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The political economy of fiscal rules and financial markets: when, why, and how does the market enforce rules?

财政规则和金融市场的政治经济学：市场何时、为何以及如何执行规则？

基本信息

批准号：
2285964
负责人：
金额：
--
依托单位：
King's College London
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Studentship
财政年份：
2019
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2019 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2285964
关键词：
political economy fiscal rules financial

项目摘要

Fiscal rules (FRs) were swiftly employed during the greatrecession as a response to procyclical policy. The recentstand-off between the Italian government and the EuropeanCommission over FRs, however, raises serious concernsabout how they are enforced (Khan & Brunsden, 2018). Thisdevelopment is worrying as FRs have been a key post-crisisinstitutional response from international organisations suchas the IMF and European Commission (Frayne, Jaffee, & Riso,2013; Kumar et al., 2009). Recent experiences call intoquestion the validity of key assumptions about theenforceability of FRs, such as the market disciplinehypothesis (Bishop, Damrau, & Miller, 1989) which statesthat markets discipline sovereigns by increasing bond yields.Likewise, it is uncertain if non-democratic countries enjoy thesame benefit as democracies when adopting FRs, or if a7 / 12'democratic advantage' exists (Schultz & Weingast, 2003).My aim is to address a critical debate in the existingliterature about rule enforceability, which is couched in abroader debate about IMF conditionality (Mishkin, 2004;Rodrik, 2000). I will research FRs and financial markets acrossthree dimensions investigating: when and why FRs areadopted, when markets enforce rules, and if markets enforceFRs in non-democracies. The question about ruleenforceability will be addressed through a neoliberalinstitutionalist framework (Keohane, 1989) and will contributewith empirical work on the enforceability of institutions.

财政规则（FR）在大衰退期间被迅速采用，作为对顺周期政策的回应。然而，意大利政府和欧盟委员会最近在FR问题上的僵局引发了人们对如何执行FR的严重担忧（Khan & Brunsden，2018）。这一发展令人担忧，因为FR一直是国际组织（如IMF和欧盟委员会）在危机后的关键机构反应（Frayne，Jaffee，& Riso，2013; Kumar等人，2009年）。最近的经验使人们对关于金融监管可持续性的关键假设的有效性提出了质疑，如市场纪律假说（Bishop，Damrau，&米勒，1989），该理论认为市场通过提高债券收益率来约束主权国家。同样，不确定非民主国家在采用自由汇率时是否享有与民主国家同样的好处，或者是否存在7/ 12的“民主优势”。（Schultz & Weingast，2003）.我的目标是解决现有文献中关于规则可接受性的一个关键性辩论，这一辩论体现在关于国际货币基金组织条件性的更广泛的辩论中（Mishkin，2004;Rodrik，2000）。我将从三个方面研究金融规则和金融市场：何时以及为什么采用金融规则，市场何时执行规则，以及市场是否在非民主国家采用金融规则。关于可统治性的问题将通过一个新自由主义制度主义框架（Keohane，1989）来解决，并将有助于对制度可统治性的实证研究。