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ESRC SDAI DfE Highlight Notice: The Effects of Teacher Pay Reforms on Teacher Pay, Teacher Careers and Student Attainment (Invited Resubmission)

ESRC SDAI DfE 重点通知：教师薪酬改革对教师薪酬、教师职业和学生成绩的影响（受邀重新提交）

基本信息

批准号：
ES/R00367X/1
负责人：
BILAL NASIM
金额：
$ 19.93万
依托单位：
University College London
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2017
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2017 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FR00367X%2F1
关键词：
ESRC SDAI DfE Highlight Notice

项目摘要

Delivering good education means attracting and incentivising good teachers to perform well and remain in the profession. Ofsted and the National Audit Office (NAO) have highlighted problems recruiting teachers and developing attractive career paths for those entering the profession. Centralised pay determination is deemed part of the problem since it is unable to respond to workers' outside options in local labour markets (Britton and Propper 2016). In 2012 the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB) argued: "The current pay system is rigid, complex and difficult to navigate and does not support schools to recruit the high-quality teachers or leaders" (DfE 2012). It recommended increased flexibility in determining teacher salaries and greater discretion in teacher recruitment and retention. It also recommended linking teacher pay to excellence and performance improvement, with higher rewards and more rapid progression for the most able teachers. The reforms came into effect in 2013 for new teachers and for all in 2014 (STRB, 2013) and provided "maintained" schools with powers Academies already had. There is currently no evidence on its effects on schools, teachers or student attainment. This study will fill this gap in knowledge, and will assess to what degree the reform can help recruit and retain teachers.It is unclear what impact the reforms might have had. First, there is little evidence regarding the value of performance pay (PP) in the public sector. The literature linking PP to increased output via worker sorting and incentive effects relates mainly to for-profit activities. The sorting and incentive effects of PP are less certain for public sector professionals where intrinsic motivation plays an important part in occupational choice and worker effort (Burgess and Metcalfe, 2000). Traditionally teachers have been rewarded through career incentives based on incremental pay progression and promotion (Prendergast, 1999: 10). Schools may wish to stick to "tried and tested" approaches given difficulties appraising the benefits of changing. On the other hand, schools may act in the knowledge that research indicates that the pay of teachers relative to other professions is an important factor in attracting high ability workers to teaching (Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011). More broadly, there is no reason to suspect that efficiency wages should not affect worker effort and labour turnover in public sector occupations just as they do in the private sector.Our study will compare the school-level distribution in teacher pay pre- and post-reforms, and whether this varies by school, teacher and regional characteristics. Using estimates of pay levels under the pre-reform regime to capture counterfactual wages, we will develop statistical tests to identify the schools changing their pay setting behaviour and compare them to those that did not. This classification of schools will allow us to examine the impact of the pay reforms on schools' ability to fill teacher vacancies, on the entry wages of new hires, wage progression among incumbents and teacher mobility within and across schools. We will consider the effects of the pay reforms on teacher retention and investigate whether the pay reforms changed teacher characteristics through effects on those entering and leaving the profession. Finally, we will examine how the pay reforms may have affected average student attainment at the school level.The findings will interest policy makers concerned with the implementation and effects of the teacher pay-reform, academics interested in (de)centralised pay structures and PP in the public sector and educationalists with a focus on teacher labour markets. The results may also affect school leaders' propensity to depart from "tried and tested" pay practices to manage their school's workforce.

提供良好的教育意味着吸引和激励优秀的教师表现出色并留在职业中。英国教育标准局和国家审计署（NAO）强调了招聘教师和为进入该行业的人制定有吸引力的职业道路的问题。集中的薪酬决定被认为是问题的一部分，因为它无法回应工人在当地劳动力市场的外部选择（布里顿和Propper，2016年）。2012年，学校教师审查机构（STRB）认为：“目前的薪酬制度僵化、复杂、难以驾驭，不支持学校招聘高质量的教师或领导”（教育部，2012年）。它建议在确定教师工资方面增加灵活性，在招聘和留用教师方面增加酌处权。它还建议将教师的工资与卓越和业绩改善挂钩，对最有能力的教师给予更高的奖励和更快的晋升。改革于2013年对新教师生效，2014年对所有人生效（STRB，2013年），并为“维持”学校提供了学院已经拥有的权力。目前没有证据表明其对学校、教师或学生成绩的影响。这项研究将填补这一知识空白，并将评估改革在多大程度上有助于招聘和留住教师。首先，很少有证据表明绩效工资在公共部门的价值。通过工人分类和激励效应将生产力与产量增加联系起来的文献主要涉及营利性活动。PP的分类和激励效果是不太确定的公共部门的专业人员，内在动机在职业选择和工人的努力发挥了重要作用（伯吉斯和梅特卡夫，2000年）。传统上，教师的报酬是通过以递增工资和晋升为基础的职业奖励办法获得的（Prendergast，1999年：10）。鉴于难以评估改变的好处，学校不妨坚持“经过试验和测试”的方法。另一方面，学校可能会采取行动，因为研究表明，教师相对于其他职业的薪酬是吸引高能力工作者从事教学的重要因素（Dolton和Marcenaro-Gutierrez，2011年）。更广泛地说，没有理由怀疑效率工资不应该像私营部门那样影响公共部门职业的工人努力和劳动力流动。我们的研究将比较改革前后教师工资的学校水平分布，以及这是否因学校、教师和地区特征而异。使用改革前制度下的薪酬水平估计来捕捉反事实工资，我们将开发统计测试，以确定改变薪酬设置行为的学校，并将它们与没有改变的学校进行比较。对学校的这种分类将使我们能够研究薪酬改革对学校填补教师空缺的能力、新雇员的入职工资、在职人员的工资增长以及学校内部和学校之间的教师流动性的影响。我们将考虑薪酬改革对教师保留的影响，并调查薪酬改革是否通过对进入和离开教师职业的影响改变了教师的特征。最后，我们将研究如何薪酬改革可能会影响学生的平均成绩在学校的水平。调查结果将关注教师薪酬改革的实施和影响的政策制定者，感兴趣的学者（去）集中的薪酬结构和PP在公共部门和教育家，重点是教师劳动力市场。结果也可能影响学校领导倾向于偏离“久经考验”的薪酬做法来管理学校的劳动力。