Optimal Impartial Mechanisms

最优的公正机制

• 批准号: EP/T015187/1
• 负责人: Felix Fischer
• 金额: $ 24.52万
• 依托单位: Queen Mary University of London
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2020 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=EP%2FT015187%2F1
• 关键词: Optimal; Impartial; Mechanisms

In many settings of practical concern a close connection exists between the expertise held within a group of individuals and individuals' selfish interests, which may prevent the expertise from being offered in an impartial way. Examples of this phenomenon can be found in scientific peer review, which is based on the very idea that the quality of scientific work is best judged by peers of the scientist or scientists carrying out the work, in peer grading, where students on a course assess the work of other students and thus relieve pressure on teachers and enable better quality teaching or larger class sizes, and in the appraisal of employee performance, which relies on reports from other employees to make decisions regarding bonus payments or promotions. In all of these examples we are interested in aggregating individuals' impartial assessment concerning other members of the group into a collective judgment, but honest reporting may be compromised by selfish interests: the interest of a scientist to receive funding for scientific work and publish the results of this work, the interest of a student to do well on a course, or the desire of an employee to receive a bonus payment or be promoted. As it is often reasonable to assume that individuals will provide impartial assessments as long as they cannot influence the resulting judgment about themselves, it makes sense to consider what we call impartial mechanisms for aggregating individuals' reports, procedures that select an outcome in such a way that truthful reporting is in each individual's best interest. The mathematical study of impartial mechanisms is part of the area of mechanism design in microeconomic theory, and specializes the larger class of incentive-compatible mechanisms to settings where reports amount to an assessment of the members of a group and the preferences of an individual only concern the collective judgment of that individual. The study of impartial mechanisms is relatively new and only a small literature exists on such mechanisms, specifically for the allocation of a fixed amount of a divisible resource and the selection of a fixed number of individuals. The proposed project sets out to rigorously study optimal impartial mechanisms for a larger class of settings: selection with and without abstentions and with or without intensities, assignment, and ranking. An impartial mechanism is called optimal in this context if among all impartial mechanisms it maximizes the overall quality of the solution. New mathematical insights regarding impartiality will be used to develop new practical mechanisms for real-world problems of peer review, peer grading, and performance appraisal. These mechanisms will be tested and made available to the public as part of a free online service, which will also be used to investigate real-world impartiality requirements and new application areas.

在许多实际关切的情况下，一群人所拥有的专门知识与个人的私利之间存在着密切的联系，这可能会妨碍以公正的方式提供专门知识。这一现象的例子可以在科学同行评议中找到，这种评议所依据的理念是，科学工作的质量最好由科学家或从事这项工作的科学家的同行来评判;在同行评分中，一门课程的学生评估其他学生的工作，从而减轻教师的压力，提高教学质量或扩大班级规模;在对员工业绩的评估中，该公司依靠其他员工的报告来决定奖金支付或晋升。在所有这些例子中，我们感兴趣的是将个人对群体其他成员的公正评价汇总为集体判断，但诚实的报告可能会受到自私利益的损害：一个科学家的兴趣是获得科学工作的资金并发表这项工作的结果，一个学生的兴趣是在一门课程上取得好成绩，或雇员希望获得奖金或晋升的愿望。由于假设个人会提供公正的评估通常是合理的，只要他们不能影响对自己的最终判断，考虑我们所说的汇总个人报告的公正机制是有意义的，这些程序以真实报告符合每个人最佳利益的方式选择结果。对公正机制的数学研究是微观经济学理论中机制设计领域的一部分，它将激励相容机制的大类专门用于报告相当于对群体成员的评估，而个人偏好只涉及个人的集体判断的情况。对公正机制的研究相对较新，关于这种机制的文献很少，特别是关于分配固定数量的可分资源和选择固定数量的个人的文献。拟议的项目开始严格研究更大类别的设置的最佳公正机制：选择有和没有弃权，有或没有强度，分配和排名。在这种情况下，如果在所有公正机制中，公正机制最大限度地提高了解决方案的总体质量，则该机制被称为最佳机制。关于公正性的新的数学见解将用于开发新的实用机制，以解决同行评审、同行评分和绩效评估等现实问题。这些机制将作为免费在线服务的一部分进行测试并向公众提供，该服务还将用于调查现实世界的公正性要求和新的应用领域。

项目成果

Unknown I.I.D. Prophets: Better Bounds, Streaming Algorithms, and a New Impossibility

未知 I.I.D.

• 发表时间: 2021
• 作者: Correa J

Nontruthful Position Auctions Are More Robust to Misspecification

不真实的头寸拍卖更容易出现错误指定

• DOI: 10.1287/moor.2023.1380
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: Mathematics of Operations Research
• 影响因子: 1.7
• 作者: Dütting P

Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection

改进单一提名公正选择的界限

• DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597693
• 发表时间: 2023
• 作者: Cembrano J

Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion

通过迭代删除提供附加保证的公正选择

• DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538294
• 发表时间: 2022
• 作者: Cembrano J

Web and Internet Economics - 18th International Conference, WINE 2022, Troy, NY, USA, December 12-15, 2022, Proceedings

网络和互联网经济学 - 第 18 届国际会议，WINE 2022，美国纽约州特洛伊，2022 年 12 月 12-15 日，会议记录

• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_11
• 发表时间: 2022
• 作者: Cembrano J