London Experimental Workshop

伦敦实验研讨会

• 批准号: ES/L001071/1
• 负责人: Pablo Branas-Garza
• 金额: $ 3.8万
• 依托单位: Middlesex University
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2014 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FL001071%2F1
• 关键词: London; Experimental; Workshop

The proposal is to set up three workshops every year: spring, autumn and winter. Each of them will be devoted to respectively to "Labour markets and virtual organizations", "Tacit and explicit collusion in markets" and "The emergence of social preferences". Each workshop will be held in a different institution (rotating between Middlesex, Queen Mary and Royal Holloway). Including the Opening session, we will have 10 events.Every workshop will host 2 or 3 international speakers. Participants will be drawn mainly from Faculty, Masters and PhD programmes in the participant Universities, other Universities in the UK (mainly in London), selected legal and commercial firms, Government bodies and NGOs.Description of topics:Labor markets (including gender issues) and virtual organizations: Recent literature in labour markets has studied the issue of gift exchange. For example, if workers respond positively when their employers are pleasant and show reciprocal behavior in effort. Another avenue of research connects payoff schemes and performance, that is, if workers are more productive under piece-rate incentives. This innovative research is run in laboratory settings where participants receive real monetary incentives to perform tasks.Tacit and explicit collusion in markets: Advancing our understanding of when cartels form and how they behave is crucial in developing a competition policy. In words, how and when tacit and explicit collusion arises. Although in practical competition policy, there is a significant distinction between explicit (illegal) and tacit collusion (legal) along the economic models, however, there is almost no distinction between these two types of collusion. In this seminar series we plan to foster discussion aimed at understanding when explicit collusion is significantly more profitable than tacit collusion - and thus when illegal cartels are likely to form.Emergence of social preferences: How important is the welfare of others for the individuals? Inequity aversion, redistribution, fairness considerations or pure altruism are crucial keywords for a proper definition of Social Preferences. During the last 20 years, experimental economics has systematically shown that subjects are usually not genuinely selfish but altruistic. Yet several open questions remain regarding how, and under what circumstances, social preferences form. For example, are social preferences determined by nature or nurture? Are children naturally inequity averse? Is the current level of social integration in society relevant to forming social preferences? The aim of this workshop is to facilitate a research discussion that would lead to a better understanding of some of these questions.

建议每年设立春、秋、冬三个讲习班。每个人将分别致力于“劳动力市场和虚拟组织”，“市场中的隐性和显性勾结”和“社会偏好的出现”。每个讲习班将在不同的机构举行（在米德尔塞克斯、玛丽女王和皇家霍洛威之间轮流举行）。包括开幕式在内，我们将举办10场活动。每个研讨会将邀请2至3位国际演讲者。参加者将主要来自参加者大学、联合王国其他大学（主要在伦敦）、选定的法律的和商业公司、政府机构和非政府组织的教授、硕士和博士课程。例如，如果员工积极回应，当他们的雇主是愉快的，并表现出互惠行为的努力。另一种研究方法将报酬方案和绩效联系起来，也就是说，如果工人在计件工资激励下更有生产力。这项创新的研究是在实验室环境中进行的，参与者接受真实的货币激励来执行任务。市场中的隐性和显性共谋：提高我们对卡特尔何时形成及其行为方式的理解，对制定竞争政策至关重要。换句话说，如何以及何时出现了默许和明确的勾结。虽然在实际的竞争政策中，有一个显着的区别之间的明确（非法）和默许（法律的）沿着的经济模式，但是，这两种类型的串通几乎没有区别。在这一系列的研讨会中，我们计划促进讨论，旨在了解什么时候明确的共谋比默许的共谋更有利可图--因此，什么时候可能形成非法卡特尔。社会偏好的出现：他人的福利对个人有多重要？不平等厌恶，再分配，公平考虑或纯粹利他主义是正确定义社会偏好的关键词。在过去的20年里，实验经济学已经系统地表明，实验对象通常不是真正的自私，而是利他主义。然而，关于社会偏好是如何形成的，以及在什么情况下形成的，还有几个悬而未决的问题。例如，社会偏好是由先天还是后天决定的？孩子天生就厌恶不平等吗？目前的社会融合程度与形成社会偏好是否相关？该讲习班的目的是促进研究讨论，从而更好地理解其中一些问题。