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CHILD SUPPORT, CHILD WELFARE & EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM

儿童抚养、儿童福利

基本信息

批准号：
6636878
负责人：
H ELIZABETH PETERS
金额：
$ 35.89万
依托单位：
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
财政年份：
1999
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
1999-04-12 至 2005-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

Two demographic phenomenon that have affected the wellbeing of children in recent decades are 1) the increase in labor force participation rates of mothers with young children, leading to a concern about the quality, cost, and availability of child care, and 2) the increase in divorce rates that has increased the proportion of children who live in single parent families and has contributed to increasing poverty rates for children. This proposal describes two separate projects relating to these issues. The first part of the proposal explores the relationships between child support awards, the non-custodial parent's (NCP) willingness to pay child support, state enforcement efforts, and compliance with the awards. We develop a game-theoretic bargaining model of child support awards and payments that is based on the idea that some NCPs will be willing to pay child support because they care about their children's wellbeing, while others will require government enforcement to insure full compliance. An NCP's willingness to pay will depend on the level of altruism towards his children and on any agreement regarding the level of total expenditures on the children that he can make with his ex-spouse. Thus compliance will be a function of the parent-parent relationship, the parent-child relationship, the minimum award level specified by law, and government enforcement efforts. We use data from the Stanford Child Custody Study and Adolescent Followup and from the National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor Market Behavior of Youth (NLSY) to provide estimates of the level of parental altruism towards their children and the degree to which greater child support payments are due to self-enforcing agreements, higher child support guidelines or greater government enforcement efforts. The second part of this proposal investigates the effect of the Child Care Tax Credit (CCTC) in the U.S. income tax system on the labor supply decisions of mothers with young children and on the choice of child care. We utilize a household production framework to develop a static model of labor supply and child care choice. The CCTC subsidizes both the number of hours of child care purchased and the per hour cost or price of child care. The subsidy rate differs by the income level of the family. We exploit the price variation caused by this structure to estimate the effect of child care costs on women's labor supply and the choice of hourly expenditures on child care. We also examine the distributional impact of the subsidy. Is there a differential impact of the subsidy by the age of the children, the education of the mother, or the socio- economic status of the family? Finally we incorporate several child care programs that are targeted at the low income population. Our estimation methodology allows us to use our results to do simulations of the effects of various policies on labor supply and child care choice. Data from the 1986, 1988, and 1989 waves of the NLSY are used to estimate the model.

影响儿童福祉的两种人口现象近几十年来，1）劳动力参与率的提高有年幼子女的母亲，导致对质量的关注，成本和儿童保育的可用性，以及2）离婚率的增加提高了单身儿童的比例，贫困率上升，孩子本提案描述了两个独立的项目，这些问题建议的第一部分探讨了儿童与支持奖励，非监护父母（NCP）支付孩子的意愿支持、国家执法努力和遵守裁决。我们开发儿童抚养费奖励的博弈论讨价还价模型，基于一些NCP愿意支付的想法的支付子女抚养费，因为他们关心子女的福祉，而有些则要求政府强制执行，以确保完全遵守。一个NCP的支付意愿将取决于利他主义的水平，及其子女的任何协议，他可以和他的前配偶一起为孩子们花钱。因此合规性将是父母关系的一个功能，父母-子女关系，法律规定的最低奖励水平，以及政府执法力度。我们使用来自斯坦福大学儿童的数据监护研究和青少年随访，并从全国纵向青年劳动力市场行为调查，父母对子女的利他主义水平以及哪种更高的子女抚养费是由于自我强制协议，更高的儿童抚养指导方针或更大的政府执法努力。本提案的第二部分调查了儿童护理税收抵免（CCTC）在美国所得税制度中对劳动力供给的影响有年幼子女的母亲的决定和儿童保育的选择。我们利用一个家庭生产框架来开发一个静态模型，劳动力供给和儿童保育选择。中央反腐败委员会补贴购买的儿童保育小时数和儿童保育的每小时费用或价格在乎补贴率因家庭收入水平而异。我们利用这种结构引起的价格变化来估计儿童保育费用对妇女劳动力供给的影响及每小时的托儿费用。我们还研究了分布补贴的影响。补贴的影响是否因孩子的年龄，母亲的教育，或社会- 家庭经济状况？最后，我们将几个儿童保育针对低收入人群的计划。我们的估计这种方法允许我们使用我们的结果来模拟劳动力供给和儿童保育选择的各种政策。的数据 1986年，1988年和1989年的波NLSY被用来估计模型。