A Universalist Philosophy of Mind

普遍主义心灵哲学

• 批准号: EP/X023419/1
• 负责人: Brice Bantegnie
• 金额: $ 34.36万
• 依托单位: University of Southampton
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Fellowship
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2022 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=EP%2FX023419%2F1
• 关键词: Universalist; Philosophy; Mind

Philosophers traditionally distinguish between particulars (entities which can be counted), and universals (entities which are the common natures in which these particulars partake) - contrast, e.g., the table with the property of being gray. The core assumption of philosophy of mind in the analytic tradition is a conception of mental states (e.g. beliefs, emotions) as mental particulars. This assumption has never been argued for. The ambition of UNIPHIMIND is to provide the first full defense of the universalist thesis, according to which mental states are universals or instantiations thereof. It will do so by drawing the full implications of the universalist thesis for philosophy of mind and by tracing the history of the adoption of the particularist assumption, thereby breaking new grounds. The overarching goal of UNIPHIMIND is to show that these implications are deep and far-ranging.

哲学家传统上区分特殊性（可以计数的实体）和普遍性（这些特殊性参与的共同性质的实体）-对比，例如，具有灰色属性的桌子。精神分析哲学的核心假设是将精神状态（如信念、情感）视为精神的具体事物。这一假设从未得到过论证。UNIPHIMIND的目标是为普遍主义命题提供第一个完整的辩护，根据这个命题，精神状态是普遍的或其实例。它将通过描绘普遍主义命题对心灵哲学的全部含义，并通过追溯采用特殊主义假设的历史，从而开辟新的基础来做到这一点。UNIPHIMIND的首要目标是表明这些影响是深刻和广泛的。