Economic Analysis of Horizontal Mergers in an International Oligopolisitic Market

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We analyzed horizontal mergers in domestic and international oligopolistic markets. First, we conducted the analysis on domestic mergers among firms which are located in the same countries, which becomes the basis on the theoretical analysis of international mergers among firms which are located in different countries. In the analysis of the domestic mergers, we focused on the influences of wage bargaining within each firm on the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. In the analysis of international mergers, we attempted to clarify the relationship between the market structure in equilibrium and the most preferred structure with respect to each country's social welfare and/or total social welfare, when all existing firms can freely merge with each other in an international oligopoly.