The political economy of fiscal rules and financial markets: when, why, and how does the market enforce rules?

作为对顺周期政策的回应，财政规则(FRS)在大衰退期间迅速被采用。然而，意大利政府和欧盟委员会最近在FRS问题上的僵局引发了人们对它们如何执行的严重担忧(Khan&Brunsden，2018)。这一事态发展令人担忧，因为FRS一直是IMF和欧盟委员会等国际组织在危机后的关键制度反应(Frayne，Jaffee&Riso，2013；Kumar等人，2009)。最近的经验让人质疑关于FRS可执行性的关键假设的有效性，例如市场纪律假说(Bishop，Damrau，&Miller，1989)，该假说指出，市场通过增加债券收益率来约束主权国家。同样，不确定非民主国家在采用FRS时是否享有与民主国家相同的好处，或者是否存在7/12‘民主优势’(Schultz&Weingast，2003)。我的目的是解决现有文献中关于规则可执行性的关键辩论，这一辩论在关于IMF条件性的广泛辩论中得到了阐述(Mishkin，2004；Rodrik，2000)。我将从三个方面研究FRS和金融市场：何时以及为什么采用FRS，市场何时执行规则，以及市场是否在非民主国家执行FRS。关于规则可执行性的问题将通过新自由主义制度主义框架(Keohane，1989)来解决，并将有助于关于制度可执行性的实证工作。

Fiscal rules (FRs) were swiftly employed during the greatrecession as a response to procyclical policy. The recentstand-off between the Italian government and the EuropeanCommission over FRs, however, raises serious concernsabout how they are enforced (Khan & Brunsden, 2018). Thisdevelopment is worrying as FRs have been a key post-crisisinstitutional response from international organisations suchas the IMF and European Commission (Frayne, Jaffee, & Riso,2013; Kumar et al., 2009). Recent experiences call intoquestion the validity of key assumptions about theenforceability of FRs, such as the market disciplinehypothesis (Bishop, Damrau, & Miller, 1989) which statesthat markets discipline sovereigns by increasing bond yields.Likewise, it is uncertain if non-democratic countries enjoy thesame benefit as democracies when adopting FRs, or if a7 / 12'democratic advantage' exists (Schultz & Weingast, 2003).My aim is to address a critical debate in the existingliterature about rule enforceability, which is couched in abroader debate about IMF conditionality (Mishkin, 2004;Rodrik, 2000). I will research FRs and financial markets acrossthree dimensions investigating: when and why FRs areadopted, when markets enforce rules, and if markets enforceFRs in non-democracies. The question about ruleenforceability will be addressed through a neoliberalinstitutionalist framework (Keohane, 1989) and will contributewith empirical work on the enforceability of institutions.