Trade disputes and quality upgrading in China. Who loses and who gains?
Trade disputes and quality upgrading in China. Who loses and who gains?
批准号:
2202788
负责人:
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
英国
项目类别:
Studentship
财政年份:
2019
资助国家:
英国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2019 至 --
中文摘要
点击翻译按钮获取中文摘要
英文摘要
The trade war triggered by the Trump administration is posing serious risks to the stability of the international trade balance, challenging the capacity of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to provide a clear regulatory ground for the smooth functioning of global trade (Stiglitz, 2018). Among the determinants which revealed the vulnerability of the trade order, China's accession to WTO in 2001 is unambiguously claimed as one of the major disruptive forces. Indeed, the integration within the global trade system and the increasing exposure of western countries to trade with China came with a series of collateral effects. The Chinese'Syndrome, as coined by Autor et al. (2011), describes the US domestic labor market effects as triggered by the rise in import competition. Other main concerns relate to the slow pace at which China is delivering significant changes in its labor market policies and the persistence of its non`trade barriers. The poor performance of multilateral negotiations, while fostering a revival of trade agreements, determined a rise in the use of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)1, characterized by an escalation of investigations against China. Currently, China is involved in 43 cases as respondent party, a third of the total (with most disputes lodged by the EU and US). The intense and disproportionate action against China suggests a strategic behavior of the complainant countries, with the DSB playing an instrumental and prominent role in limiting discretionary trade policies. The current USA's attempt to block the appointment of judges to the DSB may be intended as a way to further undermine, by slowing the DSB activity, the whole Organization.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
海外基金