The Role of Meta-representation in the Meta-cognition of Emotion

元表征在情感元认知中的作用

• 批准号: 1778167
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Manchester
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2016
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2016 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-1778167
• 关键词: Role; Meta; representation; cognition; Emotion

Emotions undoubtedly play an important role in cognition. There is, however, remarkably little consensus within philosophy and psychology about their exact constitution and role within our cognitive architecture. The focus of this thesis is on the cognitive processes by which we attribute affective states (e.g. emotions and moods) to ourselves: for example, how do we recognise, categorise, and evaluate our own happiness or anger when they occur? In addressing this question, this research will develop and defend a new theory of how we monitor and control our own emotions, based on an updated view of 'meta-representation'. This thesis will centre on self-directed meta-representations (representations of our own mental representations) and metacognition of emotion, that is, the monitoring and controlling of one's own emotional thoughts, experiences, and cognitions. However, before deciding how we recognise ouremotions, I must clearly explain what an instance of an emotion might be; how they differ from other affective states, like moods and pains, whether there are discrete categories of emotion, and whether emotion is a form of perception or a form of evaluative judgement, or perhaps some combination of the two. It will investigate these issues with a particular focus on the functional role emotions play within our cognitive architecture.A primary aim of this project is to challenge the claim that, in order to grasp an emotion, our cognitive system must somehow recognise that what is presented is a representation of the emotion. In other words, it is not enough for the cognitive system to grasp 'I am happy about the scholarship'; it must also somehow recognise 'this is a representation of my happiness about the scholarship'. While this position may initially seem a baroque one, there are in fact very persuasive arguments provided for it by the philosopher Peter Carruthers (2011). This thesis will reconsider the concept of 'meta-representation' in light of recent psychological and philosophical research, and consequently, will produce a new theory of 'meta-cognition' of emotion.

毫无疑问，情绪在认知中起着重要的作用。然而，在哲学和心理学中，关于它们在我们认知结构中的确切构成和作用，几乎没有共识。本论文的重点是我们将情感状态（例如情绪和心情）归因于自己的认知过程：例如，我们如何识别，分类和评估我们自己的快乐或愤怒时，他们发生？为了解决这个问题，这项研究将发展和捍卫一个新的理论，我们如何监测和控制自己的情绪，基于更新的观点“元表征”。本论文将集中讨论自我导向的元表征（我们自己的心理表征的表征）和情绪的元认知，即对自己的情绪思想，经验和认知的监控和控制。然而，在决定我们如何识别情感之前，我必须清楚地解释什么是情感的实例;它们与其他情感状态（如情绪和痛苦）有何不同;是否存在离散的情感类别;情感是一种感知形式还是一种评价性判断形式，或者两者的某种组合。它将研究这些问题，特别关注情绪在我们认知结构中的功能作用。这个项目的主要目的是挑战这样一种说法，即为了抓住一种情绪，我们的认知系统必须以某种方式识别所呈现的是情绪的表征。换句话说，认知系统仅仅理解“我对奖学金感到高兴”是不够的;它还必须以某种方式认识到“这是我对奖学金感到高兴的表现”。虽然这一立场最初似乎是巴洛克式的，但实际上哲学家彼得·卡拉瑟斯（Peter Carruthers，2011）为它提供了非常有说服力的论据。本文将结合心理学和哲学的最新研究成果，重新审视“元表征”的概念，并由此提出一种新的情绪“元认知”理论。