Explaining "Unexplained" Grade Inflation in the UK's Universities

解释英国大学“无法解释的”成绩膨胀

• 批准号: ES/X006883/1
• 负责人: Robertas Zubrickas
• 金额: $ 21.43万
• 依托单位: University of Bath
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2023
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2023 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FX006883%2F1
• 关键词: Explaining; Unexplained; Grade; Inflation; UK

The UK's higher education (HE) sector has recently come under much criticism in public debate and from policymakers over grade inflation. According to the Office for Students (2019), 29% of students obtained a first-class honours degree in 2018, up from 16% in 2011. Comparing this rise with changes in students' prior attainment, the authors conclude that increases in top grades are "unexplained" for three-quarters of universities.The observed grade inflation has coincided with two developments: (i) HE expansion, and (ii) increases in tuition fees. Both developments were Government initiatives to meet growing demand for HE whilst funding it by tuition fee income (HM Treasury, 2013; UCAS, 2013). As a result, the student population increased from 222,430 in 2010/11 to 259,185 in 2017/18, with the tuition fee cap raised to £9,000. The Government also encouraged competition among universities in attracting more students (HM Treasury, 2013, provision 1.202). Consequently, the cause of grade inflation is widely believed to be the artificial lowering of grading standards by universities in competition for students and, thus, tuition income (Turner, 2019). The over 50% increase in 'good' degrees among students with the A-level entry qualifications of DDD or below (Coughlan, 2019) seems impossible to explain by anything but opportunistic grade inflation. This opinion is shared by the Government, which issued stark warnings to universities against "unfair practices" and proposed interventions aimed at restoring the value of grades (Department for Education, 2019).In this project, we contrast this popular explanation for grade inflation with an alternative explanation that recognises the role of lecturers as educators (Zubrickas, 2015). We argue that the cause of grade inflation may lie in the expansion of HE, which brought in more students from the lower end of the ability spectrum (Belfield et al., 2018), while acknowledging that the approach to teaching is not constant but depends on the composition and needs of a class. Lecturers may have made their teaching and, accordingly, grading standards more accessible for more numerous weaker students with implications for grade inflation. These adjustments are not opportunistic and artificial but made for the good cause of facilitating learning.For illustration, consider a lecturer teaching a strong class of students. To challenge them, the lecturer introduces some harder topics and reserves the highest grades for students who coped well with challenging material. Now suppose that the following year the same lecturer teaches a class of lower-ability students. In response to this change, the lecturer scraps harder topics in favour of more accessible topics so that most students are engaged in learning. The outcome of more accessible teaching is coarser grading and, consequently, grade inflation despite the adverse change in class composition. Such an approach pursues learning objectives to enhance the "average" student's knowledge rather than to generate more income.We will empirically test these two competing explanations of grade inflation using data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency. The explanations make different predictions about grade inflation within a university. If grade inflation is driven by university administrations, then it should take place across all the departments of a university. However, if grade inflation is driven by lecturers' adjustments of teaching standards, then it should take place only in those departments that attracted a larger number of less able students. Our findings on the causes of grade inflation will be important for policy responses. If the popular explanation is true, then policymakers need to clamp down on the opportunistic behaviour of universities and implement policies to restore standards. If the alternative explanation finds support, then such a response would be unnecessary and potentially damaging to the sector.

英国的高等教育（HE）部门最近在公共辩论中受到许多批评，并受到政策制定者对分数通胀的批评。根据学生办公室（2019年），29%的学生在2018年获得一等荣誉学位，高于2011年的16%。将这一增长与学生先前成绩的变化进行比较，作者得出结论，对于四分之三的大学来说，最高分数的增长是“无法解释的”。观察到的分数膨胀与两个发展趋势相吻合：（i）高等教育的扩张，以及（ii）学费的上涨。这两项发展都是政府的举措，以满足不断增长的需求，同时通过学费收入为其提供资金（HM财政部，2013; UCAS，2013）。因此，学生人数从2010/11年度的222，430人增加到2017/18年度的259，185人，学费上限提高到9，000英镑。政府还鼓励各大学之间开展竞争，吸引更多的学生（财政部，2013年，第1.202条）。因此，人们普遍认为，分数膨胀的原因是大学为了争夺学生而人为降低评分标准，从而降低学费收入（Turner，2019）。在DDD或以下的A级入学资格的学生中，“好”学位增加了50%以上（考夫兰，2019），除了机会主义的等级膨胀之外，似乎无法解释任何事情。这一观点得到了政府的认同，政府对大学发出了严厉的警告，反对“不公平的做法”，并提出了旨在恢复成绩价值的干预措施（教育部，2019）。在这个项目中，我们将这种流行的成绩膨胀解释与承认讲师作为教育者的另一种解释进行了对比（Zubrickas，2015）。我们认为，成绩膨胀的原因可能在于高等教育的扩张，这带来了更多来自能力谱低端的学生（Belfield等人，2018），同时承认教学方法不是恒定的，而是取决于班级的组成和需求。讲师可能已经使他们的教学，因此，评分标准更容易为更多的弱势学生与等级通货膨胀的影响。这些调整不是机会主义的，也不是人为的，而是为了促进学习而做的。为了挑战他们，讲师介绍了一些更难的话题，并为那些应对挑战性材料的学生保留了最高的分数。现在假设第二年，同一位讲师教一班能力较低的学生。为了应对这种变化，讲师放弃了更难的主题，转而选择更容易理解的主题，以便大多数学生都能参与学习。更容易获得的教学的结果是评分更粗糙，因此，尽管班级组成发生了不利变化，但分数仍在上升。这种方法追求的学习目标是提高“普通”学生的知识，而不是创造更多的收入。我们将使用高等教育统计局的数据对这两种相互竞争的分数膨胀解释进行实证检验。这些解释对大学内部的分数膨胀做出了不同的预测。如果分数膨胀是由大学行政部门推动的，那么它应该发生在大学的所有部门。然而，如果分数膨胀是由讲师对教学标准的调整推动的，那么它应该只发生在那些吸引了大量能力较差学生的系。我们对分数膨胀原因的研究结果对于政策应对非常重要。如果流行的解释是正确的，那么政策制定者需要打击大学的机会主义行为，并实施恢复标准的政策。如果另一种解释得到支持，那么这种反应将是不必要的，并可能对该部门造成损害。