Minimal Mindreading in Great Apes and Young Children

该项目将测试双系统读心假设，该假设认为非人类动物和婴儿的读心能力（将精神状态归因于他人）受到签名限制，这将其与年龄较大的儿童和成人所显示的更复杂的系统区分开来。认知上更复杂的系统可能会处理“信仰本身”，而有限的系统则处理注册--类似信仰的状态，其局限性在于它们无法处理有关身份的命题（这是“信仰本身”所需的）。注册类似于信念，并且可以用于通过信念推理的基准测试-位置变化错误信念任务。位置改变错误信念任务由一个被试观察一个行动者将一个想要的物体放入两个容器中的一个组成。随后，演员离开场景，另一个演员将物体的位置改变到不同的位置，而演员不知道，但主体不知道。当第一个参与者返回时，主体应该指出它期望参与者在哪里寻找对象。重要的是，主语不一定代表行动者的命题信念（即“他们相信对象隐藏在那里”），但也可以通过跟踪行动者和对象的关系来解决任务;换句话说，通过注册行动者与对象的关系。为了揭示在错误信念测试中部署了哪个系统，测试还需要表示在另一个头脑中表示的对象的哪个方面-对象需要改变身份。这种身份改变任务将区分有限读心者和复杂读心者的成功表现：有限读心者将通过位置改变任务，但不能通过身份改变任务;老练的读心者会通过这两项测试。根据一些作者的说法，四岁以下的儿童和非人类动物具有有限的系统，不能代表他人的体表征（这需要一个复杂的系统）。据报道，猿类和幼儿通过了一个内隐的位置变化错误信念任务，在这个任务中，他们的注视行为被记录下来（代替明确的预测，如指向或言语），同样的眼动追踪方法可以用于体视错误信念任务。双系统假说预测，虽然在位置改变任务中取得了成功，但猿和儿童在身份改变任务中应该失败。该项目的总体目标是检验这一假设，并进一步阐明类人猿和幼儿代表他人精神状态的方式，这反过来又更广泛地揭示了他们社会认知的本质。

The project will test the two-system mindreading hypothesis which holds that the mindreading ability (attributing mental states to others) of nonhuman animals and infants is subject to signature limits which set it apart from a more sophisticated system displayed by older children and adults. A cognitively more sophisticated system may process 'beliefs as such' whilst the limited system processes registrations - belief-like states that are limited in that they cannot process propositions about identity (which is required for 'beliefs as such'). Registrations resemble beliefs and either could be used to pass the benchmark test of belief-reasoning - the change-of-location false belief task. The change-of-location false belief task consists of a subject viewing an actor put a desired object in one of two containers. Subsequently, the actor leaves the scene and, unbeknownst to actor but not the subject, another actor changes the location of the object to a different location. When the first actor returns, the subject should indicate where it expects the actor to look for the object. Crucially, the subject is not necessarily representing a propositional belief of the actor (i.e. 'they believe the object to be hidden there') but could also solve the task by tracking the relation of the actor and an object; in other words, by registering the actor's relation to the object. In order to reveal which of the systems is being deployed in a false belief test, the test needs to require representing also under which aspect is an object represented in another's mind - an object needs change identities. This change-of-identity task would tease apart the successful performance of the limited mindreaders from the sophisticated ones: a limited mindreader would pass the change-of-location task but fail the change-of-identity task; the sophisticated mindreader would pass both.According to some authors, children under the age of four and nonhuman animals have a limited system and cannot represent others' aspectual representations (which requires a sophisticated system). Given that apes and young children have been reported to pass an implicit change-of-location false belief task in which their looking behaviour was recorded (in lieu of explicit predictions such as pointing or verbalising), the same eye-tracking methodology can be used with an aspectual false belief task. The two-system hypothesis predicts that, while successful in the change-of-location task, apes and children should fail at a change-of-identity task. The overall aim of this project is to test this hypothesis and further illuminate the way great apes and young children represent the mental states of others, which in turn informs the nature of their social cognition more broadly.