Most Unusual Measures: British Approaches to Covert Activity, 1945-68

本研究分析了英国在1945年至1968年间的秘密行动。秘密行动是指一个国家以看似不可否认的方式干预另一个国家的事务，包括通过宣传、准军事和颠覆性的政治活动。与间谍活动不同，它是活跃的，并试图塑造事件本身。这个项目开始于从战争到和平的过渡，结束于1968年英国决定从苏伊士以东撤军；这一年，我们对英国的全球角色有了更现实的评估，也预示着秘密行动的转变，从关注全球转向关注北爱尔兰。该项目的主要产出是一篇专著，将讨论三个广泛的主题：(i)秘密行动揭示了英国的全球角色；（ii）衰落和义务与实力之间日益扩大的差距如何塑造了干预主义；（三）白厅对情报、秘密行动和政策之间关系的理解不断演变。它将论证首相和外交大臣使用秘密行动作为外交政策的工具，并且他们通过SIS这样做，揭示了(a)英国情报人员积极塑造国际关系，(b)秘密行动与核心执行人员联系在一起。为了缩小义务与实力之间的差距，英国制定了一系列谨慎的秘密行动策略，旨在保持影响力。分析将分为三个部分。每个将接近主题和使用定性的历史方法，主要是通过档案在英国和美国。第一部分：转变探索从战争到和平的变化范式如何影响英国人对秘密行动的态度，本节将研究冷战早期发展起来的一些秘密行动策略。其中包括一个雄心勃勃的、短暂的解放战略，以及一种更为保守的“针刺”方法，这种方法试图逐渐削弱苏联的权威。这一部分强调了比历史学家目前所认为的更大的干预，试图重塑白厅早期的冷战政策。第二节：反颠覆以秘密行动为载体，探讨英国维持全球角色的尝试，本节分析决策者如何利用秘密行动克服政治、经济和军事限制。本书探讨了地缘战略背景、经济问题和帝国遗产，探讨了为什么秘密行动在中东、殖民地和英联邦地区如此具有吸引力。它评估了所采用的战略（“反颠覆”），所执行的战术，以及对英美关系的影响。本节还探讨了反颠覆如何强调宣传和政治行动，同时搁置军事参与。它将秘密行动置于外交部和国防部之间更广泛的紧张关系之中。第三部分：“联合”研究了“联合”（SIS和特种部队之间的联络）这一概念的演变，该概念发展于20世纪60年代，至今仍在使用，本节重点关注中东和东南亚。它考虑了政府如何在更大、更准军事的规模上使用秘密行动来实现政策目标，以及它们如何确保在议会和联合国的推诿。现在正是进行这类研究的好时机。首先，这些概念是高度相关的。它们与当前有关英国全球角色以及情报部门在国际事务中的角色的辩论是同义词。其次，最近公布的档案让人们重新思考英国海外政策的做法，并对现有的正统观念提出挑战。奖学金将通过建立新的联系，管理研究助理，组织会议，塑造国际研究议程，帮助我发展我的领导能力，成为英国秘密行动在这一时期最重要的专家。

This fellowship analyses Britain's approach to covert action between 1945 and 1968. Covert action is a state's intervention in the affairs of another in a plausibly deniable manner, including through propaganda, paramilitary, and subversive political activity. Unlike espionage, it is active and seeks to shape events itself. The project begins with the transition from war to peace and ends with Britain's decision to withdraw from East of Suez in 1968; a year which saw steps toward a more realistic appraisal of Britain's global role and heralded a transition in covert action, from a global to a Northern Ireland focus. The project's main output, a monograph, will address three broad themes: (i) what covert action reveals about Britain's perceived global role; (ii) how decline and the growing disparity between obligations and strength shaped interventionism; and (iii) Whitehall's evolving understanding of the relationship between intelligence, covert action and policy.It will argue that Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries used covert action as an instrument of foreign policy and that they did so through SIS, revealing that (a) British intelligence actors actively shaped international relations and (b) covert action was tied to the core executive. Bridging the gap between obligations and strength, Britain developed a series of cautious covert action strategies designed to maintain influence.Analysis will be divided into three sections. Each will be approached thematically and use qualitative historical method, predominantly through archives in the United Kingdom and America. Section I: TransitionExploring how the changing paradigm from war to peace impacted upon British attitudes to covert action, this section will examine a number of covert action strategies developed in the early Cold War. These included an ambitious and short-lived liberation strategy and a more conservative "pinprick" approach, which sought to chip away gradually at Soviet authority. Highlighting greater intervention than historians currently allow, this section seeks to recast Whitehall's early Cold War policy.Section II: Counter-SubversionUsing covert action as a vehicle to explore Britain's attempts to sustain a global role, this section analyses how policymakers used covert action to overcome political, economic, and military constraints. Exploring geo-strategic contexts, economic issues, and imperial legacies, it examines why covert action was so appealing in the Middle East, colonies, and Commonwealth. It assesses the strategy employed ("counter-subversion"), the tactics executed, and the impact upon the Anglo-American relationship. This section also explores how counter-subversion emphasised propaganda and political action, whilst side-lining military involvement. It places covert action within broader tension between the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence. Section III: "Jointery"Examining the evolving concept of "jointery"(liaison between SIS and Special Forces) which developed in the 1960s and remains in place today, this section focuses on the Middle East and South East Asia. It considers how governments used covert action on a larger, more paramilitary, scale to achieve policy goals - and how they ensured deniability in parliament and the United Nations. It is an opportune time to conduct such research. Firstly, these concepts are highly relevant. They are synonymous with current debates about Britain's global role, as well as the role of intelligence in international affairs. Secondly, recent archival releases permit a rethinking of the practice of British overseas policy and a challenge to existing orthodoxies.The fellowship will develop my leadership skills through establishing new contacts, managing a Research Assistant, organising a conference, and shaping the international research agenda, helping me to become the foremost expert on British covert action during this period.