The Development of Character: Attachment Theory and the Moral Psychology of Vice and Virtue

人类的优点和缺点--性格的优点和缺点--50年来一直是道德哲学的核心。但是，尽管亚里士多德甚至提到了美德伦理学的发展维度--正如他所说，"我们从最早的年龄开始形成什么样的习惯是一个非常重要的问题"--但直到今天，它仍然没有得到充分的探索。这本身就是一个重大的理论空白。填补它不仅有望产生新的理解的过程中，邪恶和美德的形成，而且也是什么邪恶和美德，从而重新解决的基本问题，在美德伦理学：邪恶和美德的关系，以适当的发展人性。然而，这种理论上的差距也有可能产生实际后果。在最近的公共政策讨论中，邪恶和美德一直是一个突出的主题，性格教育被认为是早期干预解决社会问题的关键手段。但是，如果我们不了解性格的美德和恶习是如何形成的，我们就不能有效地进行干预，以促进或防止它们的形成。如果我们不理解传统的恶习和美德与那些发展目标之间的关系，这些发展目标显然在早期干预的范围内--比如与照顾者的温暖关系，专注于任务的能力，或者推迟满足的能力--我们就没有办法评估这些干预是否真的在促进美德，或者如果是这样，如何促进美德。拟议中的跨学科研究网络旨在解决上述理论差距，并设计理论工具，以评估早期性格塑造干预措施。它将把从事美德伦理学的道德哲学家与依恋理论（当今发展心理学的主要方法之一）的专家聚集在一起，它在关于性格的公共政策讨论中具有影响力，但尚未得到哲学家的适当认可。它能够承担这两项任务，因为网络的理论和政策目标巧妙地结合在一起。根据依恋理论，依恋倾向是自然选择的产物：依附、追随等引起成年人的依附行为，这有利于生存。个体依恋倾向（安全或不安全）解释了高层次的心理差异-例如，在合作或调节情绪的能力方面。但是，合作和情绪调节美德--这些独特的现代美德--是否值得在哲学中与亚里士多德和（后）基督教目录一起占有一席之地？或者它们是更基本的倾向，可以成为邪恶和美德的基础？合作是有益于社会的，因此，如果像菲利帕·富特所坚持的那样，美德是我们过上特有的物种生活所必需的特质，那么答案似乎是肯定的。但是，合作对于战争和利率欺诈来说是必要的，就像它对于社会有益的活动一样。因此，这个答案对于新亚里士多德美德伦理学的基本主张--美德和罪恶是自然的优点和缺点--是决定性的。评估这种说法是该网络的中心理论目标。但是合作性和情绪调节也是早期干预的典型目标：由于这些特质与安全依恋之间的联系已经建立，如果我们能够促进安全依恋（例如通过教授育儿技巧），我们知道我们可以促进这些特质。但我们是否因此而提倡美德呢？如果这些特征是美德，是的;如果不是，那么要么我们没有促进美德，要么我们正在这样做，但还没有正确地理解为什么。因此，绘制传统美德与依恋理论能够解释的高级心理特征之间的关系，是实现网络理论和实践抱负的一条途径。

Human excellences and defects - the virtues and vices of character - have been central to moral philosophy for fifty years. But though the developmental dimension of virtue ethics is mentioned even by Aristotle - as he says, 'it is a matter of no little importance what sort of habits we form from the earliest age' - it remains underexplored to this day. This is a significant theoretical gap in its own right. Filling it promises to yield new understanding not only of the processes by which vice and virtue are formed, but also of what vice and virtue are, and thus to address afresh the fundamental issue in virtue ethics: the relationship of vice and virtue to the proper development of human nature. However, this theoretical gap is one which also threatens to have practical consequences. Vice and virtue have been a prominent theme in recent public policy discussions, with character education envisaged as a key means by which early years interventions can address social problems. But if we do not understand how virtues and vices of character are formed, we cannot intervene effectively to promote or prevent their formation. And if we do not understand how the traditional vices and virtues relate to those developmental goals which lie more obviously within the reach of early years interventions - like warm relations with caregivers, the ability to focus on a task, or the ability to defer gratification - we have no way of evaluating whether these interventions really are promoting virtue, or if so, how. The proposed interdisciplinary research network aims both to address the theoretical gap identified above, and to devise theoretical tools with which to assess character-building interventions in the early years.It will do so by bringing moral philosophers working in virtue ethics together with experts in attachment theory, one of today's leading approaches in developmental psychology, which has been influential in public policy discussion on character but has yet to gain proper recognition from philosophers.It is able to take on both tasks because the network's theoretical and policy-focused ambitions stitch together neatly.According to attachment theory, attachment dispositions are the product of natural selection: clinging, following and so on evoke caregiving behaviour in adults, which favours survival. And individual attachment dispositions (secure or insecure) explain high-level psychological differences - e.g., in respect of the ability to co-operate or to regulate emotion. But are co-operativeness and emotion-regulation virtues - distinctively modern ones which deserve a place in philosophy alongside the Aristotelian and (post)-Christian catalogue? Or are they more basic dispositions which can underlie vice and virtue alike? Co-operativeness is socially useful, so if - as Philippa Foot maintained - the virtues are the traits necessary for us to lead our characteristic species life, the answer seems to be yes. But co-operation is as necessary for war and interest-rate fraud as it is for socially useful activity. The answer is thus decisive for the fundamental claim of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics - that virtues and vices are natural excellences and defects. To evaluate that claim is the network's central theoretical goal. But co-operativeness and emotion-regulation are also typical goals of early years interventions: because of these traits' well-established links to secure attachment, if we can promote secure attachment (e.g. by teaching parenting skills), we know we can promote those traits. But are we thereby promoting virtue? If these traits are virtues, yes; if not, then either we are not promoting virtue, or we are doing so but do not yet properly understand why. Mapping the relationships between the traditional virtues and the high-level psychological traits attachment theory is in a position to explain is thus a path to fulfilling both the network's theoretical and its practical ambitions.