Kantian Propositional Attitudesand Doxastic Norms

康德命题态度与信念规范

• 批准号: 2487717
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Cambridge
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2020 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2487717
• 关键词: Kantian; Propositional; Attitudesand; Doxastic; Norms

Famously, Kant attributed great significance to his proclaimed achievement of making'room for faith' (or "Belief"). There's recently been a surge in interest in Kant's notion of Belief and other propositional attitudes. This interest is partly being justified by the putative relevance of Kant's doxastic theory for contemporary epistemology. This is because Belief, for Kant, is a firmly held positive propositional attitude that is not entertained for epistemic reasons; it does not and cannot constitute knowledge.So, one might think Belief could be of use in contemporary debates about, for example,non-evidential belief.This debate concerns whether beliefs can or should be held for non-truth-promoting and non-fact-based reasons. For instance, one might think that a cancer patient has good reasons to believe that they will be cured if this belief increased their chances of survival,even though their actual chances of survival are minimal.Given that Kant's notion of belief involves an analogous set of justificatory norms, it could be relevant for debates of this kind. Yet,the suggested contemporary relevancy of Kant's doxastic theory has so far remained a conjectural promise and available scholarship is still largely exegetical. Moreover, there are competing interpretive taxonomies of Kant's doxastic theory6anda systematic comparative analysis of them is missing.My current thesis has two components. First, most commentators neglect the degree to which Kant's doxastic theory presupposes a commitment to transcendental idealism, for instance to "things in themselves". To exemplify,I think that Belief requires the noumenal possibility of its object, i.e., possibility as a relation of things in themselves. So, Kant's account seems to me quite deeply entangled in his transcendental idealism.Second, an alternative taxonomy to those currently proposed is needed. Most available readings take epistemic sufficiency as the primary basis for differentiating types of belief. By contrast, I think Kant's requirements are better met by first differentiating doxastic reference-frameworks. These frameworks are sets of doxastic norms and differentiated by the type of purpose a subject is aiming for(e.g.: moral vs theoretical). And different contents (instead of types of)of propositional attitudes are permissible for different reference-frameworks. That is, I think that the norms for entertaining a propositional attitude depend not so much on the type of propositional attitude(as currently suggested in the secondary literature) but instead on the type of purpose a subject is pursuing.If my thesis is correct,a completely new account of Kant's theory on propositional attitudes and doxastic norms is required. Moreover, even if currently available accounts turn out to be largely correct, they would still fail to account for its entanglement in transcendental idealism. But surely, if Kant's account is to carry any import for contemporary debates, a more neutral "Kantian" taxonomy of propositional attitudes is needed. I intend to develop such an account and to apply it to some problems in contemporary epistemology, such as non-evidential belief,peer disagreement, or doxastic voluntarism.8Accordingly, the project has the following aims:(1)Development of a new account of Kant's doxastic theory.(2)Defence of a Kantian doxastic theory that does not presuppose strong commitments to transcendental idealism.(3)Application of the Kantian account to a selection of contemporary issues in epistemology.The proposed project should at the very least clarify whether Kant's account, or at least a derivative of it, can indeed be of contemporary relevance. Ideally, it would result in insightful new contributions to questions about the nature of belief and other attitudes and the norms that govern them

著名的是，康德将他所宣称的为信仰腾出空间的成就(或称“信仰”)赋予了巨大的意义。最近，人们对康德的信仰概念和其他命题态度的兴趣激增。这种兴趣在一定程度上是由康德的道克斯主义理论与当代认识论的假定相关性所证明的。这是因为，对于康德来说，信仰是一种坚定的积极命题态度，不会因为认识的原因而受到娱乐；它不构成也不能构成知识。因此，有人可能会认为信仰在当代关于非证据信仰的辩论中是有用的。这场辩论涉及的是信仰是否可以或应该出于不促进真理和不基于事实的原因而持有。例如，有人可能认为，癌症患者有很好的理由相信，如果这种信念增加了他们的生存机会，他们就会被治愈，尽管他们实际生存的机会很小。鉴于康德的信念概念包含一套类似的正当性规范，它可能与这类辩论有关。然而，到目前为止，康德的道克斯主义理论所提出的当代相关性仍然是一种猜想的承诺，现有的学术仍然在很大程度上是训诫。此外，康德的道克斯主义理论存在着相互竞争的解释性分类，缺乏对它们的系统的比较分析。首先，大多数评论家忽视了康德的道克斯主义理论在多大程度上预设了对先验唯心主义的承诺，例如对“事物本身”的承诺。作为例证，我认为信仰需要其对象的本体可能性，即可能性作为事物本身的一种关系。因此，在我看来，康德的描述似乎深深地纠缠在他的先验理想主义中。第二，需要一种替代目前提出的分类法。大多数现有的读物都将认知充分性作为区分信仰类型的主要基础。相比之下，我认为首先区分道克斯主义的参照框架能更好地满足康德的要求。这些框架是道教规范的集合，并根据主体目标的类型(例如：道德与理论)进行区分。不同的参照框架允许不同的命题态度内容(而不是类型)。也就是说，我认为，对待命题态度的标准与其说是取决于命题态度的类型(如目前在次要文献中所建议的)，不如说是取决于主体所追求的目的类型。如果我的论点是正确的，那么就需要对康德关于命题态度和道教规范的理论进行全新的解释。此外，即使目前可用的描述被证明在很大程度上是正确的，它们仍然无法解释它与先验理想主义的纠缠。但可以肯定的是，如果康德的叙述对当代的辩论有任何重要意义，就需要对命题态度进行更中立的“康德”分类。8因此，这个项目有以下目的：(1)对康德的道教理论进行新的解释；(2)为康德的道教理论辩护；(3)将康德的解释应用于认识论中的一系列当代问题。提出的项目至少应该澄清康德的解释，或者至少是它的一个派生，是否真的具有当代意义。理想情况下，这将导致对信仰和其他态度的性质以及支配它们的规范的问题做出有洞察力的新贡献