'Epistemic Value, Luck, and Scepticism'

“认知价值、运气和怀疑”

• 批准号: AH/D500494/1
• 负责人: Duncan Pritchard
• 金额: $ 3.15万
• 依托单位: University of Stirling
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2006 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FD500494%2F1
• 关键词: Epistemic; Value; Luck; Scepticism

It is a commonplace in the theory of knowledge (epistemology) that if one genuinely knows then it is not a matter of luck that one's belief is true. A lucky guess, for example, is not knowledge. In our day-to-day lives we often ascribe knowledge to ourselves, and thereby regard ourselves as being able to possess non-lucky true belief. It is this picture of our epistemic standing that is challenged by sceptical arguments. On the standard construal of them, these arguments purport to show that widespread knowledge is impossible on the grounds that where our beliefs are true this is substantively due to luck, despite our conviction to the contrary. According to the sceptic, then, when we believe truly we are not substantially better off, epistemically speaking, than the person who makes a lucky guess.We care about resolving the sceptical problem because knowledge is valuable to us; more valuable than simply having beliefs that are only luckily true. Explaining why knowledge is valuable, however, is notoriously difficult. Suppose we grant that all true belief is instrumentally valuable because it enables us to achieve our goals. While contentious, this claim has some plausibility, since even a true belief about something inconsequential, such as the number of sweets in a jar, could potentially be of use (to enable one to win a prize at a village fair perhaps). It is not clear, however, that the value of knowledge is different in either degree or kind from the value of mere true belief. As the charge goes, so long as one's belief is true, then what does it matter what its epistemic pedigree is? A man who merely truly believes that he is in the best pub in town gets to drink at the same bar as the man who knows that he is. But if knowledge is no more valuable than true belief, then why do we care about the sceptical challenge?The goal of this project is to offer an account of the value of knowledge and in doing so cast light on the sceptical problem. Knowledge, I argue, is indeed of greater value (instrumentally and otherwise) than mere true belief, but this greater degree of value does not account for the importance of resolving sceptical arguments, nor does it captures their enduring appeal. Instead, 1 argue for the provocative thesis that the true focus of scepticism is not on the possibility of knowledge simplifier, as it is usually understood, but rather on the possibility of a particular type of knowledge that is different not only in degree of value from mere true belief, but also different in kind by being of intrinsic value (i.e., its value is not dependent upon something else of value).Furthermore, I maintain that this distinction between knowledge simplifier and a sub-class of knowledge which is intrinsically valuable is mirrored in a parallel distinction between two varieties of epistemic luck; one variety which is incompatible with knowledge simplifier, and one variety which is only incompatible with that sub-class of knowledge which is intrinsically valuable.This way of understanding the sceptical problem has important ramifications for the main anti-sceptical proposals in the contemporary literature. Moreover, since many of these proposals are also advanced as theories of knowledge in their own right, the implications of this approach extend right into mainstream epistemology. This research will result in five full-length articles. Three of these articles are already destined for prominent academic journals and publishers. The remaining two articles will be submitted to world-class philosophy journals.

在知识论（认识论）中，如果一个人真的知道，那么他的信仰是真的就不是运气的问题。例如，一个幸运的猜测不是知识。在我们的日常生活中，我们经常把知识归于自己，从而认为自己能够拥有非幸运的真正信仰。正是这种关于我们认识论地位的图景受到了怀疑论论点的挑战。按照标准的推论，这些论证旨在表明，广泛的知识是不可能的，因为在我们的信念为真的地方，这主要是由于运气，尽管我们的信念与此相反。根据怀疑论者的观点，从认识论上讲，当我们真正相信时，我们并不比侥幸猜中的人好多少，我们关心解决怀疑论问题，因为知识对我们来说是有价值的，比仅仅拥有幸运地为真的信念更有价值。然而，要解释为什么知识是有价值的，是出了名的困难。假设我们承认所有真正的信仰都具有工具价值，因为它使我们能够实现我们的目标。虽然有争议，但这种说法有一定的合理性，因为即使是对一些无关紧要的事情的真实信念，例如罐子里糖果的数量，也可能是有用的（也许可以让一个人在乡村集市上获奖）。然而，知识的价值与纯粹的真正信仰的价值在程度或种类上是否不同，这一点并不清楚。正如指控所说，只要一个人的信念是真的，那么它的认识谱系是什么又有什么关系呢？一个人如果真的相信他在城里最好的酒吧里，他就可以和知道他在的人在同一个酒吧里喝酒。但是，如果知识并不比真正的信仰更有价值，那么我们为什么要关心怀疑论的挑战呢？这个项目的目标是提供一个帐户的知识的价值，并在这样做投光怀疑的问题。我认为，知识确实比纯粹的真正信仰具有更大的价值（工具性的或其他方面的），但这种更大程度的价值并不能说明解决怀疑论论点的重要性，也不能抓住它们的持久吸引力。相反，我认为，怀疑论的真正焦点不是知识的可能性，正如通常所理解的那样，而是一种特定类型的知识的可能性，这种知识不仅在价值程度上不同于纯粹的真正信仰，而且在本质上也不同于内在价值（即，此外，我认为，知识的价值不依赖于其他有价值的东西）。此外，我认为，这种区分知识的验证者和一个子类的知识是内在有价值的反映在一个平行的区分两种类型的认识运气;一种与知识简化器不兼容的变体，还有一个变种只与那个亚种不相容这种理解怀疑论问题的方式对主要的反怀疑论有着重要的影响，当代文学中的怀疑论。此外，由于这些建议中的许多也是作为知识理论本身提出的，这种方法的影响延伸到主流认识论。这项研究将产生五个完整的文章。其中三篇文章已经被指定为著名的学术期刊和出版商。其余两篇文章将提交给世界级哲学期刊。

项目成果

Oxford Handbook of Scepticism

牛津怀疑论手册

• 发表时间: 2007
• 作者: Pritchard, D. H.

Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value

• DOI: 10.1017/s1358246109000046
• 发表时间: 2009-01-01
• 期刊: EPISTEMOLOGY
• 作者: Pritchard, Duncan

Anti-luck epistemology

• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9039-7
• 发表时间: 2007-10-01
• 期刊: SYNTHESE
• 影响因子: 1.5
• 作者: Pritchard, Duncan

The Value of Knowledge

知识的价值

• DOI: 10.5840/harvardreview20091616
• 发表时间: 2009
• 期刊: The Harvard Review of Philosophy
• 作者: Pritchard D

Recent work on epistemic value

最近关于认知价值的工作

• 发表时间: 2007
• 期刊: American Philosophical Quarterly
• 影响因子: 0.8
• 作者: Pritchard D.