Theoretical and Empirical Study of the Government's Lending and Its Involvement with Lending Institutions

研究成果归纳为三篇，每一篇都是未发表的手稿。首先，利用经济贸易与工业研究院进行的调查中收集的贷款条件数据以及受访公司贷款人的数据，我们发现，从其主要银行借款的公司只支付比那些不仅向其主要银行借款而且向其他贷款人借款的公司更高的贷款利率。其次，我们发现，银行承担风险是为了增加通过存款保险制度获得的收益，从而存在道德风险，而这种道德风险可以通过适当设计的公共资本注入来缓解。第三，利用亚洲各地银行的数据，我们比较了不同所有制类型的银行，公共银行(国有)、外资银行和国内私人银行，发现公共银行的成本效率最低。

The research results are summarized into three, each of which is now an unpublished manuscript. First, using the data of loan terms collected in the survey conducted by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry as well as the data on respondent firms' lenders, we found that firms that borrow from their main bank only pay higher loan rates than those that borrow not only from their main bank but also from other lenders. Second, we found that banks take risks so as to increase benefits earned through the deposit insurance system so that the moral hazard is present, and this moral hazard can be mitigated by properly designed public capital infusions. Third, using the data of banks from all across Asia, we compared banks of different ownership types, public(state owned), foreign and domestic private and found that public banks were the least cost efficient.