Impassioned Belief: Developing and Defending a New Form of Meta-Normative Expressivism

热情的信仰：发展和捍卫一种新形式的元规范表现主义

• 批准号: AH/I022965/1
• 负责人: Michael Ridge
• 金额: $ 10.44万
• 依托单位: University of Edinburgh
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Fellowship
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2011 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FI022965%2F1
• 关键词: Impassioned; Belief; Developing; Defending; New

Whenever one ponders what he or she ought to do, what would be rational to do, what he or she has most reason to do, what it would be good to do, or what he or she must do, where these questions are meant to settle the question of what he or she shall do, one is engaged in what philosophers call 'normative thought.' Such thoughts are ubiquitous in human life, and indeed are a fundamental aspect of human nature which distinguishes us from simpler creatures. A cat may in some loose or weak sense deliberate about what to do, but certainly is not capable of agonizing about the morality of tormenting its prey. On reflection normative thought is, though, as philosophically puzzling as it is familiar and ubiquitous. It is this juxtaposition of the familiar with the philosophically puzzling that makes reflection on the nature of normative thought and discourse so fascinating.Normative thought and discourse is puzzling in part because it seems rather Janus-faced. On the one hand, normative judgment is classified as true or false, figures in seemingly rational inferences, and is even thought to provide a possible object of knowledge. In all of these ways, normative judgments seem like ordinary beliefs. On the other hand, normative judgment can directly guide action, we doubt the sincerity of someone who says some form of behaviour is (e.g.) morally wrong but shows no compunction about engaging in that behaviour, and we tend to think that someone who really does believe they ought to do something but choose not to do it is irrational. In all of these ways, normative judgment seems more like desire, sentiment or intention rather than belief. Given powerful philosophical arguments that beliefs and desires are what David Hume famously called 'distinct existences', this Janus-faced aspect of moral judgment is deeply philosophically puzzling. For if beliefs are just inert representations of the facts, and nothing but the facts, then it is hard to see how normative judgment qua belief could be motivating in and of itself. If, however, normative judgments are just desires then it is hard to see how normative judgment could have the belief-like features which it manifestly does have.Traditional attempts to answer these thorny questions tend to emphasize sentiment to the exclusion of reason (e.g., in the work of David Hume and those inspired by his approach) or reason and cognition to the exclusion of sentiment (e.g. in the work of Plato and Kant and those inspired by their work). Since the dawn of the 20th century this long-standing debate has taken the form of a debate between self-styled 'expressivists' and 'cognitivists' in metaethics. Cognitivists try to show how beliefs can play the motivational role more naturally associated with desire, while expressivists try to model belief-like features with desires. Not surprisingly, these efforts can seem like attempts to fit a square peg in a round hole. It is here that my project offers the promise of breaking through this impasse at the heart of contemporary metaethics and meta-normative theory more generally. On my account, moral and other normative sentences express both beliefs and desires, and moral and other normative judgments are constituted by both beliefs and desires. This approach promises to synthesize the best of both the sentimentalist and rationalist traditions without the costs of either.In developing this theroy, I contrast it with other recent 'hybrid' theories in the literature and argue for its superiority. I also explore its implications for such issues as the context-sensitivity of reasons, the role of principles in moral thought and judgment, and the logical relationships between values and reasons. I also embed the theory in a broader semantic framework which avoids the rampant and implausible ambiguities posited by other semantic theories. Thisprovides a novel perspective on how specifically normative uses of terms like 'ought' are located.

每当一个人思考他或她应该做什么，做什么是合理的，他或她最有理由做什么，做什么是好的，或者他或她必须做什么，当这些问题旨在解决他或她应该做什么的问题时，一个人正在从事哲学家所说的“规范思维”。这种想法在人类生活中无处不在，确实是人性的一个基本方面，使我们区别于简单的生物。一只猫可能在某种松散或微弱的意义上考虑该做什么，但肯定没有能力为折磨猎物的道德感到痛苦。然而，反思一下，规范性思维既熟悉又无处不在，却又令人费解。正是这种熟悉的事物与令人困惑的事物的并列，使得对规范性思维和话语的本质的反思如此引人入胜，规范性思维和话语之所以令人困惑，部分原因在于它看起来相当两面派。一方面，规范性判断被划分为真或假，出现在看似理性的推论中，甚至被认为提供了一个可能的知识对象。在所有这些方面，规范性判断看起来像是普通的信念。另一方面，规范性判断可以直接指导行动，我们怀疑某人说某种形式的行为是（例如）道德上是错误的，但对从事这种行为却没有表现出任何内疚，我们倾向于认为，那些真的相信他们应该做某事但选择不做的人是非理性的。在所有这些方面，规范性判断似乎更像是欲望、情感或意图，而不是信仰。考虑到大卫休谟（David Hume）所谓的“不同的存在”（distinct existence）这一强有力的哲学论证，道德判断的这种两面神的面貌在哲学上令人深感困惑。因为如果信念只是事实的惰性表征，除了事实之外别无他物，那么就很难看出作为信念的规范性判断本身是如何激励的。然而，如果规范性判断仅仅是欲望，那么就很难看出规范性判断如何具有它显然确实具有的类似信仰的特征。回答这些棘手问题的传统尝试倾向于强调情感而排除理性（例如，在大卫休谟的作品和那些受他的方法启发的人）或理性和认知排除情感（例如在柏拉图和康德的作品和那些受他们的作品启发的人）。自20世纪世纪以来，这一长期存在的争论就以元伦理学中自封的“表现主义者”和“认知主义者”之间的争论为形式。认知主义者试图展示信念如何更自然地发挥与欲望相关的动机作用，而表达主义者则试图用欲望来模拟类似信念的特征。毫不奇怪，这些努力看起来就像是试图把方钉装进圆孔里。正是在这里，我的项目提供了突破这一僵局的承诺，在当代元伦理学和元规范理论的核心更普遍。在我看来，道德和其他规范性句子表达的是信念和欲望，而道德和其他规范性判断是由信念和欲望构成的。这种方法有望综合最好的感伤主义和理性主义的传统，而没有任何costs.In发展这一理论，我对比它与其他最近的“混合”理论在文学和论证其优越性。我还探讨了它的影响，如上下文敏感性的原因，道德思想和判断的原则的作用，价值观和原因之间的逻辑关系等问题。我还嵌入了一个更广泛的语义框架，避免了其他语义理论所提出的猖獗和难以置信的歧义理论。这提供了一个新的视角如何具体规范使用的术语，如'应该'的位置。

项目成果

Impassioned Belief

热情的信念

• 发表时间: 2014
• 作者: Ridge