The Taliban's War: The Other Side of the Afghan Conflict, 2001-2015

在2001-02年的一场闪电战中，美国(在英国的支持下)入侵阿富汗，将塔利班赶下了台。从那时起，西方花费了超过1万亿美元和长达十多年的时间与塔利班作战，并试图重建阿富汗国家。尽管如此，叛乱仍未被击败。在解释这种情况时，分析人士主要关注国际和阿富汗努力的不足。缺乏进展被归咎于西方领导和战略的失败，国际社会的傲慢和不一致，阿富汗政府的腐败，以及行动战术上的缺陷。这个项目将从塔利班的角度审视阿富汗战争。通过口述历史，我们将重建塔利班是如何计划、战斗和经历这场战争的。我们将研究塔利班自2001年以来在战略、结构和战术方面的演变。我们将探讨塔利班如何从2004年起在南部和东部重新站稳脚跟，并稳步扩大其在该国北部和西部的存在。最后，我们将评估国际作战部队撤离对塔利班军事行动的影响。总体而言，我们将评估塔利班在冲突中的适应能力以及塔利班复原力的根源。情况极其复杂，政治、压力和个性在当地有很大差异，推动实地冲突的因素很多，塔利班领导层内部各派别之间以及交战各方之间、国际、阿富汗和叛乱分子之间存在着动态的互动。研究小组汇集了三名研究人员，他们在阿富汗和西方对战争的看法方面拥有丰富的实地工作经验和丰富的专业知识。该项目方法已经在ESRC资助的一项试点研究中得到测试，该研究重建了2004-2012年阿富汗南部赫尔曼德省的塔利班运动，采访了53名塔利班指挥官和27名当地长老。该项目将把这项研究扩大到另外8个省，覆盖阿富汗所有地区。选定各省是因为其对塔利班的重要性，并使其能够评估当地动态、神职人员支持、地理位置和其他武装团体对塔利班运动的影响。利用经验丰富的阿富汗实地研究人员，该项目将进行275次访谈；195次采访塔利班指挥官和干部，80次采访当地长老。该项目还借鉴了研究小组自己对国际军事行动和塔利班影子政府的广泛研究，该项目的一个创新特点是，除了研究当前冲突的最后阶段外，它还将寻求通过与塔利班高级领导人接触，积极塑造冲突的结局。这将建立在ESRC资助的与塔利班高级领导人的两组会谈的基础上；2012年7月，探讨塔利班对和解的观点，并将这些观点传达给西方政策制定者；以及2013年3月，探索停火的可能性。该项目将产生四份高质量的出版物；一本书，两篇在领先学术期刊上发表的学术论文，以及一篇在美国领先政策期刊上发表的论文。中期项目调查结果将为西方从2014年年中开始的政策提供参考；今年是关键的一年，西方军队的撤出和阿富汗总统选举为和平谈判带来了进展的潜力，但同样也有可能加剧冲突。最后的项目结果还将使西方军队从这场战争中吸取教训，用于理论和能力发展以及军事教育，并为更广泛的政策界提供信息，用于未来的西方军事干预。

In a lightning war in 2001-02, the United States (with British support) invaded Afghanistan and removed the Taliban from power. Since then, the West has spent over a trillion dollars and well over a decade battling the Taliban and trying to rebuild the Afghan state. Despite this, the insurgency remains undefeated. In explaining this state of affairs, analysts have mostly focused on deficiencies in the international and Afghan effort. Lack of progress has been blamed on the failings of Western leadership and strategy, on the hubris and incoherence of the international community, on Afghan government corruption, and on flaws in the tactical conduct of operations.This project will examine the Afghanistan War from the Taliban perspective. Through oral history, we will reconstruct how the Taliban planned, fought and experienced the war. We will examine the evolution in Taliban strategy, structures and tactics since 2001. We will explore how the Taliban re-established itself in the south and the east from 2004 on, and steadily expanded its presence in the north and the west of the country. Finally, we will assess the impact of the withdrawal of international combat forces on the Taliban military campaign. Overall, we will assess Taliban adaptability in the conflict and the roots of Taliban resilience. The picture is an immensely complex one, with great local variation in the politics, pressures and personalities driving the conflict on the ground, and a dynamic interactions between various factions within the Taliban leadership and between the warring parties, international, Afghan and insurgent. The research team brings together three researchers with extensive in-country fieldwork experience and extensive expertise on Afghan and Western perspectives of the war. The project methodology has been tested in an ESRC-funded pilot study that reconstructed the Taliban campaign in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan from 2004-2012, using interviews with 53 Taliban commanders and 27 local elders.This project will expand that study to eight more provinces, covering all the regions of Afghanistan. Provinces have been selected for their importance to the Taliban, and to enable assessment of variation in terms of the impact of local dynamics, clerical support, geographical location, and other armed groups on the Taliban campaign. Using experienced Afghan field researchers, this project will conduct 275 interviews; 195 with Taliban commanders and cadres and 80 with local elders. The project also draws on the research team's own extensive research on the international military campaign and on Taliban shadow government.An innovative feature of this project is that in addition to studying the closing stages of the current conflict, it will also seek to positively shape the conflict endgame through engagement with senior Taliban leaders. This will build on two sets of ESRC funded talks with senior Taliban leaders; in July 2012 to explore Taliban perspectives on reconciliation and communicate these perspectives to Western policymakers, and in March 2013 to scope out the possibilities for ceasefires. The project will result in four high-quality publications; a book, two scholarly papers in leading academic journals, and an essay in the leading US policy journal. Interim project findings will inform Western policy from mid 2014 onwards; this is a critical year with the withdrawal of Western forces and the Afghan Presidential elections opening up the potential for progress in peace talks but equally the potential for an intensification in the conflict. Final project findings will also inform the learning of lessons from this war by Western militaries for doctrine and capability development and military education, and by wider policy communities for future Western military interventions.