Trust or Control? Mid-level bureaucratic dynamics and the quality of education provision in India's Districts

信任还是控制？

• 批准号: 2480088
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: London School of Economics and Political Science
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2020 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2480088
• 关键词: Trust; Control; Mid; level; bureaucratic

Summary (no more than 500 words) How can public service quality be improved in developing countries? Is tighter control or more autonomy and trust conducive to service quality? Difficult-to-monitor tasks, i.e. thick tasks that are "implementation intensive" (Pritchett, 2014) and not solely logistical, pose a challenge to efforts preventing bureaucrats from shirking and require different accountability systems than thin tasks (Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, 2017). Those following the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm and its variations argue for quantitative targets, monetary incentives, close surveillance and easier exit by creating private options (Fukuyama, 2013). Those questioning this paradigm point out the successes of bureaucracies where bureaucrats are using informal channels in the public interest, do not shirk even when not watched and show a high esprit de corps despite a lack of monetary incentives. In the field of education, there has been a shift in recent years away from the quantity of schools built towards how much children learn. Thus, the focus of analysis has moved from thin tasks that are easy to observe and monitor (e.g. has a school been built?) to thick tasks that are difficult to monitor (e.g. do one hundred thousand teachers distributed across twenty thousand primary schools engage children in learning?). Preliminary research questions include:1. Is local embeddedness of District-level bureaucrats conducive to the quality of school education? 2. Does exposure to high-quality District bureaucracies influence the performance of bureaucrats in later postings? 3. Where positive outliers exist, which approach better explains the processes by which they came to be or operate? The following working hypotheses will be tested:1. Local embeddedness is conducive to bureaucratic performance and even more crucial for thick tasks than thin tasks 2. Exposure to high-quality bureaucracies changes bureaucrats' preferences for a limited amount of time 3. Hidden positive outliers can better be explained by autonomy and trust rather than tighter control The proposed PhD aims to answer whether control or trust and autonomy are conducive to the quality of education by analyzing panel data on several hundred of India's Districts. It aims to contribute to the larger debate on reforming public services to ensure that citizens get their rights fulfilled. To do so, a mixed methods approach will be used that includes large-N statistical analyses as well as in-depth qualitative work.

摘要（不超过500字）如何提高发展中国家的公共服务质量？更严格的控制或更多的自主权和信任有利于服务质量？难以监测的任务，即“执行密集型”的厚任务（Pritchett，2014），而不仅仅是后勤，对防止官僚偷懒的努力构成了挑战，需要与薄任务不同的问责制度（Andrews，Pritchett和Woolcock，2017）。那些遵循新公共管理范式及其变体的人主张量化目标、货币激励、密切监督和通过创造私人选择更容易退出（Fukuyama，2013）。那些质疑这一范式的人指出，官僚机构的成功之处在于，官僚们利用非正式渠道为公众利益服务，即使没有人监督，也不推卸责任，尽管缺乏金钱激励，但仍表现出高度的敬业精神。在教育领域，近年来出现了一种转变，即从学校的数量转向儿童学习的程度。因此，分析的重点已经从容易观察和监测的细任务（例如，学校是否已建成？）到难以监控的繁重任务（例如，分布在两万所小学的十万名教师是否让儿童参与学习？）。初步研究问题包括：1。区级官僚的地方嵌入性是否有利于学校教育质量？2.接触高质量的地区官僚机构是否会影响官僚在以后的职位上的表现？3.在存在正异常值的情况下，哪种方法更好地解释了它们形成或运作的过程？以下工作假设将被测试：1。本地嵌入有利于官僚绩效，甚至对厚任务比薄任务更重要2。接触高质量的官僚机构会在有限的时间内改变官僚的偏好。隐藏的积极离群值可以更好地解释自主权和信任，而不是更严格的控制拟议博士学位的目的是回答是否控制或信任和自主权是有利于通过分析面板数据对印度的几百个地区的教育质量。它旨在促进关于改革公共服务的更广泛辩论，以确保公民实现其权利。为此，将使用混合方法，包括大N统计分析以及深入的定性工作。