The International Balance of Power and Voting Behavior

在牛津大学，我打算调查国际力量平衡的重大转变与民主国家政治生活之间的关系，特别是在选举结果方面。例如，这一领域以前的研究表明，主要的外部冲动(例如，一个新超级大国的崛起，或一个超级大国内部的制度变化)可能会在其他国家引起反应，包括政权更迭。这背后的理论是，政治精英对这些冲击的反应要么是通过模仿(通过复制似乎成功的模式--例如苏联解体和美国成为世界上仅存的超级大国后的民主化浪潮)，要么是通过遏制和压制模仿(例如，对许多西方国家在20世纪20-30年代感觉到的布尔什维克革命威胁的反应)。我的论点是，可以为民主国家的选民提出类似的论点：这些国际冲击的影响应该在选举结果方面显现出来。例如，我的研究想要回答的一个问题是，随着俄罗斯和中国(这两个国家都不是自由民主国家)重新成为超级大国，以及以美国为首的单极全球秩序逐步终结，最近西方民主国家中民族主义和极端主义的激增，我们能否做出部分解释。选民可能会在威权主义中看到一种可以效仿的成功模式(这可能解释了弗拉基米尔·普京在许多西方保守派中的受欢迎程度)，从而支持极端主义和民族主义政党。另一方面，也有理由假设动员起来对抗威权主义和民族主义威胁的选民会做出相反的反应。因此，外部冲击可能导致可量化的结果，如普通选民意识形态的转变或两极分化的加剧。

At Oxford, I intend to investigate the relationship between major shifts in the international balance of power and the political life of democracies, particularly in terms of election outcomes. Previous research in this field has shown, for example, that major external impulses (e.g. the rise of a new superpower, or institutional changes within one) can cause reactions in other countries, including regime changes. The theory behind this is that political elites react to these shocks either through emulation (by reproducing a model that seems successful - e.g. the wave of democratization following the fall of the Soviet Union and the United States' being the only remaining world superpower) or through containment and repression of emulation (e.g. the reactions to the perceived threat of a Bolshevik revolution in many Western countries in the 1920-30s). My contention is that similar arguments could be made for voters in democracies: the effects of these international shocks should be visible in terms of election outcomes. For instance, one question that my research would aim to answer is whether we can partly explain the recent surge of nationalism and extremism in Western democracies with the re-emergence of Russia and China (neither of which is a liberal democracy) as superpowers and the progressive end of a unipolar, U.S.-led global order. Voters might see in authoritarianism a successful model to emulate (which might explain Vladimir Putin's popularity among many Western conservatives), and thus support extremist and nationalist parties. On the other hand, it is also reasonable to hypothesize an opposite reaction by members of the electorate who mobilize to counter the threat of authoritarianism and nationalism. Therefore, external shocks might cause quantifiable outcomes such as shifts in the average voter's ideology or an increase in polarization.