'Square Peg, Round Hole': Exploring the Evolutionary Relationship Between Climate Change Litigation and the Development of Legal Doctrine

“方钉圆孔”：探索气候变化诉讼与法律主义发展的演进关系

• 批准号: 2242865
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University College London
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2019 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2242865
• 关键词: Square; Peg; Round; Hole; Exploring

This research will explore the ways in which climate change litigation has challenged fundamental structures of legal reasoning in common law jurisdictions. It is a direct response to the conclusions of Fisher, Scotford and Barritt, who have identified the 'disruptive' nature of climate change litigation. For this reason, I believe it is most appropriate to develop this project under the supervision of Professor Scotford. It specifically seeks to apply a constructive interpretivist theory of adjudication to 'climate change' case law in the UK and Australia from 2010 to 2018, to identify the theoretical legal challenges that arise in climate disputes. The overarching aim of this research is to facilitate an understanding of the interaction between climate change and the law that encapsulates the malleability of adjudication, without compromising its stability.Litigants and courts are frequently forced to 'box' climate change grounds into existing legal frameworks, resulting in unprecedented legal disputes, with fewer legal reasoning tools than ordinarily available. An understanding of the implications of this for both present and future legal responses to climate change is fundamental, particularly as the role and use of courts continues to increase in this space. Scholars have sought to define and identify 'typologies' of climate change litigation, or map out 'future pathways' for its development. There is also extensive literature that considers the role of courts in addressing climate change. The purpose of this research is to contribute to this growing body of work, and begin to make 'legal sense' of a problem that does not appear to 'fit' into the constraints of legal reasoning. Dworkin's theory of legal interpretivism may offer an explanation for the role played by courts, which goes beyond mere 'judicial discretion' and does not threaten either the rule of law or democratic principles. It could be argued that climate change litigation presents Dworkin's 'hard cases'; cases where the result may not be dictated by statute or precedent. His assertion that 'judicial decisions in civil cases...characteristically are and should be generated by principle not policy' could therefore offer an effective theoretical framework. Limitations of this are acknowledged; Dworkin's work applies almost exclusively to common law reasoning, which demands adaptation of the theoretical approach during the course of the PhD. It is also acknowledged that Dworkinian theory may not present complete answers to the research question; however, this does not compromise the ability of the research to identify theoretical limitations to adjudicative capacity in climate change litigation.Doctrinal legal analysis of UK case law alone would not provide sufficient sources required for this research. Comparative study will diversify the pool of novel institutional responses available for analysis. Australia is a useful comparator, as its jurisprudence is more plentiful, draws heavily upon principles in its legal reasoning processes and provides for interesting contrast to the administrative review processes more commonly seen in the UK.

这项研究将探讨气候变化诉讼挑战普通法司法管辖区法律的推理的基本结构的方式。这是对费舍尔、斯科特福德和巴里特结论的直接回应，他们已经确定了气候变化诉讼的“破坏性”性质。因此，我认为在Scotford教授的监督下发展这个项目是最合适的。它特别寻求将一种建设性的解释主义裁决理论应用于2010年至2018年英国和澳大利亚的“气候变化”判例法，以确定气候争端中出现的理论法律的挑战。这项研究的首要目标是促进气候变化和法律之间的相互作用，封装的可塑性的裁决，而不损害其stability.Litigants和法院经常被迫'框'气候变化的理由到现有的法律的框架，导致前所未有的法律的纠纷，较少的法律的推理工具比通常可用的理解。理解这一点对当前和未来应对气候变化的法律的影响至关重要，特别是因为法院在这一领域的作用和使用不断增加。学者们试图定义和确定气候变化诉讼的“类型学”，或为其发展绘制“未来路径”。还有大量文献考虑了法院在应对气候变化方面的作用。这项研究的目的是为这一不断增长的工作做出贡献，并开始使“法律的意义”的问题，似乎不“适合”到法律的推理的约束。德沃金的法律的解释主义理论可以为法院所扮演的角色提供一种解释，这种解释超越了单纯的“司法自由裁量权”，并不威胁法治或民主原则。可以说，气候变化诉讼提出了德沃金的“硬案件”;案件的结果可能不是由法规或先例决定的。他断言“民事案件的司法判决...因此，“基本原则是而且应该是由原则而不是政策产生的”可以提供一个有效的理论框架。这是承认的局限性;德沃金的工作几乎完全适用于普通法推理，这需要在博士课程的理论方法的适应。人们也承认，德沃金的理论可能不会提出完整的答案的研究问题，但是，这并不妥协的研究能力，以确定理论的局限性，在气候变化literates.Doctrinal英国判例法的法律的分析单独的裁决能力不会提供足够的资源，本研究所需的。比较研究将使可供分析的新的体制对策库多样化。澳大利亚是一个有用的比较者，因为其判例更为丰富，在其法律的推理过程中大量借鉴了原则，并与英国更常见的行政审查程序形成了有趣的对比。