THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL STATUS HEARINGS IN DRUG COURT

已经积累了大量证据，支持戒毒治疗法庭的效用和成本效益。 然而，人们对这一干预措施的具体内容知之甚少。 在迄今为止的几乎所有研究中，药物法庭都与标准或增强的试用条件进行了比较，其中客户接受的治疗服务显着减少，尿液分析监测频率显着降低，司法接触显着减少，对违反计划的制裁显着减少。 由于对照组与干预组在许多方面存在差异，因此无法确定哪些因素导致结果差异。 特别重要的是要确定司法地位听证会对毒品法庭的具体贡献，因为这些是干预措施中最昂贵和最耗时的要素。我们建议进行两组，随机评估不同的方法来使用司法地位听证会在轻罪毒品法庭在新城堡县，DE。 在一个条件下的受试者将被安排参加两周一次的司法地位听证会在整个毒品法庭干预的过程中。处于其他情况的受试者不会提前安排参加司法地位听证会;相反，这些被告将受到案件经理的监控，案件经理可能会请求法院举行地位听证会，以应对严重违反规则的行为或处理其他重要事项。 干预条件是以这样一种方式安排的，以公平地反映毒品法庭的当代实践标准。受试者将在基线、治疗期间以及入院后6个月和12个月进行评估，我们还将在入院后24个月内监测刑事司法数据库。 初步分析将比较两组在后续的物质使用，刑事累犯和服务利用，我们将进行成本效益和成本效益分析的两种情况。 其他分析将讨论司法管理的奖励和制裁对治疗后状态的具体影响。据我们所知，这将是第一次随机拆除毒品法庭，以分离其基本成分。 研究结果将揭示管理这种有希望的干预措施的最有效和最具成本效益的手段。

Substantial evidence has accumulated to support the utility and cost-effectiveness of drug treatment courts. Yet, little is known about the operative components of this intervention. In virtually all studies to date, drug court has been compared to standard or enhanced probationary conditions in which clients received significantly less treatment services, significantly less frequent urinalysis monitoring, significantly fewer judicial contacts, and significantly lesser sanctions for program infractions. Because the comparison groups differed from the inter-vention groups on so many dimensions, it is not possible to determine which element(s) is responsible for the dif-ferences in outcomes. It is particularly important to identify the specific contributions of judicial status hearings to drug court, because these are among the most costly and time-consuming elements of the intervention. We propose to conduct a two-group, randomized evaluation of different approaches to the use of judicial status hearings in a misdemeanor drug court in New Castle County, DE. Subjects in one condition will be scheduled to attend bi-weekly judicial status hearings over the course of the entire drug court intervention. Subjects in the other condition will not be scheduled in advance to attend judicial status hearings; rather, those defendants will be monitored by a case manager who may petition the court for a status hearing in response to serious rule infractions or to deal with other important matters. The intervention condition is scheduled in such a manner as to fairly reflect contemporary standards of practice for drug courts. Subjects will be evaluated at baseline, during treatment, and at 6 and 12 months post-admission, and we will also monitor criminal justice databases for 24 months post-admission. Primary analyses will compare the two groups at follow-up on substance use, criminal recidivism, and service utilization, and we will perform cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses of the two conditions. Additional analyses will address the spe-cific effects of judicially administered rewards and sanctions on post- treatment status. To our knowledge, this will be the first randomized effort to dismantle a drug court so as to isolate its essential ingredients. The results will shed light on the most effective and cost-efficient means to administer this promising intervention.