Intellectualism in U.S. Diplomacy

历史学家和记者，如理查德·霍夫施塔特和苏珊·雅各比，都谴责了美国社会、文化和政治中“反智慧主义”的现实。然而，从阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉(Alfred Thayer Mahan)到保罗·沃尔福威茨(Paul Wolfowitz)，知识分子在塑造美国外交方面发挥了至关重要但未得到充分重视的作用。这本名为《世界创造者：美国外交中的智慧主义》的专著探讨了为什么美国政府如此容易受到学术界、智囊团和自由职业知识分子的影响的各种原因，并考察了八位撰写了有影响力的地缘政治学说的知识分子的职业生涯：阿尔弗雷德·马汉、伍德罗·威尔逊、查尔斯·比尔德、沃尔特·李普曼、乔治·凯南、保罗·尼采、亨利·基辛格和保罗·沃尔福威茨。这本书的导言首先讨论了‘知识分子’的不同定义方式，并提出了允许我们识别外交政策知识分子的标准。其次，它考察了从1890年到现在，让知识分子--广义的知识分子--影响美国外交的历史条件；重点关注美国大学在19世纪的激增，利用该学院的开创性尝试，如罗伯特·拉·福莱特的《威斯康星思想》，受德国研究型大学成就启发的美国高等教育专业化，以及在进步时代、两次世界大战、冷战及以后时期学术界、智囊团和政府之间建立的牢固联系。第三，将美国欢迎知识分子参与政策制定的经验与英国、法国、俄罗斯和中国的经验进行了比较-这四个国家在近代史上表现出了与美国不相上下的全球雄心。这本书的核心是关于上述个人的八个章节。这些章节不是离散的传记研究，而是为了探索一代又一代知识分子在某种程度上对他们的前辈提出的思想做出的反应。伍德罗·威尔逊的道德主义国际主义在一定程度上被认为是对阿尔弗雷德·马汉对国家利益的精明计算的回应。查尔斯·比尔德的孤立主义抨击了威尔逊的国际联盟天真的绝望，并辩称，东北沿海的精英亲英派忽视了美国穷人的困境。务实的沃尔特·李普曼反对威尔逊对国际事务的盲目乐观，反对比尔德的狭隘和缺乏远见。后来，保罗·沃尔福威茨等新保守派人士嘲笑亨利·基辛格的非道德现实主义，以及他对美国传统价值观缺乏亲和力。这些章节以美国最新的档案研究为基础，包括乔治·凯南最近在普林斯顿西利-穆德图书馆发布的日记中的一些精彩材料，旨在衡量这些知识分子施加的影响。但更广泛的目的是就三种外交政策学说--现实主义、孤立主义和自由国际主义的变体--展开一场盛大辩论，这三种学说一直在争夺美国政府最高层的主导地位。这本书的倒数第二章考察了奥巴马政府目前聘用的知识分子施加的影响--安妮-玛丽·斯劳特、萨曼莎·鲍尔、詹姆斯·斯坦伯格和苏珊·E·赖斯，仅举四例--最后讨论了对美国外交政策制定做出最有用贡献的知识分子类型--政治历史学家的政治学家；多面手或专家；以及以赛亚·柏林所说的狐狸或刺猬。这本书的核心目的是找出在制定美国外交政策时最有效地结合在一起的智力属性。它警告说，外交政策的制定需要认知灵活性，而学术界往往无法用理论来证明这一点。

Historians and journalists such as Richard Hofstadter and Susan Jacoby have decried the reality of 'anti-intellectualism' in American society, culture, and politics. Yet intellectuals have played a vital and underappreciated role in shaping US diplomacy - from Alfred Thayer Mahan to Paul Wolfowitz. This monograph, titled World Makers: Intellectualism in American Diplomacy, explores the varied reasons why US government has proved so amenable to input from academia, think-tanks, and freelance intellectuals and examines the careers of eight intellectuals who authored influential geopolitical doctrines: Alfred Mahan, Woodrow Wilson, Charles Beard, Walter Lippmann, George Kennan, Paul Nitze, Henry Kissinger and Paul Wolfowitz. The introduction to the book first discusses the varying ways in which the 'intellectual' has been defined, and proposes criteria that allow us to identify a foreign policy intellectual. It secondly examines the historical circumstances that have allowed intellectuals - broadly conceived - to influence US diplomacy from 1890 to the present; focusing on the proliferation of US colleges through the nineteenth century, pioneering attempts to utilise the academy such as Robert La Follette's 'Wisconsin Idea,' the professionalization of US higher education inspired by the achievements of Germany's research universities, and the strong links forged between academia, think-tanks and government through the progressive era, two world wars, and into the Cold War and beyond. It thirdly compares the US experience of welcoming intellectuals into policymaking with that of the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China - the four nations that have displayed a global ambition comparable to the United States in recent history. The core of the book constitutes eight chapters on the individuals named above. These chapters are not discrete biographical studies, but are designed to probe the way in which successive generations of intellectuals reacted, to some degree, to the ideas presented by their predecessors. Woodrow Wilson's moralistic internationalism was conceived partly as a response to Alfred Mahan's hard-headed calculation of national interest. Charles Beard's isolationism railed against the naïve hopelessness of Wilson's League of Nations and argued that the plight of poor Americans was being ignored by the elitist Anglophiles of the north-eastern seaboard. The pragmatic Walter Lippmann reacted against Wilson's Panglossian vision for international affairs and Beard's insularity and lack of foresight. In later years, neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz pilloried Henry Kissinger for his amoral realism and his lack of affinity for traditional American values. These chapters, based on fresh archival research in the United States - including some wonderful material from George Kennan's recently released diaries at the Seeley-Mudd library in Princeton - are designed to gauge the influence exerted by these intellectuals. But the wider purpose is to set out a grand debate on the three foreign policy doctrines - realism, isolationism, and variants on liberal internationalism - that have vied for dominance at the apex of US government. The book's penultimate chapter examines the influence exerted by the intellectuals currently employed by the Obama administration - Anne-Marie Slaughter, Samantha Power, James Steinberg, and Susan E. Rice, to name but four - and concludes with a discussion of the intellectual types - the political scientist of political historian; the generalist or specialist; the fox or the hedgehog, as Isaiah Berlin would have it - that have contributed most usefully to US foreign policy-making. The book's core purpose is to identify the intellectual attributes that combine most efficaciously in the making of US foreign policy. It cautions that the making of foreign policy requires a cognitive flexibility that too often eludes academics with theories to prove.