Clandestine Statecraft: Russian Foreign Policy and Corruption in Europe and Asia

根据数据泄露、调查报告和精英访谈，我的研究着眼于俄罗斯是否以及何时利用腐败网络推进其在欧洲和亚洲的外交政策。在过去的二十年里，对腐败的研究急剧增长。在国际关系（IR）中，这最近导致了对跨国腐败网络的研究。这些人包括金融中介机构和中间人，他们使腐败在现代国际经济中成为可能和有利可图。特别是在对后苏联欧亚大陆的研究中，学者们认为这些网络可能受到地区大国的影响。西方智库和政策制定者经常谴责像俄罗斯和中国这样的国家的腐败“武器化”，这进一步推动了这一点。然而，到目前为止，还没有对这一现象进行彻底的学术处理：它的存在、逻辑和局限性。因此，我的研究旨在确定腐败可能成为一种可行的外交政策工具的条件，以及激励相关行为者的逻辑。在这样做的过程中，我希望为有关腐败的国际层面和俄罗斯外交政策的丰富工作机构作出贡献

Drawing on data leaks, investigative reports, and elite interviews, my research looks at if and when Russia uses corruption networks to advance its foreign policy in Europe and Asia. The study of corruption has grown precipitously over the past two decades. In International Relations (IR), this has recently led to the study of transnational corruption networks. These consist of the financial intermediaries and middle-men that make corruption both possible and profitable in the modern international economy. Particularly in studies of post-Soviet Eurasia, scholars have suggested these networks could come under the influence of regional powers. This is taken further by Western think tanks and policymakers who frequently decry the "weaponization" of corruption by states like Russia and China. Yet, to date, there has been no thorough academic treatment of this phenomenon: its existence, logics, and limits. My research therefore seeks to determine the conditions under which corruption might be a viable foreign policy tool, and the logic motivating the actors involved. In so doing, I hope to contribute to rich bodies of work on the international dimensions of corruption and Russian foreign policy