"Unpopular Policies, Electoral Spending, and Undesirable Local Fiscal Outcomes: Evidence from Romanian Austerity

“不受欢迎的政策、选举支出和不良的地方财政结果：来自罗马尼亚紧缩政策的证据

• 批准号: 1964156
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Cambridge
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2017
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2017 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-1964156
• 关键词: Unpopular; Policies; Electoral; Spending; Undesirable

I investigate whether unpopular measures implemented by a central government incentivize electorally-motivated local governments to redistribute public funds from long-term investments to short-run spending. Using constituency-level expenditure data from Romania, I quantify the effects of an austerity policy by which 67 public hospitals were shut-down. I find evidence of a substitution of funds from education and infrastructure investments to residential, as well as cultural, recreational and religious expenditures in governmental areas more strongly impacted by the policy. I find weaker redistributions in opposition constituencies. Further, I find these estimates to be largest in electorally contested areas. The results suggest that undesirable local fiscal redistributions can undermine the effectiveness of unpopular national policies, particularly austerity. The findings can partially explain why such measures often fail to achieve their stated objectives even when implemented with supranational institutional support.

我调查了中央政府实施的不受欢迎的措施是否会激励出于选举动机的地方政府将公共资金从长期投资重新分配到短期支出。我利用罗马尼亚选区层面的支出数据，量化了关闭 67 家公立医院的紧缩政策的影响。我发现有证据表明，受该政策影响更大的政府领域的资金从教育和基础设施投资转向住宅以及文化、娱乐和宗教支出。我发现反对派选区的重新分配较弱。此外，我发现这些估计在有选举争议的地区是最大的。结果表明，不良的地方财政再分配可能会损害不受欢迎的国家政策（尤其是紧缩政策）的有效性。研究结果可以部分解释为什么即使在超国家机构的支持下实施，这些措施也常常无法实现其既定目标。