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Games between Diversely Sophisticated Players

不同经验的玩家之间的游戏

基本信息

批准号：
ES/L003031/1
负责人：
Ran Spiegler
金额：
$ 25.07万
依托单位：
University College London
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2013
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2013 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FL003031%2F1
关键词：
Games between Diversely Sophisticated Players

项目摘要

Conventional equilibrium analysis of games presumes that all players are rational decision makers with full understanding of the game and the equilibrium behaviour of their opponents. Yet part of what makes strategic interactions interesting is players' limited, often asymmetric ability to understand the game's regularities. Conventional game theory is silent over this important dimension. The last twenty years saw a few attempts to model limited strategic sophistication, in the form of novel "equilibrium concepts" that depart from conventional Nash equilibrium, capturing phenomena such as limited depth of reasoning in one-shot interactions, or naive extrapolation from small, selective or coarse-grained samples drawn from the equilibrium distribution of play. This state of affairs, in which aspects of "boundedly rational expectations" in games are captured by distinct equilibrium concepts, is unsatisfactory. First, it turns modeling bounded rationality in games into a collection of seemingly ad-hoc tools, thus inhibiting economic applications. Second, these aspects should not be viewed as mutually exclusive. They are often artifacts of the feedback players receive when learning the equilibrium, just as conventional informational constraints are not intrinsic personal characteristics but vary from one situation to another. My objective in this project is to formulate a general game-theoretic model that can accommodate many forms of limited strategic sophistication, drawing inspiration from the textbook theory of "games with incomplete information" due to Harsanyi (1967-8). I plan to demonstrate the usefulness of this model with a number of economic applications. If successful, the project can give a major boost to theoretical and applied work on strategic interactions between players with diverse strategic sophistication.

传统的博弈均衡分析假设所有参与者都是理性的决策者，充分理解博弈和对手的均衡行为。然而，让战略互动变得有趣的部分原因是，玩家理解游戏规则的能力有限，而且往往是不对称的。传统的博弈论对这一重要维度保持沉默。在过去的20年里，我们看到了对有限战略复杂性进行建模的一些尝试，其形式是新颖的“均衡概念”，这些概念偏离了传统的纳什均衡，捕捉了一些现象，如一次性互动中有限的推理深度，或者从博弈均衡分布中抽取的小样本、选择性样本或粗粒度样本进行天真的外推。在这种情况下，博弈中的“有限理性预期”被不同的均衡概念所捕获，这是不令人满意的。首先，它将游戏中的有限理性建模变成了一系列看似特别的工具，从而抑制了经济应用。第二，这些方面不应被视为相互排斥的。它们通常是玩家在学习均衡时收到的反馈的人工产物，就像传统的信息约束不是内在的个人特征，而是随着情况的变化而变化。我在这个项目中的目标是制定一个通用的博弈论模型，可以容纳多种形式的有限的战略复杂性，从海萨尼（1967-8）的教科书理论的“不完全信息博弈”的启发。我计划通过一些经济应用来证明这个模型的有用性。如果成功的话，该项目可以大大推动具有不同战略复杂性的参与者之间战略互动的理论和应用工作。