A Universalist Philosophy of Mind

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Philosophers traditionally distinguish between particulars (entities which can be counted), and universals (entities which are the common natures in which these particulars partake) - contrast, e.g., the table with the property of being gray. The core assumption of philosophy of mind in the analytic tradition is a conception of mental states (e.g. beliefs, emotions) as mental particulars. This assumption has never been argued for. The ambition of UNIPHIMIND is to provide the first full defense of the universalist thesis, according to which mental states are universals or instantiations thereof. It will do so by drawing the full implications of the universalist thesis for philosophy of mind and by tracing the history of the adoption of the particularist assumption, thereby breaking new grounds. The overarching goal of UNIPHIMIND is to show that these implications are deep and far-ranging.