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Are ownership and authorship of thoughts necessary for intentionality and rationality?

思想的所有权和作者权对于意向性和理性来说是必要的吗？

基本信息

批准号：
AH/G002606/1
负责人：
Lisa Bortolotti
金额：
$ 3.3万
依托单位：
University of Birmingham
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2009
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2009 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FG002606%2F1
关键词：
ownership authorship thoughts necessary intentionality

项目摘要

There is already an extensive philosophical literature on the nature and rationality of delusions, aimed at establishing whether the behaviour of subjects with delusions can be genuinely characterised in intentional terms and what norms ofrationality deluded subjects violate. In this project I will attempt to advance the existing debate by suggesting that in some cases of psychopathology subjects exhibit a failure of self-knowledge, that is, they do not seem to genuinely endorse (and be able to justify with reasons) some of the thoughts that they can access by introspection. Let me offer an example. You tell me that you have just decided to move to Egypt, when I know that you have lived most of your life in the UK, and I ask you: 'Really? How come?' and you reply: 'I don't know. No reason'. This exchange is puzzling because an important decision that is likely to significantly affect someone's life in a variety of ways cannot be supported by any reasons and as a result the interpreter does not know whether the reported intention should be taken seriously. Sometimes this is what happens in delusions: a thought is reported with what appears to be absolute conviction, but no reasons can be given for it, or no reasons that the interpreter can recognise as relevant.In his very influential 'Authority and Estrangement' Richard Moran argues for a connection between reason giving and self-knowledge. He claims that the capacity to justify a belief (or decision) with reasons shows that the subject has some kind of authority over the content of the belief (or decision). My project aims at developing this notion of authority and exploring its links with degrees of self-knowledge and intentionality. Maybe what is puzzling about delusions is that they are not justified with reasons by the people reporting them. This might suggest that subjects with delusions lack some form of authority over the content of the thoughts they report. This breakdown of self-knowledge does not eually affect all delusional subjects and does not affect delusional subjects alone and therefore might not be a promising criterion of demarcation between normal and delusional beliefs. However, importing the notion of authority in the philosophical literature on psychopathology has other important applications. By endorsing reported thoughts an agent forms a conception of herself (e.g. as the person who wants to move to Egypt for, say, a sense of adventure) which guides future action and decision-making (see David Velleman's notion of self-constitution). Gaps in the self-narrative impair this process and affect the exercise of autonomy in thought and action. It is this aspect of the failure of self-knowledge that I want to account for in the project and that could have a contribution to make to current analyses of self-determination, autonomy and moral responsibility.

关于妄想的性质和合理性，已经有大量的哲学文献，旨在确定妄想主体的行为是否可以真正地用意向性术语来描述，以及被妄想主体违反了什么样的理性规范。在这个项目中，我将试图推进现有的辩论，提出在某些情况下，精神病理学的主体表现出自我认识的失败，也就是说，他们似乎并不真正认可（并且能够用理由来证明）他们可以通过内省获得的一些想法。让我举一个例子。你告诉我，你刚刚决定搬到埃及，当我知道你在英国生活了大部分时间，我问你：'真的吗？怎么会这样？”你回答说：“我不知道。没有理由。这种交流令人费解，因为一项可能以各种方式对某人的生活产生重大影响的重要决定无法得到任何理由的支持，因此口译员不知道是否应该认真对待所报告的意图。有时候，这就是错觉的情况：一个想法被报告时似乎是绝对确信的，但却无法给出任何理由，或者解释者无法识别任何相关的理由。理查德·莫兰（Richard Moran）在他非常有影响力的《权威与疏远》（Authority and Estrangement）一书中，论证了给出理由与自我认识之间的联系。他声称，用理由证明一个信念（或决定）的能力表明，主体对信念（或决定）的内容具有某种权威。我的项目旨在发展这种权威的概念，并探索它与自我认识和意向性程度的联系。也许错觉令人困惑的地方在于，报告它们的人没有理由为它们辩护。这可能表明，患有妄想症的受试者对他们报告的思想内容缺乏某种形式的权威。这种自我认识的崩溃并不真正影响所有妄想症受试者，也不单独影响妄想症受试者，因此可能不是区分正常信念和妄想信念的有希望的标准。然而，在精神病理学的哲学文献中引入权威的概念还有其他重要的应用。通过认可报告的想法，一个行动者形成了一个关于自己的概念（例如，作为一个想搬到埃及去冒险的人），这个概念指导着未来的行动和决策（见大卫韦勒曼的自我构成概念）。自我叙述中的空白损害了这一过程，影响了思想和行动自主性的行使。我想在这个项目中解释的正是自我认识失败的这一方面，它可能对当前对自决、自主和道德责任的分析有所贡献。