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Making Good Decisions: Theory, Reflection, and Practice in Ethics

做出正确的决策：伦理学的理论、反思和实践

基本信息

批准号：
AH/I020993/1
负责人：
Sophie Grace Chappell
金额：
$ 5.21万
依托单位：
The Open University
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Fellowship
财政年份：
2011
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2011 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FI020993%2F1
关键词：
Making Good Decisions Theory Reflection

项目摘要

Making Good Decisions: Summary of Proposed ResearchWhat makes a good decision? Intuitively this is a very obvious question. And its practical importance is obvious. We need to know how to make good decisions in politics, in medicine, in business, in career choice, about whether to go to war or not, about the environment, about where to cut or increase spending, about whom to marry (if anyone) and how else to live our personal lives, and in all sorts of other ways too. So if there is a simple answer to the question 'What makes a good decision?', we need to hear it. And if there isn't a simple answer to the question-either because there are different simple answers for different areas, or because there is no simple answer-we need to hear that too. The question is also one that ethicists might be expected to focus on. Ethics is a practical study, with wide-ranging applications in human action. 'If philosophical ethics can't tell us how to make good decisions,' someone might rhetorically inquire, 'what can it tell us?'Such an inquirer might be surprised by the marginality in most academic ethics of the question 'What makes a good decision?'. Not that ethicists have nothing to say about it; but they don't usually focus on it. This seems a missed opportunity, and in the research proposed I aim to put this right. I propose to take 'What makes a good decision?' as my focal question. To do so is to look at ethics from an unusual angle, and I believe a revealing one, which can be of interest not only to professional philosophers but also to decision-makers in, e.g., medical, business, environmental, and political contexts. When we think about the question 'What makes a good decision?', we find ourselves facing two opposite alternatives. One is to take a systematic view of ethics: to think that good decision-making is so central to life that there simply has to be a formula for making good decisions, otherwise we will be completely lost in life. The other is to take an anti-systematic view of ethics: to think that there cannot possibly be a formula for making good decisions, because life is too complicated and circumstances are too various. So, it is a waste of time to try and find one. In my book I shall explore both possibilities. My own approach is to take an anti-systematic view of ethics, which I shall develop on the basis of a historical survey running from Plato, via Aristotle, Jesus, Kant, and Mill, to the present day. The upshot of my overall argument will be that we can't expect any simple formula to tell us how to make good decisions in any way which can hope to be quite generally applicable. In particular, we can't expect the kind of simple formulas that modern numerical systems like 'decision theory', or systematic moral theories like utilitarianism, Kantianism, and (some forms of) virtue ethics, try to offer us. The result is one foreseen very clearly in Plato's Republic. It is that, to answer the question 'What makes a good decision?' adequately, we need to go a surprisingly long way round-all the way round to a theory of internal transformation, in fact. Instead of looking for a simple all-purpose rule to govern our decision-making, we need to look to ourselves, and in particular to our own capacity for good judgement. For even if a simple all-purpose rule for making good decisions were available-and none is, nor ever looks likely to be-its application would still depend on good judgement about how and when and where to apply it. This good judgement cannot itself, on pain of regress, be taught by any rule. As stressed by Aristotle and Plato-and in a different way, by the ethics of the New Testament-it simply has to be internalised from the right sort of moral education, the right sort of reflection on and contemplative engagement with whatever is truly of value.

做出好的决定：建议的研究摘要什么是好的决定？直觉上这是一个非常明显的问题。其实际意义是显而易见的。我们需要知道如何在政治、医学、商业、职业选择、是否参加战争、环境、削减或增加开支、与谁结婚（如果有的话）以及如何过我们的个人生活等方面做出正确的决定。因此，如果有一个简单的答案，以问题'什么使一个好的决定？如果这个问题没有一个简单的答案--或者是因为不同的领域有不同的简单答案，或者是因为没有简单的答案--我们也需要听到这个答案。这个问题也是伦理学家应该关注的一个问题，伦理学是一门实践性的研究，在人类行为中有着广泛的应用。“如果哲学伦理学不能告诉我们如何做出好的决定，”有人可能会问，“它能告诉我们什么？”这样一个询问者可能会对大多数学术伦理中的边缘化问题感到惊讶：“什么是好的决定？”'.这并不是说伦理学家对此无话可说，而是他们通常不会关注这一点，这似乎是一个错失的机会，在我提出的研究中，我的目标是纠正这一点。我建议采取“什么是好的决定？作为我的焦点问题这样做是从一个不寻常的角度来看待伦理学，我相信这是一个启示性的角度，这不仅对专业哲学家感兴趣，而且对决策者也感兴趣，例如，医疗、商业、环境和政治背景。当我们思考“什么是好的决定？”“，我们发现自己面临着两个相反的选择。一种是对伦理学采取系统的观点：认为好的决策对生活如此重要，以至于必须有一个做出好决策的公式，否则我们将完全迷失在生活中。另一种是对伦理学采取反系统的观点：认为不可能有一个做出好决定的公式，因为生活太复杂，环境太多样化。所以，试图找到一个是浪费时间。在本书中，我将探讨这两种可能性。我自己的方法是对伦理学采取一种反系统的观点，我将在从柏拉图到亚里士多德、耶稣、康德和密尔直到今天的历史考察的基础上发展这种观点。我的全部论点的结论是，我们不能指望任何简单的公式来告诉我们如何以任何方式做出好的决定，这可能是非常普遍适用的。特别是，我们不能指望现代数字系统（如“决策论”）或系统的道德理论（如功利主义、康德主义和（某些形式的）美德伦理学）试图提供给我们的那种简单公式。柏拉图在《理想国》中清楚地预见到了这一结果。这是，回答这个问题'什么使一个好的决定？“我们需要走一条令人惊讶的长路，事实上，一直走到内部转化理论。我们不应寻找一个简单的通用规则来指导我们的决策，而应审视我们自己，特别是我们自己作出良好判断的能力。因为即使有一个简单的、通用的、能做出正确决策的规则--现在没有，而且看起来也不可能有--它的应用仍然取决于如何、何时、何地应用它的良好判断，而这种良好判断本身是不能通过任何规则来传授的，否则就会倒退。正如亚里士多德和柏拉图所强调的，以及《新约》伦理学以不同的方式所强调的那样，它只需要从正确的道德教育中内化，对真正有价值的东西进行正确的反思和批判性的参与。