Puzzles in Philanthropy

慈善事业的难题

• 批准号: 2252530
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Cambridge
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2019 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2252530
• 关键词: Puzzles; Philanthropy

My research attempts to identify and answer three puzzles in philanthropy. The first concerns the odd claim that, insituations in which aiding is supererogatory, it's preferable not to aid than to aid sub-optimally. Current solutions areunappealing insofar as they imply that no aid is truly supererogatory, and it requires all giving, not just obligatory giving,to be optimific (Horton, 2017: 95) or that whether we've already incurred the cost of aiding determines whether we canpermissible aid sub-optimally (McMahan, 2018). The second puzzle concerns the fact that cost-effectiveness seems toimply that we ought to refrain from aiding - for now. We must wait until interventions become cheaper for our use ofcurrent resources to become cost-effective (Moller, 2016). Given that doing so will likely save more lives, a defence ofthe permissibility of aiding now must show that we can permissibly attach less value to the lives of future people. I willattempt to sketch an account of this which is consistent with our common principles of beneficence. The third concerns adilemma inspired by the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda. This dilemma occurs when aid-workers, in providing necessaryaid, enable the wrongful agency of others. There are many factors under which this can occur, for example whether thewrong-doing was required for the distribution of aid or if the wrongdoing pre-existed. I will attempt to isolate these factorsto provide various models of this problem.

我的研究试图找出并回答慈善事业中的三个难题。第一个问题涉及一个奇怪的主张，即在援助是多余的情况下，不援助比次优援助更好。目前的解决方案没有吸引力，因为它们暗示没有援助是真正的多余的，它需要所有的捐赠，而不仅仅是强制性的捐赠，是最优的（Horton, 2017: 95），或者我们是否已经发生了援助的成本决定了我们是否可以允许次优的援助（McMahan, 2018）。第二个谜题涉及这样一个事实：成本效益似乎意味着我们应该暂时避免援助。我们必须等到干预措施变得更便宜，以使我们使用现有资源变得具有成本效益（Moller, 2016）。考虑到这样做可能会挽救更多的生命，为现在允许援助辩护必须表明，我们可以允许对未来人们的生命不那么看重。我将尝试对这一现象作一个与我们普遍的仁慈原则相一致的描述。第三个问题涉及卢旺达人道主义危机所造成的两难困境。当援助人员在提供必要的援助时，使他人的不法行为成为可能时，就会出现这种困境。可能发生这种情况的因素有很多，例如，不当行为是否是分配援助所必需的，或者不当行为是否预先存在。我将尝试分离这些因素，以提供这个问题的各种模型。