Metacognition and Mindreading: One system or two?

元认知和读心术：一个系统还是两个系统？

• 批准号: ES/M009890/1
• 负责人: David Williams
• 金额: $ 35.51万
• 依托单位: University of Kent
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2015 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FM009890%2F1
• 关键词: Metacognition; Mindreading; system; two

Intuitively, we are aware of our own thoughts in a way that is quite different to the way that we are aware of other people's thoughts; each of us is privileged in knowing only our own thoughts directly, whereas we have to *infer* others' thoughts on the basis of their overt behaviour. The ability to monitor one's own thoughts is termed "metacognition", whereas the ability to monitor others' thoughts is termed "mindreading". The intuitive view of metacognition described above has led some (so-called "two systems" theorists) to claim that distinct psychological mechanisms underpin metacognition and mindreading, and that metacognition is evolutionarily and developmentally prior to mindreading. This claim is disputed by another group of ("one-system") theorists who argue that mindreading and metacognition actually rely on exactly the same core psychological mechanism (despite common intuition), and that metacognition actually emerged as a by-product of the evolutionary need to mind-read others. Two-systems theorists use two potentially powerful arguments to support their view. First, they argue that non-human primates are capable of performing well on tests of metacognition even though such primates show little evidence of mindreading ability. Second, they argue that humans with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show intact metacognitive ability despite impaired mindreading. If these arguments are validated, then this would rule out the one-system view of the relation between mindreading and metacognition. However, one-system theorists have challenged these arguments, claiming that (a) the supposedly metacognitive tasks that non-human primates perform well on do not, in fact, require metacognitive awareness, and (b) people with ASD *do* show metacognitive impairments. There is, however, very little empirical research to decide between these arguments and counter-arguments. Therefore, the aim of our proposed research is to test these theories in a systematic fashion by employing multiple kinds of metacognitive task across two sets of experiments.In the first set of experiments, we will manipulate the demands of metacognitive tasks in systematic ways to establish whether the kinds of task used to test metacognition in non-human primates really do require awareness of one's own thoughts. Neurotypical adults will take part in this set of studies.In the second set of experiments, we will assess metacognitive monitoring among adults with ASD and neurotypical adults who are closely similar to participants with ASD in terms of age and general intelligence. We will use a variety of tasks, including those kinds that are used to test metacognition in non-human primates. Together, these experiments will allow us to decide between the competing theories of the relation between metacognition and mindreading. In addition to supporting theory development, our proposed research will be important in understanding the nature of cognitive functioning in people with ASD. It is striking how little research there is into metacognition in ASD, given that many hundreds of studies that have explored mindreading in this disorder. Indeed, difficulties with such *self*-awareness might explain aspects of the behavioural features of ASD that difficulties with mindreading do not so easily explain (e.g., behavioural inflexibility). Thus, we hope that our proposed research will, in the end, have practical benefits for people with ASD, by informing teaching practices and intervention efforts designed to enhance learning and cognitive-behavioural functioning among people with this disorder.

直觉上，我们意识到自己的想法的方式与我们意识到他人的想法的方式完全不同;我们每个人都有特权直接知道自己的想法，而我们必须根据他们的公开行为来推断他人的想法。监控自己思想的能力被称为“元认知”，而监控他人思想的能力被称为“读心术”。上面描述的元认知的直观观点导致一些（所谓的“两个系统”理论家）声称，不同的心理机制支撑着元认知和读心术，元认知在进化和发展上先于读心术。这一主张受到另一组（“一个系统”）理论家的质疑，他们认为读心术和元认知实际上依赖于完全相同的核心心理机制（尽管有共同的直觉），元认知实际上是进化需要读心术的副产品。双系统理论家使用两个潜在的强有力的论据来支持他们的观点。首先，他们认为非人类灵长类动物能够在元认知测试中表现良好，尽管这些灵长类动物几乎没有表现出读心能力的证据。第二，他们认为患有自闭症谱系障碍（ASD）的人尽管读心能力受损，但仍显示出完整的元认知能力。如果这些论点得到验证，那么这将排除读心术和元认知之间关系的单一系统观点。然而，单系统理论家对这些论点提出了质疑，他们声称：（1）非人类灵长类动物所擅长的所谓元认知任务实际上并不需要元认知意识;（B）自闭症谱系障碍患者确实表现出元认知障碍。然而，很少有实证研究来决定这些论点和反论点。因此，我们提出的研究的目的是在两组实验中采用多种元认知任务来系统地验证这些理论。在第一组实验中，我们将以系统的方式操纵元认知任务的要求，以确定用于测试非人类灵长类动物元认知的任务是否真的需要意识到自己的想法。在第二组实验中，我们将评估ASD成年人和在年龄和一般智力方面与ASD参与者非常相似的神经典型成年人的元认知监测。我们将使用各种各样的任务，包括那些用来测试非人类灵长类动物元认知的任务。总之，这些实验将使我们能够在元认知和读心之间关系的竞争理论之间做出决定。除了支持理论发展外，我们提出的研究对于理解ASD患者认知功能的本质也很重要。令人惊讶的是，关于自闭症患者元认知的研究如此之少，尽管有数百项研究探讨了这种疾病中的读心术。事实上，这种自我意识的困难可能解释了ASD行为特征的某些方面，而读心术的困难并不容易解释（例如，行为能力）。因此，我们希望我们提出的研究最终能为ASD患者带来实际利益，为教学实践和干预工作提供信息，以增强这种疾病患者的学习和认知行为功能。

项目成果

The Questioning Child: Insights from psychology and education.

提问的孩子：心理学和教育的见解。

• 发表时间: 2020
• 作者: Peter Carruthers

Linking metacognition and mindreading: Evidence from autism and dual-task investigations.

• DOI: 10.1037/xge0000878
• 发表时间: 2021-03
• 期刊: Journal of experimental psychology. General
• 作者: Nicholson T;Williams DM;Lind SE;Grainger C;Carruthers P
• 通讯作者: Carruthers P

Comparative metacognition

• DOI: 10.26451/abc.06.04.08.2019
• 发表时间: 2019-11
• 期刊: Animal Behavior and Cognition
• 作者: P. Carruthers;David M Williams

Lind, Sophie E. and Williams, David M. and Grainger, Catherine and Landsiedel, Julia

索菲·E·林德 (Lind) 和大卫·威廉姆斯 (David M.) 以及凯瑟琳·格兰杰 (Grainger) 和朱莉娅·兰西德尔 (Landsiedel)

• 作者: Lind, Sophie E.;Williams, David M.;Grainger, Catherine;Landsiedel, J
• 通讯作者: Landsiedel, J

Interoceptive impairments do not lie at the heart of autism or alexithymia.

• DOI: 10.1037/abn0000370
• 发表时间: 2018-08
• 期刊: Journal of abnormal psychology
• 影响因子: 4.6
• 作者: Nicholson TM;Williams DM;Grainger C;Christensen JF;Calvo-Merino B;Gaigg SB
• 通讯作者: Gaigg SB