Bargaining Game Theory of Strategic Coalition Formation and Incomplete Information

本研究的目的是运用讨价还价博弈论中的新方法，在联盟之间存在外部性的情况下，研究联盟形成的战略层面和实现有效结果的条件。此外，我们还考察了不完全信息讨价还价问题的合作对策和非合作对策的解概念，并考虑了机制设计问题。(1)战略联盟形成与非合作讨价还价博弈模型：在配分函数形式博弈中建立了一个非合作讨价还价博弈模型，考察了稳定子博弈完美均衡、纳什讨价还价解与核心之间的关系。我们将其应用于自由贸易协定的问题。(2)不完全信息协商问题的纳什协商解的定义。(3)信息不对称下的机制设计与联盟形成。

The aim of this research is to investigate strategic aspects of coalition formations and conditions to realize the efficient outcome, by applying new methods in bargaining game theory, in the situations where there exist externalities among coalitions. Moreover, we examine the solution concepts of the cooperative and noncooperative games for the bargaining problem with incomplete information and consider the problem of mechanism design. The research consists of the following three topics:(1)Strategic coalition formation and a noncooperative bargaining game model: We present a non-cooperative bargaining game model in the partition function form game and examine the relationships between a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, Nash bargaining solutions and core. We apply it to the problem of free trade agreements. (2)Definition of Nash bargaining solution for the bargaining problem with incomplete information. (3)Mechanism design and coalition formations under asymmetric information.