Reconsideration of the currentJapanese cabinet systemfrom the point of view of constitutional history and comparative constitution.

通过与英国和德国内阁制的比较研究，我可以指出以下事实和分析日本内阁制的特点和问题：日本首相在管理内阁方面并不被认为优于其他成员，尽管在组织原则上首相显然处于高于其他国务大臣的地位。关于中央部门，人们经常指出，主要问题是对1946年日本宪法第72条的解释：首相只能建议每个部门，而没有任何内阁决定。然而，在这一点上，首相的权力与英国首相或德国坎茨勒并无不同。导致日本政府严重问题之一的部门部门主义，可能是因为首相(或内阁)既没有部门重组权，也没有高级公务员任命权，而是缺乏具有法律效力的指导权。作为日本宪法的结构性解释，由于在内阁形成中的优越地位，管理内阁的领导权；“部门部门主义”不应以日本宪法原则为基础。因此，有关部门(重新)组织和高级公务员人事权力的规则应该重新考虑，因为这些规则可能会带来“部门部门主义”。

I could point out the following facts and analysis on the characteristics and problemsof Japanese cabinet system as a result of comparative study with British and Germancabinet system.The Japanese Prime Minister has not been considered to be superior to other members in managing the Cabinet, although it is clear that the PM is located insuperior status to other Ministers of State in organization principles. In relation withthe central departments, it has been often pointed out that the main issue is the interpretation of the Article 72 of the Japanese Constitution 1946: the PM can onlysuggest each department without any Cabinet decisions. However, in this point, the PM’s power is not different from the British Prime Minister or German Kanzler. What has caused one of serious problems in the Japanese government, sectionalism ofdepartments, might be that the PM (or the Cabinet) has neither the power ofdepartments reorganisation nor the power of senior civil service appointments, ratherthan lack of the power of direction with legal force.leadership in managing the Cabinet, as the structuralinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution, due to the superior status in shaping the Cabinet; “departments’ sectionalism” shall not be based on the Japanese Constitution principles. Therefore, the rules relating to department (re)organization and personnel power of senior civil service, which might have brought the “departments’ sectionalism” , should be reconsidered.