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Cyber Warfare and Nuclear Strategy: Challenging the Utility of Nuclear Weapons in Global Security

网络战与核战略：挑战核武器在全球安全中的作用

基本信息

批准号：
ES/K008838/1
负责人：
Andrew Futter
金额：
$ 21.21万
依托单位：
University of Leicester
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2013
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2013 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FK008838%2F1
关键词：
Cyber Warfare Nuclear Strategy Challenging

项目摘要

My proposed research seeks to evaluate the challenge to conventional notions of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy posed by the growth of cyber warfare capabilities. While the relevance and utility of nuclear weapons has been increasingly challenged from other angles - such as through the revival of the 'global zero' movement, new technological advances in conventional weaponry and the rise of assymetric warfare - little thought has been given to how the growth in cyber capabilities may actually be eroding deeply held understandings of deterrence and nuclear weapons as the 'ultimate guarantor' of state security. Consequently, as policymakers begin to rethink defence and national security strategy in light of changing global requirements, financial pressures, and political obligations, it is essential that thought be given to how new cyber capabilities may be altering the dynamics which have proved central to international security since 1945.The central objective of this research is to investigate how advances in global cyber capabilities might impact nuclear strategy and the utility of nuclear weapons. In abstract terms, one can already identify four potential areas of complication; (1) the real-time nature of a cyber warfare means that defence planners may no longer have time to organise a response to a cyber attack - consequently it is difficult to see how a system of mutual vulnerability could be instigated to control this, or how the threat of nuclear response could remain credible; (2) cyber capabilities and intentions cannot be easily monitored or verified, therefore it is difficult to judge whether someone is planning an attack - indeed, 'trap doors' and 'logic bombs' may have already been placed inside a nations critical infrastructure, meaning that the ability to respond to an attack has already been compromised; (3) it is difficult to produce guidelines that specify when a cyber attack has taken place, and to distinguish when this may be sufficient to induce a kinetic response (i.e. what level of attack might justify a nuclear retaliation); (4) because preparations for cyber attack may go unnoticed, you can never be entirely sure that your nuclear and defensive systems will work in a time of crisis; they may already have been compromised. The US, UK and NATO all continue to place nuclear weapons and deterrence at the heart of their security strategies; all have recently declared cyber threats to be key security objectives, and all three have been coming under increasing political, economic and normative pressure to rethink their respective nuclear strategies. For each, cyber warfare presents and new and unique security challenge, the implications of which are yet to be fully understood or explored. A key aim of this project is therefore to provide case-specific information about the impact of advances in cyber capabilities for the nuclear weapons postures of each of these governments, and for NATO, while also considering these developments on a more conceptual level. Ultimately therefore the project is designed to be of benefit to national governments and NATO as decisions are made about future resource allocation and security requirements - specifically about the continued role of nuclear weapons - and therefore the role that cyber might play in current debates about nuclear disarmament and 'global nuclear zero' - in addition to driving thinking forward in the informal policy world and in academia.As a result, the time is ripe for a comprehensive assessment of how cyber capabilities are, and might, impact nuclear strategy, and what these potential conceptual challenges to traditional strategic understandings mean for the future utility of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. In doing this, the project has also been designed to establish a starting point for a global debate about the impact of cyber warfare on the future of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy.

我提议的研究旨在评估网络战能力的增长对核武器和核战略的传统概念构成的挑战。虽然核武器的相关性和实用性越来越多地受到来自其他角度的挑战--例如通过“全球零核”运动的复兴，常规武器的新技术进步和不对称战争的兴起，很少有人考虑到网络能力的增长实际上可能会侵蚀人们对威慑和核武器作为国家“最终保障”的深刻理解安全因此，随着决策者开始根据不断变化的全球需求、金融压力和政治义务重新思考国防和国家安全战略，有必要考虑新的网络能力如何改变自1945年以来已被证明是国际安全核心的动态，这项研究的中心目标是调查全球网络能力的进步如何影响核战略和核武器的效用。抽象地说，人们已经可以确定四个潜在的复杂领域：（1）网络战争的实时性意味着国防规划者可能不再有时间组织对网络攻击的反应-因此很难看到如何激发一个相互脆弱的系统来控制这一点，或者如何保持核反应的威胁可信;（2）网络能力和意图不容易监测或核实，因此很难判断是否有人正在策划攻击----事实上，“活板门”和“逻辑炸弹”可能已经被放置在一个国家的关键基础设施内，这意味着应对攻击的能力已经受到损害;（3）很难制定具体说明网络攻击何时发生的指导方针，也很难区分何时这可能足以引发动态反应（即何种程度的攻击可以作为核报复的理由）;（4）由于网络攻击的准备可能会被忽视，你永远无法完全确定你的核武器和防御系统在危机时刻是否能发挥作用;它们可能已经被破坏了。美国、英国和北约都继续将核武器和威慑作为其安全战略的核心;最近都宣布网络威胁是关键的安全目标，这三个国家都面临着越来越大的政治、经济和规范压力，要求它们重新考虑各自的核战略。对每一个国家来说，网络战争都提出了新的和独特的安全挑战，其影响尚未得到充分理解或探讨。因此，该项目的一个主要目的是提供有关网络能力进步对这些政府和北约的核武器态势的影响的具体信息，同时也在更概念化的层面上考虑这些发展。因此，最终该项目的目的是有利于各国政府和北约，因为决定未来的资源分配和安全要求-特别是关于核武器的持续作用-因此，网络可能在当前关于核裁军和“全球核零”的辩论中发挥作用。除了推动非正式政策世界和学术界的思考之外。因此，全面评估网络能力如何以及可能如何影响核战略的时机已经成熟，以及这些对传统战略理解的潜在概念挑战对核武器和核威慑的未来效用意味着什么。在这样做的过程中，该项目还旨在为关于网络战对核武器和核战略未来影响的全球辩论建立一个起点。