Fichte on Cognition, Knowledge, and Epistemic Value

费希特论认知、知识和认知价值

• 批准号: NE/V02115X/1
• 负责人: Angela Breitenbach
• 金额: $ 0.89万
• 依托单位: University of Cambridge
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2021 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=NE%2FV02115X%2F1
• 关键词: Fichte; Cognition; Knowledge; Epistemic; Value

AHRC : Alexander Hutterer : AH/R012709/1Society and technology today face several information processing challenges. Human lives and digital technology become ever closer intertwined. Hence, we need to become better at understanding our own information processing practices. And we need to become more effective at using technology to aid and supplement our information processing activities. Philosophy plays a key role in explicating the meaning of the most fundamental concepts. Specifically, the sub-discipline of epistemology aims to help us understand what we mean when we say that we "believe," "know," or "understand" something. This can help us both with better understanding our contemporary socio-technological challenges and with finding solutions for them. For instance, one major challenge in the development of artificial intelligence is making it "understandable" to humans. This requires a clear picture of what it means for humans to understand something in the first place. Another example is the spreading of "fake news" via social media. Current solutions for this problem, like fact-checking, are insufficient. Part of the problem with this particular solution is that the implied aim is too ambitious, namely to "prove facts," a goal that even science does not necessarily reach. By better understanding these epistemic aims and practices, philosophy can help with the development of new, more effective solutions to challenges like the "post-truth" problem or AI development.The values and practices of today's science-powered society are frequently thought to stem from the enlightenment period. The enlightenment took place in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and coincided with significant improvements of human life, including the ascent of science and the beginnings of the industrial revolution. It was in the later stages of this period that Immanuel Kant wrote his ground-breaking "Critique of Pure Reason." In anglophone secondary literature on this book, Kant is usually understood as providing a new theory of how and what sort of "a priori knowledge," i.e., knowledge before experience, is attainable for humans. However, several recent papers in Kant scholarship cast doubt on this dominant interpretation. Instead, it is argued, Kant was not talking about knowledge at all. Specifically, he was talking about the German term "Erkenntnis" rather than knowledge. There is no clear translation for the term "Erkenntnis." The goal of my PhD is partly to figure out what precisely Kant meant by "Erkenntnis." If "Erkenntnis" really differs radically from "knowledge," this would radically affect Kant scholarship. Moreover, the implications go beyond the narrow confines of Kant exegesis. To be precise, Kant and his contemporaries seem to have used an entirely different epistemic category, namely "Erkenntnis," in addition to the categories used in philosophy today. Moreover, since Kant deemed "Erkenntnis" to be philosophically more significant than "knowledge," which is at the centre of contemporary epistemology, he quite probably also had different conceptions of the aims of our epistemic practices.During the proposed placement, I aim to find out whether Kant's immediate intellectual successor - the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte - distinguished "Erkenntnis" from knowledge in an analogous way to Kant. Moreover, I intend to find out how Fichte's thoughts about the aims of epistemology differ from Kant's. Finally, I want to explore how Fichte's thoughts on this topic could be applied to both contemporary philosophy and some of society's current information processing challenges. The project will thereby contribute to a better understanding of why knowledge, truth and other epistemic practices are valuable and how we can promote these values. Moreover, it will contribute to filling a crucial gap in research on German Idealism.

AHRC：亚历山大Hutterer：AH/R 012709/1当今的社会和技术面临着几个信息处理的挑战。人类生活和数字技术越来越紧密地交织在一起。因此，我们需要更好地理解我们自己的信息处理实践。我们需要更有效地利用技术来帮助和补充我们的信息处理活动。哲学在解释最基本概念的含义方面起着关键作用。具体来说，认识论的子学科旨在帮助我们理解当我们说我们“相信”，“知道”或“理解”某事时，我们的意思。这可以帮助我们更好地了解我们当代的社会技术挑战，并找到解决方案。例如，人工智能发展中的一个主要挑战是让人类“理解”它。这就需要首先清楚地了解人类理解某些东西意味着什么。另一个例子是通过社交媒体传播“假新闻”。目前解决这一问题的办法，如事实核查，是不够的。这种特殊解决方案的部分问题在于，隐含的目标过于雄心勃勃，即“证明事实”，即使是科学也不一定能达到这个目标。通过更好地理解这些认知目标和实践，哲学可以帮助开发新的，更有效的解决方案，以应对“后真相”问题或人工智能发展等挑战。当今科学驱动的社会的价值观和实践通常被认为源于启蒙时期。启蒙运动发生在十七和十八世纪，与人类生活的重大改善相吻合，包括科学的上升和工业革命的开始。正是在这一时期的后期，伊曼努尔·康德写下了他开创性的《纯粹理性批判》。在关于这本书的英语二级文献中，康德通常被理解为提供了一种关于如何以及什么样的“先验知识”的新理论，即，知识先于经验，是人类可以达到的。然而，康德学术界最近的几篇论文对这种占主导地位的解释提出了质疑。相反，有人认为，康德根本不是在谈论知识。具体来说，他说的是德语术语“Erkenntnis”，而不是知识。“Erkenntnis”一词没有明确的翻译。我攻读博士学位的目的之一就是要弄清楚康德所说的“认识论”究竟是什么意思。如果“认识论”真的与“知识”根本不同，这将从根本上影响康德的学术。此外，其含义超越了康德训诂学的狭隘范围。确切地说，康德和他的同时代人似乎使用了一个完全不同的认识论范畴，即“认识论”，除了今天哲学中使用的范畴之外。此外，由于康德认为“认识论”比“知识”在哲学上更有意义，而“知识”是当代认识论的中心，因此他很可能对我们认识实践的目的也有不同的概念。我的目标是找出康德的直接智力继承者-哲学家约翰戈特利布费希特-区分“Erkenntnis”以类似康德的方式从知识中分离出来。此外，我还试图找出费希特关于认识论目的的思想与康德的不同之处。最后，我想探讨如何费希特的思想在这个话题上可以应用到当代哲学和一些社会的当前信息处理的挑战。因此，该项目将有助于更好地理解为什么知识、真理和其他认识实践是有价值的，以及我们如何能够促进这些价值。此外，它将有助于填补德国唯心主义研究中的一个关键空白。