Improving Scientific Reproducibility with Applied Philosophy of Science

对研究的可复制性的关注一直引起许多科学学科的研究人员的兴趣，特别是在过去十年中。在心理学中，对低可复制性提出了许多解释。最值得注意的是当前出版标准的问题，它抑制了无效发现的出版，并鼓励使用有问题的研究实践（qrp）。对qrp流行程度的估计表明，它们在心理学中可能非常普遍。然而，研究人员自己，以及独立的法官，通常认为大多数qrp的使用在某些情况下是可以辩护的。一个相关的，迄今为止没有答案的问题是，这些QRP的理由如何适应更广泛的认识论框架，这是许多研究人员实践的基础。qrp的认识论论证问题包含了一个特别值得研究的更广泛主题的一部分：心理学研究人员在多大程度上真正注意到并解释了他们领域中因果推理的困难？有人认为，对适当和定义明确的认识论的坚持不足是社会心理学研究结果可重复性差的一个重要因素。虽然这既有趣又合理，但目前这只不过是一种猜测。因此，我提出了一个项目，该项目将探索缺乏认识论考虑可能阻碍研究可复制性的程度，以及如何改进它。这个项目既新颖又雄心勃勃，因为虽然作者在理论上讨论了如何用科学哲学来改进研究，但这个主题还没有在实验上得到解决。我建议收集研究人员的信念和观点的定性和定量数据，与科学哲学家合作分析逻辑一致性，并应用旨在测试研究实践是否可以改进的随机对照试验中产生的想法。

Concerns about the replicability of research have continued to interest researchers across a number of scientific disciplines, particularly during the last decade. Within psychology, numerous explanations for low replicability have been proposed. Most notable are the problems of current publication standards, which disincentivise the publication of null findings, as well as incentivising the use of questionable research practices (QRPs). Estimates of the prevalence of QRPs have suggested that they may be alarmingly common within psychology. However, researchers themselves, as well as independent judges, often rate the use of most QRPs as defensible in certain situations. One pertinent and hitherto unanswered question is how these QRP justifications fit into the wider epistemological frameworks which underpin the practices of many researchers. The question of epistemic justification for QRPs comprises one part of a wider topic that is particularly deserving of examination: to what extent do psychology researchers actually take note of, and account for, the difficulties of causal inference in their field? It has been suggested that insufficient adherence to an appropriate and well-defined epistemology is an important contributory factor to the poor replicability of findings in social psychology. While both interesting and plausible, this is no more than speculation at present. Consequently, I am proposing a project which will explore the extent to which a lack of epistemological consideration may be hindering the replicability of research, and how it can be improved. This project is both novel and ambitious insofar as, while authors have theoretically discussed how research could be improved with philosophy of science, the topic has yet to be addressed experimentally. I am proposing to collect qualitative and quantitative data on researchers' beliefs and opinions, collaboratively analyse logical consistencies with philosophers of science, and apply the ideas generated in randomised control trials aimed at testing if research practices can be improved.