Theoretical Analysis on mechanisms of collusion in auctions

拍卖串通机制的理论分析

• 批准号: 21730200
• 负责人: ISHIBASHI Ikuo
• 金额: $ 2.41万
• 依托单位: Osaka University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2009 至 2012
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-21730200/
• 关键词: 経済理論; 経済政策; 産業組織論; 競争政策

We collected data on collusive behaviors in auctions which are found and judged guilty by Japan Fair Trade Commission. Focusing on important items in economic theory and empirical analysis, we constructed a database from the data. We found that collusive mechanisms in the real world are much simpler than we expected. These results are summarized in a paper and it was published in one of the established international academic journal, the Japan and the World Economy.

我们收集了日本公平交易委员会认定并判定有罪的拍卖中的串通行为的数据。围绕经济理论和实证分析中的重要项目，我们从数据中构建了数据库。我们发现，真实的世界中的合谋机制比我们预期的要简单得多。这些结果总结在一篇论文中，并发表在一个既定的国际学术期刊，日本和世界经济。

项目成果

Research and analysis on bid rigging mechanisms

• DOI: 10.1016/j.japwor.2010.07.001
• 发表时间: 2011
• 期刊: Japan and the World Economy
• 影响因子: 1.3
• 作者: Koki Arai;Ikuo Ishibashi;Rieko Ishii-Ishibashi

Should public sectors be complements of private sectors?

公共部门是否应该成为私营部门的补充？

• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00439.x
• 发表时间: 2012
• 期刊: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
• 作者: Ikuo Ishibashi;Noriaki Matsushima
• 通讯作者: Noriaki Matsushima