The Political Appointment System and the Relationship between Politics and Administration in the Civil Service from Comparative Perspective

政治任命的概念在世界各国已有所转移，但从政治与行政的关系看，政治任命是一种必然的认识。本研究界定了美国和法国政治任命的概念，分析了两国法律和实践对政治任命的规定程度。所谓政治任命，其字面意思是指官员的任命仅仅是出于对任命官员的政治忠诚，而没有任何规定。研究发现，这类纯粹的任命在两国都是比较例外的，而且都有相应的机制来规范任命。两者的机制虽有差异，但也有相似之处，即国会的批准、中央人事管理机构的定性和定量调控以及官僚网络的实际调控。政治任命的概念是沿着规则阴影的分层，这一定义暗示了日本公务员制度改革的问题。

The concept of political appointment has been diverted among countries, but it is a surely perceptive to see a relationship between politics and administration. This research defines the concept of political appointment in the United States and France analyzing the extent of the statutory and practical regulations to the appointment. The political appointment literally means that officials are appointed only because of political loyalty to the appointing officer without regulations. In this research, it is revealed that these pure kinds of appointment are rather exception in two countries, and there are the mechanisms to regulate the appointment. The mechanism differs in these two, but there are some similarities in the followings: the approval by the congress, qualitative and quantitative regulation by the central personnel management institution, and practical regulation by bureaucratic network. The concept of political appointment is layered along with the regulation shading, and this definition suggests the issues of the civil service reform in Japan.