Land Tenure Through Electoral Outcome, Is It Efficient? A Study of Bengkok Land in Java, Indonesia.

我们决定全面考虑农业合同的设计，包括固定租金和分成制安排。这使我们能够回答一个同样有趣的问题：“面对有限的土地保有权，首选的耕作模式是什么？”这个研究问题也与关于分成制与固定租金合同的相对效率的争论有关。在研究中有固定租金的安排，使研究设计丰富，使我们能够回答以下研究问题：1）什么是与有限的任期契约理论的影响？2)在分成和出租的土地之间生产力不同吗？3)合同类型是否因选举周期的不同而不同？ 4)认知技能影响合同类型吗？我们的主要目标是分析数据，以找出（A）固定租金合同如何与有限使用权联系在一起，（B）佃农合同如何与有限使用权联系在一起，以及（C）固定租金和佃农之间的相互作用如何随着有限使用权而演变。主要数据样本包括合同方面：910份合同（N=130个村庄×7份合同）和家庭方面：1，820户（N=130个村庄×14户）。我们对每个地块的地主和农民特征进行了汇总统计（农民提供了具有不同属性的两个地块的详细信息）。然后我们比较了a）曼谷/非曼谷B）租户/农民所有c）分成制/固定租金。

We decided to consider a holistic picture of farming contract design, including both fixed-rent and sharecropping arrangements. This enabled us to answer an equally interesting question: “what the preferred mode of farming is facing limited tenure?” This research question was also related to the debate on relative efficiency in sharecropping versus fixed rent contracts. Having fixed-rent arrangements in the study made the research design rich and enabled us to answer the following research questions: 1)What are the implications on contract theory with the limited tenure? 2)Are productivities different between sharecropped and tenanted plots? 3)Does contract type vary depending on periods in the election cycle? 4)Does cognitive skill affect contract type?Our primary goal has been to analyze the data to find out (A) how fixed-rent contracts are linked to limited-tenure, and (B) how sharecropping contracts are linked to limited-tenure and (C) how the interplay between fixed-rent and sharecropping evolves with limited-tenure, among others. The main data sample consists of Contract-wise: 910 contracts (N=130 villages ×7 contract pairs) and Household-wise: 1,820 households (N=130 villages ×14 households). We derived summary statistics on landlord and farmers characteristics for each plot (Farmers provide detailed information of two plots with different attributes). And then we compared these findings across 　a) Bengkok/Non-Bengkok b)tenant/farmer-owned c)sharecropping/fixed rent.