那么事后核心与经济意识中所有预期均衡分配的集合相一致。

项目成果

Takashi MATSUEISA, Bayesian Communication Leading to Nash Equilibrium Through Robust Messages -p-Belief System Case -

Takashi MATSUEISA，贝叶斯通信通过稳健消息导致纳什均衡 -p-信念系统案例 -

• 发表时间: 2008
• 期刊: KES-AMSTA 2008, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Springer, Volume 4935
• 作者: N.Kato;S.Oharu;K.Shitaoka;蚊戸 宣幸;金子 丈治;龍現寺 基洋;佐藤 幸伸;蚊戸宣幸;N. Kato;N. Kato;N. Kato;蚊戸宣幸;N. Kato;Takashi Matsuhisa and Ryuichro Ishikawa;Takashi MATSUHISA
• 通讯作者: Takashi MATSUHISA

Nash equilibrium as stationary point in communication

纳什均衡作为通信中的驻点

• 发表时间: 2007
• 作者: Takashi Matsuhisa;Ryuichro Ishikawa;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA,;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA
• 通讯作者: Takashi MATSUHISA

MTE 2006 Proceedings, Mathematics, Technology and Education

MTE 2006 论文集，数学、技术和教育

• 发表时间: 2006
• 作者: Takashi MATSUHISA;Hiroshi Koibuchi(Edt);Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA(Edt);T.Matsuhisa
• 通讯作者: T.Matsuhisa

Core Equivalence in Economy under Awareness

意识下经济的核心等价性

• 发表时间: 2006
• 期刊: Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Banach Center Publications, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warszaw 71
• 作者: Takashi Matsuhisa;Ryuichro Ishikawa;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA,;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA
• 通讯作者: Takashi MATSUHISA

Core Equivalence for Economy in Belief II

信仰经济的核心等价物 II

• 发表时间: 2006
• 期刊: International Conference INFORMS, Hong Kong 2006, Abstract
• 作者: Takashi Matsuhisa;Ryuichro Ishikawa;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA,;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi MATSUHISA;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa;Takashi Matsuhisa
• 通讯作者: Takashi Matsuhisa