Clandestine Statecraft: Russian Foreign Policy and Corruption in Europe and Asia

秘密治国之道：俄罗斯外交政策与欧洲和亚洲的腐败

• 批准号: 2426402
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Oxford
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2020 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2426402
• 关键词: Clandestine; Statecraft; Russian; Foreign; Policy

Drawing on data leaks, investigative reports, and elite interviews, my research looks at if and when Russia uses corruption networks to advance its foreign policy in Europe and Asia. The study of corruption has grown precipitously over the past two decades. In International Relations (IR), this has recently led to the study of transnational corruption networks. These consist of the financial intermediaries and middle-men that make corruption both possible and profitable in the modern international economy. Particularly in studies of post-Soviet Eurasia, scholars have suggested these networks could come under the influence of regional powers. This is taken further by Western think tanks and policymakers who frequently decry the "weaponization" of corruption by states like Russia and China. Yet, to date, there has been no thorough academic treatment of this phenomenon: its existence, logics, and limits. My research therefore seeks to determine the conditions under which corruption might be a viable foreign policy tool, and the logic motivating the actors involved. In so doing, I hope to contribute to rich bodies of work on the international dimensions of corruption and Russian foreign policy

根据数据泄露、调查报告和精英访谈，我的研究着眼于俄罗斯是否以及何时利用腐败网络来推进其在欧洲和亚洲的外交政策。在过去的二十年里，对腐败的研究急剧增长。在国际关系中，这导致了最近对跨国腐败网络的研究。这些人包括金融中介和中间人，使腐败在现代国际经济中成为可能并有利可图。特别是在对后苏联欧亚大陆的研究中，学者们认为这些网络可能会受到地区大国的影响。西方智库和政策制定者更是如此，他们经常谴责俄罗斯和中国等国的腐败“武器化”。然而，到目前为止，还没有彻底的学术处理这一现象：它的存在，逻辑和限制。因此，我的研究旨在确定腐败可能成为可行的外交政策工具的条件，以及激励相关行为者的逻辑。通过这样做，我希望为有关腐败和俄罗斯外交政策的国际层面的大量工作做出贡献