Rethinking Salafi/Wahhabi transnational and the limits of state power in North Africa

点击翻译按钮获取中文摘要

The relationship between Sunni Islamic fundamentalism - known as 'Salafism' or 'Wahhabism' - and modern politics is Salafis' central dilemma (Meijer 2009): Can they adhere to God's injunctions as the supreme authority and simultaneously acquiesce to the 'secular' political power of the modern state where the rulers do not impose (strict) Islamic law? Scholarship on Salafism largely studies Salafi groups, such as al-Qaeda and the 'Islamic State', who engage in political violence as the principal political grassroots challenge to state authority and security across the Muslim (and non-Muslim) world (Cavatorta and Merone 2015). My doctoral work contested this, however. Instead it argued that the overwhelming majority of Salafis worldwide in fact reject violence and politics as 'corrupt', and focus instead on bottom-up grassroots religious education. My doctoral work argued that scholars of Salafism reduce politics to running for political office and engaging in political violence. They thus dismiss these large numbers of Salafis who reject politics from the academic radar as 'non-political' 'quietists' (see Meijer 2016). In this way, my research asked: Do purportedly 'quietist' Salafis do politics, even when they claim they don't? And if so, how? Bringing political theory and ethnographic fieldwork with Salafis in Morocco, my research responded to this question and challenged extant scholarship. Specifically, it argued that these 'quietist' Salafis in fact do do a politics of drawing difference between their group and other groups and state institutions at the level of key normative concepts in wide circulation: (democratic) politics, protests, and tolerance. Scholars thus miss the nature of a global 'fundamentalist' project focused on challenging the state authority not via revolutionary violence or party politics, but instead through radically reshaping the beliefs and norms of society from below, thus challenging the state's ability to shape citizens in its own image. Through the Fellowship I will disseminate my findings to stakeholders concerned with Islamic and religious fundamentalism. To maximise impact, I will expand my network with academic and non-academic actors and make insights available to the general public through blog posts and a short Woolf Institute/BBC radio podcast. Via the Fellowship, I will develop my track record and contribute to academic debates by publishing my findings. I will also conduct vital preliminary fieldwork in Algeria as part of my second major research project, a first multi-country comparative study of the global vs national drivers of Salafi groups in North Africa. Finally, the Fellowship will help me develop my academic career by participating in career development and applying for subsequent research funding. UoL is the perfect host research organisation for my project. Its 'Knowledge Exchange Office' and The Richardson Institute offer unique opportunities for networking, sharing findings, and collaborating on future research. The Department has deep and frequent policy connections. My mentor Simon Mabon brings world-renowned interdisciplinary expertise on Islamic studies, politics, and political theory to my project via his research and supervision of postdoctoral students. Via weekly meetings, Simon Mabon's extensive experience publishing on Islamic politics in the Middle East and North Africa (Mabon 2015; Johnson and Mabon 2018; Mabon 2019), and Salafi and Islamist movements (Mabon and Royle 2016; Mabon 2017; Mabon and Menshawy 2021) in journals that I'm also targeting will help develop my track record. I chose Simon Mabon because we both believe studying Islamic fundamentalism requires different disciplinary perspectives. With Simon Mabon I will bring Lancaster researchers from different disciplines and faculties working on Islamic fundamentalism to stimulate cross-faculty and -disciplinary collaboration on the topic.