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The epistemic innocence of imperfect cognitions

不完美认知的认知纯真

基本信息

批准号：
AH/K003615/1
负责人：
Lisa Bortolotti
金额：
$ 15.16万
依托单位：
University of Birmingham
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Fellowship
财政年份：
2013
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2013 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FK003615%2F1
关键词：
epistemic innocence imperfect cognitions

项目摘要

People diagnosed with psychiatric conditions such as Alzheimer's disease and schizophrenia have delusional beliefs and distorted memories. These symptoms are characterised by obvious epistemic faults. Delusions may be absurd in content and resistant to counterevidence, and autobiographical memories may be wildly inaccurate. I am interested in whether these 'imperfect cognitions' have also epistemic benefits, that is, whether they contribute to the preservation or acquisition of knowledge in the context in which they occur. For instance, one may argue that having a distorted memory of an important autobiographical event for someone with serious memory deficits is better than having no memory at all of that event. Being able to remember something about one's past helps one maintain a sense of self which is instrumental to autonomous thought and action and effective communication with others. In the proposed project my primary aim is to explore a new way of looking at delusional beliefs, distorted memories, and even 'imperfect cognitions' occurring in the non-clinical population, and develop the notion of 'epistemic innocence'. This is the idea that even a false belief, say, may be conducive to knowledge in some circumstances and have epistemic benefits that outweigh its epistemic faults. This notion may change the way we think about epistemic evaluation. Attempting to establish whether a cognition is true or rational is not a simple affair and makes sense when embedded in a context. The same false belief about the past may be epistemically innocent when had by someone with dementia whose memories are fading, and wholly epistemically objectionable when had by someone who has the capacity to reconstruct the memory of the same event more reliably. The development of the notion of epistemic innocence will impact on the philosophy of mind, and in particular on the overlap and differences between 'imperfect cognitions', and on cognitive psychology which is interested in whether the formation process of delusions and distorted memories is continuous with the formation process of non-pathological beliefs and memories. Ultimately, if it can be shown that at least some delusions and distorted memories are epistemically innocent, this will have implications for clinical psychiatry and in particular the management of symptoms of people with dementia and schizophrenia. If a false belief, say, is conducive to knowledge, we may have good reasons not to challenge it.The main research output will be a monograph on epistemic innocence based on three research papers to be prepared during the 12-month Fellowship. In order to obtain feedback on my analysis of the epistemic benefits of imperfect cognitions and to draw the attention of the academic community to the notion of epistemic innocence, I shall host an interdisciplinary two-day workshop in Birmingham half-way through the Fellowship. Papers presented at the workshop will be gathered in an edited collection, and the speakers will be invited to join an interdisciplinary research network on the themes of the project, aimed at promoting further collaborative work. In addition to leading experts in epistemology, philosophy of mind, psychology and psychiatry, I want to engage service users, carers and clinical psychiatrists in the project. They will participate in the workshop, but I also envisage two focus groups to be held after the end of the Fellowship and funded by the University, to encourage a discussion of the possible implications of the project results for clinical practice. Other means of dissemination and knowledge exchange will be a project webpage on the existing University website and a Twitter feed. A post-doctoral research assistant will be hired part-time for 12 months (30%) to help organise the workshop, co-edit the collection of papers with me, and maintain the project webpage and Twitter feed.

被诊断患有阿尔茨海默病和精神分裂症等精神疾病的人有妄想的信念和扭曲的记忆。这些症状的特点是明显的认识性错误。妄想在内容上可能是荒谬的，对反证可能是抵触的，自传体记忆可能非常不准确。我感兴趣的是，这些“不完美的认知”是否也有认知上的好处，也就是说，它们是否有助于在知识发生的背景下保存或获取知识。例如，有人可能会争辩说，对一个有严重记忆缺陷的人来说，对一个重要的自传体事件有扭曲的记忆比完全没有记忆要好。能够记住一个人过去的一些事情有助于保持一种自我意识，这对自主的思想和行动以及与他人的有效沟通都是有用的。在这个提议的项目中，我的主要目标是探索一种新的方法来看待非临床人群中出现的妄想信念、扭曲的记忆，甚至“不完美的认知”，并发展“认知性清白”的概念。这种观点认为，即使是错误的信念，在某些情况下也可能有助于知识，其认识上的好处超过了认识上的错误。这一概念可能会改变我们对认知评价的看法。试图确定一种认知是真实的还是理性的并不是一件简单的事情，当嵌入到上下文中时，它是有意义的。当痴呆症患者的记忆正在褪色时，对过去的错误信念在认识论上可能是无辜的，而当对同一事件有能力更可靠地重建记忆的人拥有时，同样的错误信念在认识论上可能是令人反感的。认知无辜观的发展将对心灵哲学产生影响，特别是对“不完全认知”之间的重叠和差异产生影响，并对认知心理学产生影响，认知心理学关注的是妄想和扭曲记忆的形成过程是否与非病理信念和记忆的形成过程是连续的。最终，如果能够证明至少一些妄想和扭曲的记忆在认识论上是无辜的，这将对临床精神病学产生影响，特别是对痴呆症和精神分裂症患者的症状管理。如果一个错误的信念有助于知识，我们可能有充分的理由不去挑战它。主要的研究成果将是一本关于认识论清白的专著，该专著将在为期12个月的奖学金期间准备三篇研究论文。为了获得对我对不完美认知的认识益处的分析的反馈，并引起学术界对认识清白的概念的关注，我将在伯明翰主持一个为期两天的跨学科研讨会。讲习班上提交的论文将收集在编辑过的文集中，发言者将被邀请加入一个关于该项目主题的跨学科研究网络，旨在促进进一步的协作工作。除了认识论、心智哲学、心理学和精神病学方面的顶尖专家外，我还想让服务使用者、护理人员和临床精神病学家参与到这个项目中来。他们将参加研讨会，但我也预计在奖学金结束后将举行两个由大学资助的重点小组，以鼓励讨论项目成果对临床实践的可能影响。其他传播和知识交流手段将是现有大学网站上的项目网页和推特订阅。将聘用一名博士后研究助理，为期12个月(30%)，帮助组织研讨会，与我共同编辑论文集，并维护项目网页和Twitter订阅。