Impassioned Belief: Developing and Defending a New Form of Meta-Normative Expressivism

每当一个人思考他或她应该做什么，做什么是理性的，他或她最有理由做什么，做什么是好的，或者他或她必须做什么，其中这些问题是为了解决他或她应该做什么的问题，一个人就进入了哲学家所说的“规范思维”。这样的思想在人类生活中无处不在，确实是人类本性的一个基本方面，它将我们与更简单的生物区分开来。在某种松散或虚弱的意义上，猫可能会刻意去做什么，但肯定不会为折磨猎物的道德问题而苦恼。然而，反思起来，规范思想在哲学上是令人费解的，因为它是熟悉和普遍的。正是这种熟悉与哲学困惑的并列，使得对规范思想和话语的本质的思考如此引人入胜。规范的思想和话语之所以令人困惑，部分原因是它看起来更像是Janus面孔。一方面，规范性判断被归类为对或错，出现在看似合理的推理中，甚至被认为提供了一个可能的知识对象。在所有这些方面，规范性判断似乎都是普通的信念。另一方面，规范判断可以直接指导行动，我们怀疑说某种形式的行为是(例如)的人的诚意。道德上是错误的，但对从事这种行为并不感到内疚，我们倾向于认为，那些真的认为自己应该做某事但选择不做的人是非理性的。在所有这些方面，规范性判断似乎更像是欲望、情感或意图，而不是信仰。鉴于强有力的哲学论据，即信仰和欲望是大卫·休谟著名的“截然不同的存在”，这种道德判断的雅努斯面孔在哲学上令人深感困惑。因为如果信仰只是对事实的惰性表述，除了事实什么都没有，那么很难看出作为信仰的规范性判断本身如何能够起到激励作用。然而，如果规范性判断只是欲望，那么很难理解规范性判断如何能够具有它明显具有的信仰类特征。回答这些棘手问题的传统尝试倾向于强调情感而忽视理性(例如，在大卫·休谟的作品中和那些受到他的方法启发的人)，或者强调理性和认知而排斥情感(例如在柏拉图和康德的作品中以及那些受到他们作品启发的人)。自20世纪初以来，这场旷日持久的争论以元伦理学中自封的“表现主义者”和“认知论者”之间的争论的形式展开。认知主义者试图展示信仰如何发挥与欲望更自然地联系在一起的激励作用，而表现主义者试图用欲望来模拟类似信仰的特征。不足为奇的是，这些努力可能看起来像是在圆孔里装上一个方形的钉子。正是在这里，我的项目提供了打破当代元伦理学和更广泛的元规范理论核心的僵局的希望。在我看来，道德和其他规范性句子既表达了信念，也表达了欲望，道德和其他规范性判断是由信仰和欲望构成的。这种方法承诺在不付出任何代价的情况下，综合了感情主义和理性主义的最佳传统。在发展这一理论的过程中，我将它与文献中其他最近的“混合”理论进行了比较，并论证了它的优越性。本文还探讨了它对理性的语境敏感性、原则在道德思考和判断中的作用以及价值和理性之间的逻辑关系等问题的启示。我还将该理论嵌入到一个更广泛的语义框架中，以避免其他语义理论所假定的猖獗和令人难以置信的歧义。这为诸如“应该”这样的术语的具体规范用法如何定位提供了一个新的视角。

Whenever one ponders what he or she ought to do, what would be rational to do, what he or she has most reason to do, what it would be good to do, or what he or she must do, where these questions are meant to settle the question of what he or she shall do, one is engaged in what philosophers call 'normative thought.' Such thoughts are ubiquitous in human life, and indeed are a fundamental aspect of human nature which distinguishes us from simpler creatures. A cat may in some loose or weak sense deliberate about what to do, but certainly is not capable of agonizing about the morality of tormenting its prey. On reflection normative thought is, though, as philosophically puzzling as it is familiar and ubiquitous. It is this juxtaposition of the familiar with the philosophically puzzling that makes reflection on the nature of normative thought and discourse so fascinating.Normative thought and discourse is puzzling in part because it seems rather Janus-faced. On the one hand, normative judgment is classified as true or false, figures in seemingly rational inferences, and is even thought to provide a possible object of knowledge. In all of these ways, normative judgments seem like ordinary beliefs. On the other hand, normative judgment can directly guide action, we doubt the sincerity of someone who says some form of behaviour is (e.g.) morally wrong but shows no compunction about engaging in that behaviour, and we tend to think that someone who really does believe they ought to do something but choose not to do it is irrational. In all of these ways, normative judgment seems more like desire, sentiment or intention rather than belief. Given powerful philosophical arguments that beliefs and desires are what David Hume famously called 'distinct existences', this Janus-faced aspect of moral judgment is deeply philosophically puzzling. For if beliefs are just inert representations of the facts, and nothing but the facts, then it is hard to see how normative judgment qua belief could be motivating in and of itself. If, however, normative judgments are just desires then it is hard to see how normative judgment could have the belief-like features which it manifestly does have.Traditional attempts to answer these thorny questions tend to emphasize sentiment to the exclusion of reason (e.g., in the work of David Hume and those inspired by his approach) or reason and cognition to the exclusion of sentiment (e.g. in the work of Plato and Kant and those inspired by their work). Since the dawn of the 20th century this long-standing debate has taken the form of a debate between self-styled 'expressivists' and 'cognitivists' in metaethics. Cognitivists try to show how beliefs can play the motivational role more naturally associated with desire, while expressivists try to model belief-like features with desires. Not surprisingly, these efforts can seem like attempts to fit a square peg in a round hole. It is here that my project offers the promise of breaking through this impasse at the heart of contemporary metaethics and meta-normative theory more generally. On my account, moral and other normative sentences express both beliefs and desires, and moral and other normative judgments are constituted by both beliefs and desires. This approach promises to synthesize the best of both the sentimentalist and rationalist traditions without the costs of either.In developing this theroy, I contrast it with other recent 'hybrid' theories in the literature and argue for its superiority. I also explore its implications for such issues as the context-sensitivity of reasons, the role of principles in moral thought and judgment, and the logical relationships between values and reasons. I also embed the theory in a broader semantic framework which avoids the rampant and implausible ambiguities posited by other semantic theories. Thisprovides a novel perspective on how specifically normative uses of terms like 'ought' are located.