Extended Knowledge

扩展知识

• 批准号: AH/J011908/1
• 负责人: Duncan Pritchard
• 金额: $ 51.53万
• 依托单位: University of Edinburgh
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2013
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2013 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FJ011908%2F1
• 关键词: Extended; Knowledge

A great deal of our acquisition of knowledge is dependent upon the assistance of 'external' factors. For example, it can depend on the use of technology (e.g. your iPhone), or on one's social environment (e.g. when one trusts the word of an expert). Nevertheless, it might be held that knowledge is essentially an 'internal' matter. That is, that while one might make use of external resources when acquiring knowledge, such as instruments (the iPhone) or informants (the expert), whether or not one knows is ultimately just down to the individual and their own 'internal' cognitive resources. It is, after all, the individual who is successfully making use of the instrument, and the individual who makes the decision to rely on the information provided by the expert. While such an 'internalist' account of knowledge has for a long time been central to the theory of knowledge, it has come under pressure in recent years, with the pressure coming from several different quarters. Epistemic externalism holds that factors about which one is completely unaware can have a significant bearing on whether one has knowledge. For example, some epistemic externalists have argued that when one acquires knowledge the belief-forming process used (e.g. one's eyesight) must be in fact reliable, whether or not one is aware that this process is reliable. Content externalism holds that environmental factors can have a bearing on the content of one's mental states (i.e., what those mental states are about). For example, some content externalists have argued that whether one's thoughts are about a particular substance in the world, such as water, can depend on facts about the chemical composition of the substance in question. Consequently, on this view whether one has knowledge that a particular substance is water can depend on facts about one's environment. Extended cognition holds that factors which are outside of one's skin can in certain conditions be genuine constituents of one's cognitive processes. So, for example, if an agent and an instrument are related in the right way, then they can potentially form a 'cognitive whole'. Applied to knowledge, extended cognition holds that, say, one's iPhone can in principle be more than just an 'external' instrumental for acquiring knowledge, for it can be a constitutive part of the very cognitive process by which knowledge is acquired.Distributed cognition holds that in certain conditions--such as in the context of a highly collaborative scientific inquiry--we should think of cognition not at the level of the individual but rather at the level of the group. Applied to knowledge, distributed cognition entails that in certain cases we should collectively ascribe knowledge to a group of agents rather than to the individuals who make up this group.All four proposals present a challenge to the 'internalist' conception of knowledge set out above, since in their different ways they undermine the idea that the acquisition of knowledge is primarily due to the 'internal' cognitive resources of the agent concerned. The purpose of this project is to produce, for the very first time, a systematic exploration of these four different ways in which knowledge can be 'externalised'. On the basis of this systematic exploration we will then offer a detailed investigation of two specific ways in which knowledge can be 'extended' that are of particular significance to contemporary cognitive science: extended cognition and distributed cognition.The project will draw together an international body of researchers, both early career and established. It will result in a world-class body of research output which will transform the contemporary research agenda in epistemology and philosophy of cognitive science. It will also engage with the public and with non-academic partners, through public lectures, an 'impact' workshop, and via a dedicated project webpage and blog.

我们对知识的获取在很大程度上依赖于“外部”因素的帮助。例如，它可以取决于技术的使用（例如你的iPhone），或者取决于一个人的社会环境（例如当一个人相信专家的话）。然而，我们可以认为，知识本质上是一种“内在的”事物。也就是说，虽然一个人在获取知识时可能会利用外部资源，比如工具（iPhone）或线人（专家），但一个人是否知道最终取决于个人和他们自己的“内部”认知资源。毕竟，成功地使用该工具的是个人，而决定依赖专家提供的信息的是个人。虽然这种对知识的“内部主义”解释长期以来一直是知识理论的核心，但近年来它受到了来自几个不同方面的压力。认识论的外在主义认为，一个人完全不知道的因素可以对一个人是否拥有知识产生重大影响。例如，一些认识论的外在主义者认为，当一个人获得知识时，所使用的信念形成过程（例如，一个人的视力）实际上必须是可靠的，无论一个人是否意识到这个过程是可靠的。内容外在主义认为，环境因素可以影响一个人心理状态的内容（即，这些心理状态是关于什么的）。例如，一些内容外显主义者认为，一个人的思想是否与世界上的某种特定物质有关，比如水，可以取决于有关该物质的化学成分的事实。因此，根据这种观点，一个人是否知道一种特定的物质是水取决于他所处的环境。延伸认知认为，人的皮肤之外的因素在某些条件下可以成为人的认知过程的真正组成部分。例如，如果一个代理和一个工具以正确的方式联系在一起，那么它们就有可能形成一个“认知整体”。应用于知识，扩展认知认为，比如说，一个人的iPhone原则上可以不仅仅是获取知识的“外部”工具，因为它可以是获得知识的认知过程的组成部分。分布式认知认为，在某些条件下——比如在高度协作的科学探究的背景下——我们不应该在个人层面上思考认知，而应该在群体层面上思考认知。应用于知识，分布式认知意味着，在某些情况下，我们应该把知识集体归于一组代理，而不是组成这个群体的个人。所有这四种建议都对上述“内部主义”的知识概念提出了挑战，因为它们以不同的方式破坏了知识的获取主要是由于相关主体的“内部”认知资源的观点。这个项目的目的是首次对知识可以“外化”的这四种不同方式进行系统的探索。在此系统探索的基础上，我们将详细研究知识可以“扩展”的两种具体方式，这两种方式对当代认知科学具有特殊意义：扩展认知和分布式认知。该项目将汇集一个国际研究机构，包括职业生涯早期和成熟的研究人员。它将产生世界级的研究成果，这将改变当代认识论和认知科学哲学的研究议程。它还将通过公开讲座、“影响”研讨会以及专门的项目网页和博客，与公众和非学术合作伙伴进行接触。

项目成果

Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative

第三人称自我认识、自我解释和叙事

• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3_3
• 发表时间: 2018
• 作者: Adam Carter J

Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory

扩展认知和命题记忆

• DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12157
• 发表时间: 2015
• 期刊: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
• 影响因子: 1.5
• 作者: Adam Carter J

ON TESTIMONY AND TRANSMISSION

关于见证和传播

• DOI: 10.1017/epi.2014.4
• 发表时间: 2014
• 期刊: Episteme
• 作者: Carter J

Group Peer Disagreement

群体同伴分歧

• DOI: 10.1111/rati.12077
• 发表时间: 2014
• 期刊: Ratio
• 影响因子: 0.5
• 作者: Carter J

Epistemic Situationism

认知情境主义

• DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199688234.003.0010
• 发表时间: 2017
• 作者: Carter J