If we are not morally responsible, what does this mean for our public and private lives?

说我们永远不应该承担道德责任--在某种意义上说，我们不能真正(或‘基本上’)为我们的行为而受到赞扬或指责(Fischer 2007，Pereom 2014)。实际上，这对我们的公共政策和我们彼此之间的互动意味着什么？迄今为止，哲学家们在很大程度上回避了这个问题。我的项目将正面面对它，在两个领域内调查我们缺乏这一‘基本的沙漠道德责任’的影响。首先是“人际”领域：在日常交往中，我们通过表现出感恩或怨恨等“反应态度”(Strawson 1962)，将彼此视为道德上负责任的人。第二，公共政策领域：具体地说，就是社会奖励“值得表扬的人”、惩罚“不值得指责的人”的政策和制度。为了在这些问题上取得进展，我将编写一份合理的道德责任做法的报告，适用于这两个领域。我预计，这一描述将强调特定的背景和情景条件在决定道德责任的归属是否会导致永远有问题的结果方面所起的作用。我还将探讨我们在非道德领域(最著名的是艺术和体育)的评价性做法如何教会我们如何修改我们的道德赞扬和指责做法。最后，我将起草一套建议，如果对基本的沙漠道德责任持怀疑态度，我们应该如何改革我们在这两个领域的做法。我完全有能力进行这项研究。我拥有哲学学士学位(第一)和全球伦理与人文价值观硕士学位(荣誉)。我在我的MA课上获得了最佳总成绩奖(74分)。在我获得硕士学位后，我担任了地方政府政策和项目管理的职位。这让我对我希望在这项研究中调查的许多政策问题有了独特的见解，并获得了在最后期限内交付复杂项目的经验。我的工作经验也让我对如何将哲学论点有效地转化为公共政策有了更广泛的视角，我将在绘制我的研究的现实适用性时调用这一点。我很高兴找到了一个理想的跨机构监督团队，非常适合我的研究主题。我推荐的诺丁汉主管克里斯·伍达德(Chris Woodard)和阿内斯·韦伯斯特(Aness Webster)是道德责任问题的主要哲学家；伯明翰的尤西·苏卡宁(Jussi Suikkanen)也是如此，他专注于道德责任的元伦理维度。

Say we should never be held morally responsible - in the sense that we cannot truly (or 'basically') deserve praise or blame for our actions (Fischer 2007, Pereboom 2014). What would this mean - practically speaking - for our public policy and for how we interact with one another? To date, philosophers have largely skirted this question. My project will confront it head-on, investigating the implications of our lacking this 'basic desert moral responsibility' within two domains. First, the 'interpersonal' domain: where we treat each other as morally responsible in our everyday interactions through exhibiting 'reactive attitudes' (Strawson 1962) such as gratitude or resentment. Second, the domain of public policy: specifically, those policies and systems whereby society rewards the 'praiseworthy' and punishes the 'blameworthy'.To make progress on these matters I will develop an account of justifiable moral responsibility practices, which has application to both domains. I envisage this account will emphasise the role that particular background, situational conditions play in determining whether ascriptions of moral responsibility lead tomorally problematic outcomes. I will also explore how our appraisive practices in non-moral domains (most notably, art and sports) can teach us how we might amend our practices of moral praising and blaming. Finally I will draw up a set of recommendations for how we ought to reform our practices in bothdomains, if a skeptical approach to basic desert moral responsibility is taken.I am perfectly positioned to undertake this research. I have a BA in Philosophy (First) and an MA in Global Ethics & Human Values (Distinction). I received a prize for best overall grade in my MA class (74). Following my MA, I took up positions in local government policy and project management roles. This hasgiven me a unique insight into many of the policy problems I wish to investigate in this research, as well as experience of delivering complex projects to a deadline. My work experience has also given me a wider perspective on how philosophical argument is translated effectively into public policy, which I willcall upon in drawing out the real-world applicability of my research.I am delighted to have identified a cross-institutional supervisory team which ideally fits my research topic. My proposed supervisors Chris Woodard and Aness Webster at Nottingham are leading philosophers on issues of moral responsibility; likewise Jussi Suikkanen at Birmingham who focuses on the meta-ethical dimensions of the subject.