Persons as Animals: Understanding the Animal Bases of Agency, Perceptual Knowledge and Thought

人类是动物这一事实与我们的自我理解有什么关系？哲学研究经常把注意力集中在我们自身的那些方面，这些方面使人类与其他动物“区别”（或被认为是区别）——例如，语言、理性、道德、自我意识、审美敏感性。然而，近年来，在许多相关领域，人们日益认识到，应该更认真地研究我们与其他动物的“共性”。特别是，似乎越来越明显的是，即使是我们最珍视的能力，我们认为是人类最独特的能力，如自由意志和概念能力，也重要地受到我们作为动物的本性的制约。本研究将探索三个领域，在这些领域中，有理由认为，通过考虑具体的人类力量根植于我们的动物性的方式，可以取得实质性的哲学进步。一个是自由意志和能动性的哲学，我将在这里探讨这样一种观点，即不仅仅是我们人类能动性的行为方式在某些方面可以被视为某种自由的启示。第二个是感知的哲学。长期以来，视觉一直主导着关于感知的哲学讨论；但这种感觉比任何其他感觉都更强调主体与世界的分离。我想考虑更多地关注身体形式的感知的好处，这些感知可以说是更基本的，在动物世界中更普遍，比如本体感觉（对自己身体的感知），动觉感知（对运动的感知）；以及触觉感知，所有这些都倾向于涉及到主体在世界上更大程度的嵌入性。第三个也是最后一个领域是思想哲学。最近令人兴奋的研究表明，推理和思考的结构源于我们身体的细节。我的目标是探索这些发现对我们对我们是什么样的人的概念的影响。总的目标是，通过对这三个特定领域的详细考虑，表明如果我们希望了解我们自己的真相，将我们的人性理解为动物的一种形式，这是多么重要。然而，同样重要的是要避免一种简化的倾向，这种倾向到目前为止经常主导着我们动物本性的讨论。因此，例如，有时有人认为，由于我们“只是”动物，我们必须在驱力和本能、欲望、权力斗争、领土争端等中找到我们的基本动机，从这些角度来理解动物的行为。通过试图展示我们作为动物的一些最独特的人类能力是如何被这一事实塑造的，但对我们来说仍然是独一无二的，我希望提供一种不同的方式来理解坚持人类是动物可能意味着什么。

What is the relevance to our self-understanding of the fact that we human beings are animals? Philosophical enquiry has often focused its attention on those aspects of ourselves which *differentiate* (or are alleged to differentiate) human beings from the other animals - for example, language, rationality, morality, self-consciousness, aesthetic sensibility. In more recent years, however, there has been increasing recognition, in a number of related areas, of the interest to be had in investigations which take more seriously our *commonality* with other animals. In particular, it is coming to seem apparent that even the capacities we cherish most highly, and which we regard as most distinctive of humanity - such as free will and conceptual abilities - are importantly conditioned by our nature as animal beings. This research will explore three areas in which there is reason to think that substantial philosophical progress can be made by considering the ways in which specifically human powers are rooted and grounded in our animality. One is the philosophy of free will and agency, where I shall explore the suggestion that it is not only we human agents that act in ways which can be regarded as in some respects revelatory of a certain freedom. A second is the philosophy of perception. Vision has long dominated philosophical discussions of perception; but it is a sense which emphasises more than any other the separateness of subject from world. I should like to consider the benefits of focusing more on bodily forms of perception which are arguably more fundamental, and more widespread throughout the animal world, such as proprioception (perception of one's own body), kinaesthetic perception (perception of motion); and haptic (touch) perception, all of which tend to involve a much greater degree of embeddedness of the subject in the world. The third and final area is the philosophy of thought. Recent exciting work has suggested that the very structure of reasoning and thinking emerges from the detail of our embodiment. I aim to explore the consequences of these findings for our conception of the sorts of beings we are. The overall aim is to show, via detailed consideration of these three specific areas, how important it is, if we wish to know the truth about ourselves, to understand our humanity as a version of animality. However, it is equally important to avoid a reductive tendency which has thus far often dominated discussion of our animal nature. Thus, for example, it is sometimes suggested that since we are 'just' animals, we must find our basic motivations to be amongst the drives and instincts, lusts, power struggles, territorial disputes, and so on, in terms of which animal behaviour is often understood. By trying to show how some of our most distinctively human capacities are shaped by the fact that we are animals, but remain nevertheless unique to us, I hope to provide a different way of understanding what it might mean to insist that human beings are animals.